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THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER GRAB IN ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V. 
SHELBY AND THE JUDICIARY’S AUTHORITY IN CHILD-WELFARE 
CASES 
Jerald A. Sharum* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Shelby, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that a circuit court acting as a juvenile court had suffi-
cient authority over the internal staffing operations of the Arkansas Depart-
ment of Human Services (“the Department”) to “fix” a problem identified 
by a court that has the effect of coercing the Department to reduce a case-
worker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations1 
in child-welfare proceedings (“Shelby-style order”).2 A bare majority of the 
Court3 based this authority on the majority’s assertion of a broad jurisdiction 
vested in circuit courts over juvenile matters that includes the specific pow-
ers granted to circuit courts by the Arkansas Juvenile Code as well as a cir-
cuit court’s common law jurisdiction over minors in equity and a circuit 
 
 *  Adjunct Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law, and Attorney for the 
Arkansas Department of Human Services. 
 1. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, 
at *3–5 (affirming a circuit court’s order to “rectify” a caseworker’s caseload based on the 
circuit court’s “jurisdiction to protect minor[,] . . . assure that the necessary services are being 
delivered[, and] . . . control and protect the integrity of the proceedings and the rights of the 
litigants”). 
 2. Child-welfare proceedings are specialized cases prescribed under the Arkansas Ju-
venile Code that address the abuse, neglect, and dependency of juveniles that arise from the 
acts or omissions of a given juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker, as well as 
issues related to the state’s protective custody of minors in such circumstances. E.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-303(18)(A) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-
306(a)(1)(B)–(C) (Supp. 2013). This article focuses on these proceedings, specifically those 
where a juvenile has been removed from the custody of a parent and placed in an out-of-
home placement due to the acts or omissions of that parent. Practitioners in Arkansas and 
elsewhere also commonly refer to child-welfare proceedings as dependency-neglect cases, in 
part to differentiate such cases from delinquency and family-in-need-of-services cases, which 
are other kinds of child-welfare proceedings that deal with the different elements of a child’s 
welfare. Although this article does not address these other cases per se, the principles and 
conclusions set out in this article likely apply similarly to those kinds of cases. 
 3. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Jim Hannah and joined by Justic-
es Karen Baker, Jim Gunter, and Courtney Hudson Goodson. The dissent was written by 
Justice Paul E. Danielson and joined by Justices Donald L. Corbin and Robert L. Brown. See 
Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 1, 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *1, *5. 
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court’s “inherent authority” to protect the integrity of its proceedings and 
safeguard litigants appearing before it (“the Inherent Protection Power”).4 
This article terms these broad assertions of authority—along with their un-
derlying jurisdictional bases—the Shelby Doctrine.5 
The Shelby Doctrine, however, is wrong. Arkansas courts do not have 
the authority to enter Shelby-style orders or otherwise direct the internal 
operations of any state executive agency, including the Department in child-
welfare cases like Shelby, nor do any of Arkansas’s courts have the broad 
jurisdiction and authority related to juveniles and all types of litigants that 
the Shelby Doctrine suggests. More specifically, the Shelby Doctrine is 
wrong because the authority asserted in Shelby exceeds the jurisdiction al-
lowed to the judiciary by the Arkansas Constitution. First, the Shelby Doc-
trine violates Amendment 67 because it asserts that circuit courts have juris-
diction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not provided 
by law and assumes authority outside the limited jurisdiction provided under 
the juvenile code to courts in child-welfare proceedings.6 Second, the Shelby 
Doctrine authorizes circuit courts to compel the Department to act in viola-
tion of the state’s sovereign immunity, which deprives Arkansas courts of 
the jurisdiction to coerce a state agency like the Department to act.7 
Moreover, the Shelby decision itself is a dangerous precedent that si-
lently overturns dozens of prior Arkansas Supreme Court cases8 and gives 
circuit courts across the state a license to direct any state agency to comply 
with a given circuit court’s determination of what a given agency’s staffing, 
internal operations, or services should be.9 In this way, the Shelby Doctrine 
allows circuit courts to assume in a very practical way the nonjudicial role 
of super-social worker in child-welfare proceedings without the training or 
expertise of an actual social worker and without the training or expertise that 
specialized agencies like the Department have in implementing public poli-
 
 4. Id. at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. 
 5. Although Shelby was not the first case in which a member of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court voiced approval for the judiciary’s authority to manage the juvenile system to assure 
the Department’s performance in a given case or in future cases, it is the first case where that 
authority was specifically set out and sanctioned by a majority of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court. See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 506–08, 237 
S.W.3d 7, 14–15 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 411, 802 S.W.2d 461, 465 (1991) (Glaze, J., concur-
ring). Although neither of these progenitors addressed the constitutional issues raised in this 
article, the Shelby Doctrine must be interpreted through the lens of these prior cases—
particularly Chief Justice Hannah’s dissenting opinion in Briley—because they inform the 
Shelby Doctrine’s analytical context. 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 9. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
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cies related to child welfare. Indeed, at least one circuit court has already 
attempted to employ the broad authority announced in Shelby to manage the 
Department’s human resources in counties directly.10 And if the authority 
announced in Shelby is left unchecked, there is arguably no limit to the ex-
pansion of the judiciary’s authority into other areas. 
Part II of this article begins the analysis to reach these conclusions by 
setting out Shelby and the essential elements of the Shelby Doctrine. Part III 
then compares the limits imposed on the judiciary’s authority by the Arkan-
sas Constitution with the authority asserted in the Shelby Doctrine and ar-
gues that Shelby-style orders exceed those limits based on the impact of 
Amendment 67 on the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings, 
the Shelby Doctrine’s violation of the Department’s sovereign immunity, 
and the judiciary’s lack of a constitutionally sufficient role in child-welfare 
proceedings sufficient to allow a circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order. 
Part IV then concludes that the judiciary will continue to assume unconstitu-
tional roles unless the Arkansas Supreme Court repudiates the Shelby Doc-
trine. 
II. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V. SHELBY 
The harbinger of the Shelby Doctrine, Arkansas Department of Human 
Services v. Shelby, reached the Arkansas Supreme Court after the Depart-
ment filed a petition for certiorari11 from a child-welfare proceeding in Jef-
ferson County in which the circuit judge, the Honorable Earnest E. Brown, 
had ordered the Department to “rectify” the high caseload of the Depart-
ment’s caseworker assigned to the case.12 The Department alleged that the 
 
 10. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sliger, JV-2010-40 (Scott Co. Cir. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012) 
(ordering the Department to hire or assign a caseworker into the Department’s Division of 
Children and Family Services in Scott County). Interestingly, the circuit judge in Sliger re-
considered his order upon considering some of the arguments raised in this article and modi-
fied the order to more closely track the order sanctioned in Shelby, to wit, “the Department 
shall fix the staffing issues that gave rise to this Court’s finding of no reasonable efforts.” 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sliger, JV-2010-40 (Scott Co. Cir. Ct. May 22, 2012). 
 11. The Department originally filed its appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals under 
several theories of appeal, including an appeal from an order designated as a final and ap-
pealable order under Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal from a 
mandatory injunction under Rule 2(a)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure – (en 
dash)Civil, and as a petition for a writ of certiorari under Rule 6-1 of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court and Court of Appeals of the State of Arkansas. The Arkansas Supreme Court 
asserted jurisdiction on November 15, 2011, because the appeal involved an extraordinary 
writ. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 1 n.1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1. The case was formally submit-
ted to the Arkansas Supreme Court on January 26, 2012, as a petition for a writ of certiorari, 
and the court issued its opinion in Shelby on February 9, 2012. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *1. 
 12. Id. at 1–3, 2012 WL 401615, at *1–3 (quoting Transcript of Record, Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Shelby, JV-2010-1130 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2011)). 
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circuit court did not have the jurisdiction to order the Department to change 
the caseloads of its caseworkers and that such an order violated the Arkan-
sas Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine.13 
The basis for Judge Brown’s order was that even though the Depart-
ment was statutorily required to prepare a case plan long before the perma-
nency planning hearing in the case,14
 the Department’s caseworker had testi-
fied that she was not able to prepare a case plan by the time of the perma-
nency planning hearing because the caseworker had forty-one cases on her 
caseload and was responsible for fifty juveniles in foster care.15 As Judge 
Brown explained: 
Forty-one cases are too much, so I’m going to do this. . . . Y’all either fix 
it or the Court will call somebody to fix it. This lady’s got too many cas-
es. She’s got too many tough cases to do that. Now, somebody’s going to 
have to split out some of these cases and do it and I don’t get into that 
micromanaging there, but based on what I was told by Cecile Bluch [sic] 
in Little Rock what the average load is supposed to be in Pine Bluff. For-
ty-one cases, especially the types of cases she has, is [sic] too many and I 
want that rectified within five business days of today’s court order. She’s 
got too many cases, and I don’t want nobody [sic] else to get 41 either as 





 13. See id., at 1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1.  
 14. The juvenile code requires that the Department prepare a complete case plan within 
thirty days from the date of the dependency-neglect adjudication hearing. ARK. CODE ANN. § 
9-27-402(a)(4) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-28-111(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 2013). Adjudication hearings 
and permanency planning hearings are each one of six main types of hearings that occur in 
child-welfare proceedings in which a juvenile is placed in foster care or another out-of-home 
placement due to the acts or omissions of a parent. See id. §§ 9-27-315 (Supp. 2013) (proba-
ble cause hearings), -327 (Supp. 2013) (adjudication hearings), -329 (Supp. 2013) (disposi-
tion hearings), -337 (Supp. 2013) (review hearings), -338 (Supp. 2013) (permanency plan-
ning hearing), -359 (Supp. 2013) (fifteen-month review hearings). 
 15. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–3, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–3. Judge Brown’s dissatisfac-
tion is understandable given the importance of case plans as the roadmaps for many child-
welfare proceedings and the stage of the Shelby case at the time of Judge Brown’s order. 
Case plans are developed by the Department in consultation with all parties and attorneys in 
the dependency-neglect cases and provide the benchmark for evaluating the progress of the 
parents, guardians, and custodians at each stage of a dependency-neglect case. See, e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-303(9), -338(c), -341(a), -359(b), -360(b), -361(a) (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 
2013). The lack of a case plan in Shelby at the time of the permanency planning hearing was 
also even more significant because permanency planning hearings are generally held a year 
after a juvenile enters an out-of-home placement in order to finalize a permanency plan for 
the juvenile, which may in turn call for the termination of a parent’s rights to the juvenile. See 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 16. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4 (quoting Transcript of Rec-
ord, Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, JV-2010-1130 (Jefferson Co. Cir. Ct. July 13, 
2011)). 
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Judge Brown reflected this sentiment in his written order and directly 
ordered the Department to rectify the specific issue of the caseworker’s 
caseload: “That, the case worker testified that she has 41 cases on her case-
load and fifty juveniles in foster care. That within five days, [the Depart-
ment] shall rectify this issue.”17 
A divided Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Judge Brown’s jurisdic-
tion to order the Department to fix the caseworker’s caseload as necessary 
and appropriate to address the Department’s failure to comply with the ju-
venile code.18 First, the majority held that a circuit court had the jurisdiction 
over juveniles in equity that authorized such a court to “make all orders that 
will properly safeguard the[] rights” of juveniles appearing before it, includ-
ing orders to protect such juveniles and “assure that . . . necessary services 
are being delivered.”19 Second, the majority concluded that a circuit court’s 
“inherent authority” to protect the integrity of its proceedings and safeguard 
litigants appearing before it allowed the circuit court to compel the Depart-
ment to fulfill the Department’s obligations under the juvenile code and 
“correct problems that were preventing work and services [from being per-
formed by the Department].”20 
The majority also held that the Juvenile code did not limit a circuit 
court’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings because the juvenile code 
was not a circuit court’s only source of jurisdiction over juveniles.21 Rather, 
the majority reasoned, the jurisdiction over juveniles historically held by 
courts of equity in Arkansas provided modern circuit courts with the neces-
sary additional jurisdiction to act outside the juvenile code in issuing orders 
to the Department.22 
The majority further found that Judge Brown’s order did not violate 
Arkansas’s separation-of-powers doctrine because Judge Brown did not 
specify how the Department was to correct the “problem.”23 Acknowledging 
 
 17. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3. 
 18. Id. at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. The framing of the majority and dissenting 
opinions through a jurisdictional lens is not surprising because the legal issue presented for 
appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court was that Judge Brown’s order (1) exceeded the circuit 
court’s jurisdiction, and (2) violated the Arkansas Constitution’s separation-of-powers doc-
trine. Id. at 1, 2012 WL 401615, at *1. Moreover, the Department presented the appeal to the 
Arkansas Supreme Court through a petition for a writ of certiorari, which is a writ for ex-
traordinary relief largely focused on jurisdiction. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, at 7, 346 S.W.3d 283, 288 (providing that a writ of certiorari is 
available only if “there is a lack of jurisdiction, an act in excess of jurisdiction on the face of 
the record, or the proceedings are erroneous on the face of the record”). 
 19. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
 20. Id. at 4–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5. 
 21. Id. at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
 22. See id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
 23. Id. at 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *5. 
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that a circuit court “is generally without jurisdiction to judicially review the 
discretionary functions of the executive branch of government,” the majority 
concluded that Judge Brown did not impermissibly attempt to control any 
discretionary functions of the Department because he had merely ordered 
the Department to “fix” the staffing problems that kept the Department 
“from fulfilling its obligations and duties” and did not give a specific de-
scription of how the Department was to correct the problems.24 
In a rare three-justice dissent, Justice Danielson, joined by Justices 
Corbin and Brown, argued that Judge Brown’s order violated the separation-
of-powers doctrine and set a “horrible precedent” that would allow any cir-
cuit court “to direct any state agency to comply with [the circuit court’s] 
desire for how [the state agency] should operate.”25 Not only did the dissent-
ing justices believe the majority’s claim that the “circuit court was not or-
dering [the Department] how it was to correct the problem” to be disingenu-
ous given the facts in the case and the specificity of Judge Brown’s orders, 
they also rejected the notion that a circuit court had any management author-
ity over the Department at all.26 The dissent also observed that instead of 
ordering the Department to correct its staffing problem, the circuit court 
could have constitutionally used its contempt power to ensure that the De-
partment had prepared the case plan; the dissent cautioned, however, that 
even when a court enters an order through a recognized power such as a 
circuit court’s contempt power, that court must be careful not to exceed its 
jurisdictional limitations.27 
But what the majority and dissenting opinions in Shelby did not say is 
just as important as what the opinions did say—especially the majority opin-
ion. First, neither opinion evaluated the impact of Amendment 67 to the 
Arkansas Constitution on the jurisdiction of circuit courts in juvenile mat-
ters. Second, neither opinion articulated a fully formed analysis that evaluat-
ed the authority of the General Assembly to prescribe jurisdiction under 
Amendment 67 or the authority of a circuit court to act outside of the juve-
nile code. Third, neither opinion evaluated whether the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity prohibited the direct coercion of the Department that the circuit 
court in Shelby employed by ordering the Department to rectify its staffing 
problems, much less how the Department’s sovereign immunity could be 
overcome by a circuit court’s purported jurisdiction in equity over juveniles 
or a circuit court’s “inherent authority” to protect the integrity of the circuit 
court’s proceedings and safeguard “litigants” appearing before the circuit 
court. 
 
 24. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *5. 
 25. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 5–6, 2012 WL 401615, at *5–6. 
 27. Id. at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6. 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 397 
Part III of this article addresses these and other issues by evaluating the 
Shelby Doctrine in light of Amendment 67 to the Arkansas Constitution and 
the Department’s sovereign immunity against coercion by the judiciary. And 
as described below, this article concludes that the Shelby Doctrine is uncon-
stitutional under both principles. 
III. THE SHELBY DOCTRINE VS. THE ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION 
The Shelby Doctrine is wrong because it sanctions a vastly expanded 
role of circuit courts in child-welfare proceedings based entirely on jurisdic-
tional foundations that violate the Arkansas Constitution. First, the Shelby 
Doctrine violates Amendment 67 because it asserts that circuit courts have 
jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not pro-
vided by law. Second, the Shelby Doctrine violates the sovereign immunity 
of the State of Arkansas by authorizing circuit courts to compel the Depart-
ment to act without the application of an appropriate exception to the De-
partment’s sovereign immunity. 
Part III.A of this article introduces Amendment 67 and explains the 
impact that Amendment 67 has had on the role and authority of the General 
Assembly to define the child-welfare system and prescribe the jurisdictional 
role that the judiciary plays in that system under Amendment 67. Part III.B 
then applies the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the Shelby Doctrine and 
evaluates whether Shelby-style orders fall within any recognized exceptions 
to the Department’s sovereign immunity. Part III.B also specifically evalu-
ates whether the Inherent Protection Power asserted by the Shelby Doctrine 
should constitute a new sovereign immunity exception and whether the judi-
ciary’s role in child-welfare proceedings provides sufficient support for in-
terpreting the Inherent Protection Power as a new sovereign immunity ex-
ception. 
A. Amendment 67 and the Apotheosis of the General Assembly in Child-
Welfare Proceedings 
Amendment 67 was enacted during one of the most tumultuous times 
in the history of Arkansas’s child-welfare system and was part of the Gen-
eral Assembly’s plan to change the constitutional and statutory framework 
that governed child-welfare proceedings. It represented the second of three 
major steps taken by the General Assembly to address serious issues in the 
child-welfare system in place at the time and was the vehicle through which 
the modern juvenile code was adopted. 
This article argues that Amendment 67 should be further interpreted as 
controlling the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings because 
Amendment 67 impacts the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceed-
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ings and limits the judiciary’s jurisdiction to only the jurisdiction allowed 
under Amendment 67—a limitation that in practical terms circumscribes the 
judiciary’s jurisdiction to only that jurisdiction provided through the juve-
nile code. In these ways, Amendment 67 allows the General Assembly to 
define the child-welfare system as the General Assembly sees fit—even if 
that definition conflicts with how the judiciary would want the system to 
operate and even if the judiciary does not have the authority it would want 
to have over the Department’s implementation and performance in the child-
welfare system. 
Arkansas courts and legal commentators, however, have provided only 
limited treatment of Amendment 67’s import to the judiciary’s jurisdiction 
in child-welfare proceedings and have never expressly concluded that 
Amendment 67 operates to limit affirmatively the jurisdiction of the judici-
ary. This article therefore now turns to first set out Amendment 67, the cir-
cumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted, and the proper interpreta-
tion that should be given to Amendment 67’s text. 
1. Arkansas’s Child-Welfare Menagerie and the Adoption of 
Amendment 67 and the Juvenile Code of 1989 
Amendment 67 was adopted in 1988, became effective in 1989, and 
was part of the most significant shift in Arkansas’s child-welfare system 
since the system was first created in 1907.28 In relevant part, Amendment 67 
provides the following: 
The General Assembly shall define jurisdiction of matters relating to ju-
veniles . . . and may confer such jurisdiction upon chancery, circuit or 
probate courts, or upon separate divisions of such courts, or may estab-
lish separate juvenile courts upon which such jurisdiction may be con-
ferred, and shall transfer to such courts the jurisdiction over juvenile 
 
 28. The child-welfare system began with the adoption of Act 237 in 1907, an act that 
broadly empowered county courts to take custody of at-risk juveniles between the ages of 
three and fifteen and make placements to institutions and private foster care. Act of Apr. 30, 
1907, No. 237, 1907 Ark. Acts 555. The General Assembly almost immediately began to 
expand and modify the child-welfare system into an increasingly more complex and robust 
system, beginning with the adoption of the first formal juvenile code, the Juvenile Code of 
1911, and the establishment of the first “juvenile court.” Act of Apr. 15, 1911, No. 215, 1911 
Ark. Acts 166 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 & 
Supp. 2013)). The 1911 Juvenile Code was amended at least thirteen times from 1911 to 
1975, ultimately leading up to the adoption of the 1975 Juvenile Code, which substantially 
revised the child-welfare system to formally provide, among other things, state custody of 
dependent-neglected juveniles and emergency custody. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975, No. 
451, §§ 33, 38, 1975 Ark. Acts 1179, 1193, 1196 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 45-401 to -
454 (Repl. 1977 & Supp. 1985)). The 1975 Juvenile Code was the juvenile code in effect at 
the time of the adoption of Amendment 67. 1975 Ark. Acts 1200, at § 51. 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 399 




Amendment 67 therefore expressly contemplates three main compo-
nents. First, Amendment 67 grants the General Assembly the power to de-
fine the jurisdiction of juvenile matters. Second, Amendment 67 allows the 
General Assembly to confer the jurisdiction that it defines upon one or more 
courts, specifically, the chancery, circuit, or probate courts, or upon a court 
that the General Assembly establishes to act as a juvenile court. Third, 
Amendment 67 provides that if the General Assembly grants jurisdiction to 
a court, the General Assembly is required to transfer the jurisdiction over 
juveniles held by county courts on January 1, 1989, the time Amendment 67 
became effective.30 
Amendment 67 was adopted two years after the Arkansas Supreme 
Court had held in its landmark Walker v. Arkansas Department of Human 
Services decision that the General Assembly had only limited authority to 
define the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare and that the child-welfare 
system that the General Assembly had created was unconstitutional.31 Spe-
cifically, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the county courts designated 
by the General Assembly to hear child-welfare proceedings as “juvenile 
courts” in the then-existing juvenile code were unconstitutional because the 
General Assembly lacked the constitutional authority to vest county courts 
with the jurisdiction to hear child-welfare proceedings due to the Arkansas 
Constitution’s express allocation of jurisdiction among Arkansas’s trial 
courts.32 
Prior to Amendment 67, the General Assembly lacked the authority to 
define the child-welfare system and prescribe the judiciary’s involvement in 
that system. And although the Arkansas Supreme Court observed that the 
General Assembly could address the issue of jurisdiction over child-welfare 
proceedings—and indeed expressly left the issue unresolved for the General 
 
 29. ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (emphasis added). 
 30. H.R.J. Res. 1001 § 2, 76th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1987) (providing that 
Amendment 67 would become effective on January 1, 1989). Voters approved Amendment 
67 in the 1988 general election. See Ark. Sec. of State, Historical Initiatives & Referenda 
Election Results, http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/elections/Documents/Revised%20Initiatives%
20and%20Amendments%201938-2014.pdf  (last visited May 30, 2015). 
 31. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d 558, 560–
62 (1987). The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Walker was consequential not only 
because it held that the child-welfare system in place at the time was unconstitutional, but 
also because it expressly abrogated the Arkansas Supreme Court’s nearly seventy-year old 
initial determination in Ex Parte King that the General Assembly had constitutionally vested 
county courts with jurisdiction over child-welfare proceedings. See id. at 47–48, 722 S.W.2d 
at 560, abrogating Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919); DIANE D. BLAIR & 
JAY BARTH, ARKANSAS POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 225, 227 (2d ed. 2005). 
 32. Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–52, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62. 
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Assembly to address33—the undeniable message from the Walker decision 
was that the General Assembly was not free to define jurisdiction over 
child-welfare proceedings because of the limitations that the state constitu-
tion of the day imposed on the General Assembly’s authority.34 
Even prior to Walker, the allocation of jurisdiction in matters related to 
juveniles among Arkansas’s trial courts created numerous problems for the 
child-welfare system and its effectiveness was the frequent object of criti-
cism by judges and commentators for years prior to the adoption of 
Amendment 67. Indeed, the concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction of Ar-
kansas’s courts related to juveniles prior to the adoption of Amendment 6735 
 
 33. Id. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562 (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651 
S.W.2d 90 (1983)). The Walker court’s deference to the legislature in developing a constitu-
tional child-welfare system for the Arkansas Supreme Court to then review is not surprising 
given the court’s citation of Dupree v. Alma School District, which was the first in a line of 
Arkansas Supreme Court decisions that held that the state’s public education system was 
unconstitutional under the Arkansas Constitution. Jerald A. Sharum, Arkansas’s Tradition of 
Popular Constitutional Activism and the Ascendancy of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 32 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33, 86–94 (2009). Dupree was unique in that line of cases—which 
increasingly recognized the role of the judiciary in state systems and policies—because it 
announced and employed a narrow judicial role in reviewing state systems and policies much 
in the same way that the Walker court followed a narrow role in evaluating the constitutional-
ity of the child-welfare system and then leaving it to the legislature to create a constitutional-
ly sufficient system. See id.; Dupree, 279 Ark. at 49–50, 651 S.W.2d at 95. 
 34. Walker, 291 Ark. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562. 
 35. During this time, county court held jurisdiction as “juvenile courts” over statutory 
proceedings involving juveniles who had been abused, neglected, or otherwise left without a 
legal caregiver. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 15, 1911, No. 215, § 1, 1911 Ark. Acts 166, 167–69; 
Ark. Juvenile Code of 1975, No. 451, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 1179, 1181 (codified at ARK. CODE 
ANN. §§ 45-401 to -454 (Repl. 1977 & Supp. 1985)). Arkansas’s other trial courts, however, 
had sufficient overlapping jurisdictions to allow those courts to substantially impact child-
welfare proceedings even when those proceedings were ongoing and even as to the same 
issues that child-welfare proceedings involved. Chancery courts, for example, held equitable 
jurisdiction over juveniles that allowed chancery courts to “make all orders that will properly 
safeguard [the rights of juveniles].” See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 105–06, 680 
S.W.2d 118, 120 (1984) (citing Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 617 S.W.2d 857 
(1981); Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 2 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583, 
12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919); State v. Grisby, 
38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)) (rejecting the exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile courts 
over juveniles and reaffirming the long-standing jurisdiction of chancery courts over juve-
niles as separately sufficient from the special subject-matter jurisdiction afforded juvenile 
courts to justify the actions of the chancery court in changing custody of the juvenile in the 
case). Likewise, probate courts held jurisdiction related to juveniles that included jurisdiction 
over adoptions and guardianships of the persons and estates of juveniles. See, e.g., Robins, 
273 Ark. at 244–45, 617 S.W.2d at 858–59 (citing Lee v. Grubbs, 269 Ark. 205, 599 S.W.2d 
715 (1980); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Scott v. Brown, 160 Ark. 
489, 254 S.W. 1074 (1923); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 465). Finally, cir-
cuit courts held jurisdiction over juveniles in civil and criminal proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 
245, 617 S.W.2d at 858–59. 
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created a well-recognized and “horrendous problem” whereby any juvenile 
in Arkansas could be “placed in the custody of a divorced parent by the 
chancery court, placed in the custody of a social services agency by the 
[county] juvenile court, and subjected to the guardianship of his person by 
the probate court—all at the same time!”36 
Likewise, Arkansas’s child-welfare system prior to Amendment 67 was 
cited multiple times for failing to meet the legal requirements imposed by 
increasingly complex federal and state statutory schemes to implement ex-
panding policies and mandates to protect children—in part because of how 
many different courts needed to know about and apply the requirements in 
order for the legal requirements to be properly implemented. Throughout the 
1980s, for example, numerous Arkansas courts failed to review properly or 
meaningfully certain types of child-welfare proceedings involving foster 
care.37 This failure was primarily because the various courts that dealt with 
such cases, including juvenile and probate courts, were not dedicated to such 
child-welfare cases and simply did not know about the federal law that pre-
scribed the review required.38 In addition, the child-welfare agency in exist-
ence at the time, the Social Services Division, failed to communicate the 
requirements to the various courts that did need to know.39 
Following Walker, however, the General Assembly and other entities 
began to take action to fill the void that Walker left. The General Assembly 
first enacted Act 14 of 1987 in order to create a temporary statutory fix giv-
en the jurisdictional options available after Walker.40 Specifically, Act 14 
 
 36. Dyer v. Ross-Lawhon, 288 Ark. 327, 331, 704 S.W.2d 629, 631–32 (1986) (New-
bern, J., concurring); Jarmon v. Brown, 286 Ark. 455, 457–58, 692 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1985) 
(Newbern, J., concurring) (noting the “horrendous problem of concurrent and conflicting 
jurisdiction with respect to cases pertaining to juveniles existing in our juvenile, county, and 
chancery courts”). Although Walker represented the first decision that invalidated the juris-
dictional authority of county courts to hear juvenile matters, various members of the majority 
in Walker had previously announced their dissatisfaction with the juvenile system in other 
cases. Justice Steele Hays joined Newbern’s concurrence in Jarmon, and both Justice Hays 
and Chief Justice Jack Holt joined Justice David Newbern in his concurrence in Dyer. Chief 
Justice Holt would later write the majority opinion in Walker and be joined by Justices New-
bern and Hays in that opinion. 
 37. See generally Tom Glaze, Foster Care Reform: A Model for the Nation, 20 ARK. 
LAW. 1, 27–34 (1986), available at www.issuu.com/arkansas_bar_association/docs/January-
1986 (observing problems in the child-welfare system related to the failure to apply the law 
governing the review of foster care cases by the various courts in Arkansas that interacted 
with such cases). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Act of Feb. 6, 1987, No. 14, §§ 1, 15, 1987 Ark. Acts 24, 24–25, 36; Walker v. 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d 558, 560–62 (1987); KAY C. 
GOSS, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION 239 (G. Alan Tarr ed., Oxford University Press 
2011) (1993). The General Assembly signed Act 14 into law seventeen days after Walker was 
decided; not surprisingly, the General Assembly declared that the Walker decision created an 
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vested jurisdiction over child-welfare proceedings formerly held by county 
courts into a juvenile division of the circuit courts with respect to juvenile 
delinquency and into a juvenile division of the probate courts with respect to 
“juveniles in need of supervision” and dependent-neglected juveniles.41 
Following the adoption of Amendment 67 in January of 1989, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted a revised juvenile code to govern child-welfare pro-
ceedings, the Juvenile Code of 1989.42 The 1989 Juvenile Code implement-
ed many of the features of the 1975 Juvenile Code and Act 14 of 1987, but 
vested jurisdiction over the child-welfare proceedings governed by the 1989 
Juvenile Code with the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court,43 which the 
General Assembly created by Act 294 of 1989.44 Under the 1989 Juvenile 
Code, the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court held “exclusive original ju-
risdiction of and [was] the sole court for . . . proceedings governed by [the 
1989 Juvenile Code],” including proceedings involving dependency-neglect; 
families-in-need-of-services; paternity, custody, visitation, and support in-
volving illegitimate juveniles; termination of parent rights; as well as adop-
tions and guardianships arising during such proceedings.45 Act 294 further 
announced that the General Assembly specifically intended  
to transfer and vest all powers, functions, and duties now vested by law 
in the juvenile divisions of the circuit and probate courts [pursuant to Act 
14] to juvenile divisions of the chancery courts of this state, with each 




This jurisdiction included dependency-neglect, families in need of services, 
delinquency, bastardy, termination of parental rights, and such other juve-
nile matters as may be provided by law.47 
The 1989 Juvenile Code has remained in effect since its adoption, 
though it has undergone revisions as to the court designated to hear child-
welfare proceedings, the jurisdiction of such courts, and the authority of 
 
emergency requiring immediate action to ensure the “orderly and efficient administration of 
the juvenile justice system.” 1987 Ark. Acts 24–25, 36. 
 41. 1987 Ark. Acts 25 at §§ 2–3. Interestingly, Act 14’s allocation of jurisdiction be-
tween circuit courts and probate courts left chancery courts as the only trial court without 
jurisdiction over the child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code. See id. 
 42. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, No. 273, 1989 Ark. Acts 486 (codified as amended 
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013)). 
 43. 1989 Ark. Acts 492 at secs. 3(8), 5(a) (providing that all proceedings prescribed 
under the juvenile code were to be heard before the Juvenile Division of Chancery Court). 
 44. Act of Mar. 2, 1989, No. 294, 1989 Ark. Acts 611 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 
16-13-601 to -608 (Repl. 1999)). 
 45. 1989 Ark. Acts 499 at § 5(a)–(b). 
 46. 1989 Ark. Acts 612 at §§ 1(4), 2(b). 
 47. Id., No. 294, §§ 1(4), 2(b). 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 403 
such courts to order the Department to take certain actions. Currently, the 
juvenile code provides that circuit courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code,48 which specifical-
ly authorizes, among other things, a circuit court to order the Department to 
provide “family services,” take custody of juveniles in certain circumstanc-
es, and perform other functions in child-welfare proceedings.49 The import 
of the juvenile code’s jurisdictional framework is described throughout the 
remainder of this article. 
2. Amendment 67 and the Authority of the General Assembly over 
Child-Welfare Proceedings 
Amendment 67 provides that the General Assembly defines the judici-
ary’s jurisdiction over juveniles.50 What is not clear is how Amendment 67 
and the General Assembly’s authority to define jurisdiction of child-welfare 
matters impacts the Shelby Doctrine and the jurisdiction in equity asserted 
by the Shelby Doctrine over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings that 
courts of equity in Arkansas have traditionally held over juveniles.51 This 
article argues that Amendment 67’s allocation of power to the General As-
sembly to define jurisdiction over juveniles should be interpreted to have 
broad application to the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings 
and the viability of the Shelby Doctrine. More specifically, this article ar-
gues that Amendment 67’s grant of exclusive authority to the General As-
sembly to define juvenile jurisdiction, along with the General Assembly’s 
use of that authority through the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, effective-
 
 48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a) (Supp. 2013). 
 49. Id. §§ 9-27-303(25), 9-27-329 to -335 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing the 
dispositions that circuit courts are authorized to order in delinquency, family-in-need-of-
services, and dependency-neglect proceedings). 
 50. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67; Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 766, 894 S.W.2d 888, 
889 (1995) (“The juvenile court’s jurisdiction derives from Amendment 67 to the Constitu-
tion of Arkansas.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407, 802 S.W.2d 
461, 463 (1991) (“Following the passage of Amendment 67 to the Arkansas Constitution, the 
77th General Assembly in Act 294 of 1989 defined jurisdiction of matters relating to juve-
niles and conferred such jurisdiction upon a newly created juvenile division of chancery 
court.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 352, 33 S.W.3d 514, 517 
(2000) (“Following the passage of Amendment 67, the legislature defined jurisdiction of 
matters relating to juveniles and bestowed such jurisdiction upon newly created divisions of 
chancery court.”); see also discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 51. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, 
at *3–4 (rejecting the position that the juvenile code provides a circuit court its only source of 
jurisdiction over juveniles). Although the majority in Shelby did not expressly state that equi-
table jurisdiction was the only jurisdiction that a circuit court held over juveniles that was not 
provided by the juvenile code, the majority did not indicate that there were any other jurisdic-
tional bases upon which a circuit court could rely. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
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ly rebooted the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings to in-
clude only such jurisdiction and authority as the General Assembly provided 
by law in the juvenile code. Amendment 67, however, has never been ex-
pressly interpreted as having such a broad effect by any court in Arkansas52 
or by any previous commentator.53 Nevertheless, Amendment 67 should be 
affirmatively interpreted as rebooting juvenile jurisdiction and extinguishing 
all judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings because 
this effect is required by the unambiguous plain text of Amendment 67. 
Such an interpretation also flows naturally from a reasonable interpretation 
of Amendment 67 based on standard principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion. 
a. The plain text of Amendment 67 reboots the jurisdiction of 
Arkansas courts in juvenile matters 
Amendment 67’s plain text supports the interpretation that Amendment 
67 rebooted juvenile jurisdiction and extinguished all prior judicial jurisdic-
tion over juveniles in child-welfare proceedings because Amendment 67 
expressly gives the General Assembly the exclusive power to change the 
judiciary’s jurisdiction in all juvenile matters. First, Amendment 67 provides 
the General Assembly with sole constitutional authority to define jurisdic-
tion over juvenile matters. Second, Amendment 67 does not place any 
meaningful limitation on the General Assembly’s power to circumscribe 
juvenile jurisdiction as to only legal versus equitable jurisdiction. Third, 
Amendment 67 does not place any limitation at all on the scope of the juve-
nile jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power. 
The General Assembly has the sole constitutional authority to define 
jurisdiction over juvenile matters because that is exactly what Amendment 
67 says: “[t]he General Assembly shall define jurisdiction of matters relat-
ing to juveniles.”54 This grant of power is significant because it designates 
only the General Assembly as the branch of government with the power to 
set jurisdiction related to juvenile matters and allows for the conclusion that 
all juvenile jurisdiction shall be defined by the General Assembly. Simply 
put, if the General Assembly does not provide jurisdiction, the judiciary 
 
 52. At the time of this writing, there have only been five appellate decisions that have 
even mentioned Amendment 67. See Rosario, 319 Ark. 764, 894 S.W.2d 888; Clark, 304 
Ark. 403, 802 S.W.2d 461; White v. Winston, 302 Ark. 345, 789 S.W.2d 459 (1990); Hutton 
v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 769 S.W.2d 394 (1989); Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 22 S.W.3d 514. 
That said, even the limited treatment that these cases provided on the import of Amendment 
67 supports this article’s interpretation. See infra notes 54, 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 53. At the time of this writing, none of Arkansas’s scholarly journals have published an 
article focused on Amendment 67 or its implications. 
 54. ARK. CONST. amend. 67. 
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does not have it as a matter of constitutional law. In this way, the judiciary 
does not have any jurisdiction over juvenile matters—including in child-
welfare proceedings and equitable jurisdiction that Arkansas courts previ-
ously held over juveniles—unless the General Assembly first provides the 
jurisdiction by law. 
Similarly, the judiciary lacks the authority to assert jurisdiction over 
juveniles beyond what the General Assembly provides because such an as-
sertion would mean that the judiciary would be defining juvenile jurisdiction 
in contravention to the express allocation of that authority to the General 
Assembly by Amendment 67.55 To construe Amendment 67 to allow the 
judiciary to make such an assertion would improperly add language to 
Amendment 67 and expand the amendment’s clear assignment of that au-
thority beyond the General Assembly in violation of Arkansas’s strong sepa-
ration-of-powers doctrine.56 
Further, Amendment 67 does not place any meaningful limitation on 
the General Assembly’s power to circumscribe juvenile jurisdiction because 
the express terms of the amendment do not limit the General Assembly’s 
power to add or to remove from the judiciary’s jurisdiction so long as the 
court to which the General Assembly grants juvenile jurisdiction retains the 
juvenile jurisdiction held by county courts at the time Amendment 67 was 
adopted.57 Moreover, even this requirement lacks real significance because 
county courts did not even possess jurisdiction over child-welfare matters at 
the time Amendment 67 was adopted and have never possessed jurisdiction 
in equity.58 In addition, the General Assembly does not even appear to be 
 
 55. Cf. ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2 (prohibiting any branch of government from exer-
cising any power belonging to another branch of government unless expressly allowed to do 
so by the Arkansas Constitution). 
 56. See id.; T.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 655–56, 210 S.W.3d 79, 82–
83 (2005) (providing that a court lacks the authority to compel an executive or legislative 
body to act if the duty to act is discretionary); Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 550, 898 
S.W.2d 43, 45–46 (1995) (same); State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 426, 3 S.W. 352, 360 
(1887); Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark. 570, 589–96, 1839 WL 103, at *8–13 (1839); see gen-
erally L. Scott Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative Agencies: Dis-
tinguishing Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 279 (1984). 
 57. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67. The state of county jurisdiction at the time Amendment 
67 was adopted is controlling because Amendment 67 only requires that the General Assem-
bly transfer jurisdiction “now vested in county courts.” Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, 
subsequent changes to county court jurisdiction are of no moment to the operation of 
Amendment 67, as are any changes to county court jurisdiction that may have occurred prior 
to Walker because Walker was the last event that addressed the issue of county court jurisdic-
tion prior to the adoption of Amendment 67. 
 58. See Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562 
(1987) (holding that county courts do not have jurisdiction over juvenile matters), overruling 
Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919) (holding that county courts did have 
jurisdiction over juvenile matters). County court jurisdiction dates back to the Constitution of 
1874, which vested jurisdiction over bastardy, the “apprenticeship of minors,” and other 
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required to transfer such jurisdiction to a court under Amendment 67 and 
could instead confer all jurisdiction over juvenile matters to a purely admin-
istrative system.59 This possibility arises from the plain text of Amendment 
 
matters related to the internal improvement and local concerns of the county in which the 
given county court sat, as well as jurisdiction related to certain probate matters. ARK. CONST. 
art. 7, §§ 1, 28–31, 33–34, 36–37; id. sched. § 23; King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 467–69 
(interpreting section 28 of article 7 to the Arkansas Constitution as providing a list of juris-
dictional issues related to the local concerns of a specific county in which the given county 
court sits), overruled on other grounds, Walker, 291 Ark. at 47, 722 S.W.2d at 560; GOSS, 
supra note 40, at 71, 80–83. The 1874 Constitution, however, did not vest any equitable 
jurisdiction in county courts because that jurisdiction was placed with circuit courts and then 
with chancery courts. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 15 (granting to circuit courts equitable jurisdic-
tion until such time that the General Assembly establishes courts of chancery). Nor was the 
jurisdiction of county courts ever expanded beyond its original designation. In fact, county 
court jurisdiction became more limited following the 1938 adoption of Amendment 24, 
which removed all probate jurisdiction from county courts and consolidated that jurisdiction 
with chancery court jurisdiction over equity. ARK. CONST. amend. 24; GOSS, supra note 40, at 
172–73. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Walker, which held that county courts 
hold no jurisdiction over juvenile matters, also limited the jurisdiction of county courts. 
Walker, 291 Ark. at 45–51, 722 S.W.2d at 559–62 (finding that county courts do not have 
jurisdiction over child-welfare matters because juvenile matters are not matters of local con-
cern, but still implicitly upholding the interpretation of section 28 of article 7 in King that 
county courts have jurisdiction over local concerns). Although the Arkansas Supreme Court 
in Walker broadly stated that county courts held no jurisdiction over “juvenile matters” or 
“jurisdiction over minors,” it seems clear that what the court really meant was that county 
courts did not hold jurisdiction over juveniles other than the specific designations of jurisdic-
tion over bastardy and juvenile apprenticeship afforded to county courts under the Arkansas 
Constitution, which were not modified until at least Amendment 67. See ARK. CONST. art. 7, 
§ 28. This view is consistent with the specific issue presented on appeal to the court in Walk-
er as to whether county courts have jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed by the 1975 
Juvenile Code, as well as the court’s holding that courts do not have the jurisdiction because 
the jurisdiction does not fall within county court’s jurisdiction over matters of local county 
concern. See Walker, 291 Ark. at 49–50, 722 S.W.2d at 561–62. Thus, the only jurisdiction 
that county courts appear to have retained following Walker was jurisdiction related to juve-
nile bastardy and the “apprenticeship of minors,” each as originally provided under the 1874 
Constitution. This view is also consistent with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s cases holding 
that county courts have jurisdiction over matters related to bastardy, none of which were 
overruled or otherwise abrogated by the court in Walker. See, e.g., Pucket v. Pucket, 289 Ark. 
67, 67–68, 709 S.W.2d 82, 82–83 (1986) (holding that a chancery court erred in asserting 
jurisdiction over a paternity issue by reaffirming that county courts have original jurisdiction 
in all matters relating to bastardy, not just bastardy proceedings themselves); Stain v. Stain, 
286 Ark. 140, 142–43, 689 S.W.2d 566, 567 (1985) (same). In any event, at the time 
Amendment 67 was adopted, it seems clear that county court jurisdiction was limited to the 
jurisdiction over bastardy, paternity, and juvenile apprenticeship that it was originally provid-
ed under the 1874 Constitution. See BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 31, at 233. 
 59. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (providing that the General Assembly “may” transfer 
juvenile jurisdiction to a court). Whether such a grant of authority to address child-welfare 
issues would be constitutionally permissible, however, is unclear because such an analysis 
would depend on the administrative system being used and whether, among other things, the 
administrative system impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary’s power of deciding cases. 
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67, which gives the General Assembly the power to define jurisdiction, but 
does not require the General Assembly to grant that jurisdiction to a court.60 
The transfer requirement itself could also be illusory because the judiciary 
may not compel the General Assembly to make that transfer given the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the separation of powers and dis-
cretionary actions of the executive and legislative branches.61 
Amendment 67 also does not place any limitation at all on the scope of 
juvenile jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power because 
Amendment 67 uses the term “jurisdiction” without limitation or qualifica-
tion.62 Indeed, the text of the amendment suggests that the scope of jurisdic-
 
See ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (prohibiting any branch of state government from exercising any 
power belonging to either of the other branches unless expressly directed or permitted by the 
terms of the Arkansas Constitution). The Arkansas Supreme Court has also suggested that a 
child-welfare system based even on part-executive, part-judicial courts would be insufficient 
to properly address constitutional issues or provide sufficient “judicial safeguards.” Walker, 
291 Ark. at 51, 722 S.W.2d at 562. A full analysis of an agency-based child-welfare system, 
however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
 60. ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (providing that the General Assembly “shall” define juris-
diction over juvenile matters but merely “may” confer such jurisdiction on a chancery, cir-
cuit, probate, or juvenile court (emphasis added)). Under this interpretation, the transfer of 
county court jurisdiction required by the Amendment is only triggered if the General Assem-
bly confers some jurisdiction to a court. Id. (conditioning the General Assembly’s required 
transfer of jurisdiction upon the discretionary conferral of jurisdiction on “such” courts as the 
General Assembly designates). Admittedly, such an interpretation is not the only possible 
interpretation. An equally valid interpretation could be that the permissive “may” simply 
means that the General Assembly shall confer juvenile jurisdiction on either existing chan-
cery, circuit, or probate courts, or on such juvenile courts as the General Assembly may es-
tablish. This interpretation is supported by the amendment’s language indicating that the 
juvenile jurisdiction defined by the General Assembly should be transferred in its entirety to 
courts designated by the General Assembly and the mandatory “shall” used by the amend-
ment to require that the General Assembly transfer existing county court jurisdiction over 
juvenile matters to the courts designated by the General Assembly to receive juvenile juris-
diction. 
 61. See, e.g., T.J., 362 Ark. at 655–56, 210 S.W.3d at 82–83; Saunders, 320 Ark. at 550, 
898 S.W.2d at 45–46; Churchill, 48 Ark. at 426, 3 S.W. at 360; Hawkins, 1 Ark. 570, 1839 
WL 103, *8–13. This possibility arises because the transfer of jurisdiction authorized under 
Amendment 67 was not automatically operative but rather tied to the General Assembly’s 
own action of transferring the jurisdiction as part of the General Assembly’s definition of 
jurisdiction. As the General Assembly’s act of legislating is inherently discretionary, it is 
unclear whether the judiciary could force the General Assembly to effect the transfer or even 
whether the judiciary would simply find that such jurisdiction was transferred by operation of 
law and not requiring the General Assembly to actually transfer the jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
ARK. CONST. amend. 67 (requiring the General Assembly to transfer jurisdiction but implicit-
ly providing that the transfer be by way of legislation); Saunders, 320 Ark. at 550, 898 
S.W.2d at 45–46 (observing that a court only has the authority to compel the exercise an 
executive officer his or her discretion to decide affirmatively to act or not to act when dealing 
with an issue where the officer has the discretion to act or not act). 
 62. See ARK. CONST. amend. 67. 
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tion subject to the General Assembly’s power is limited only by the re-
quirement that the General Assembly transfer any jurisdiction held by coun-
ty courts at the time Amendment 67 was adopted. Amendment 67’s designa-
tion of “jurisdiction” should therefore be given its plain-text meaning and 
include all jurisdiction over juvenile matters at law and in equity—including 
the jurisdiction over juveniles in equity asserted by the Shelby Doctrine. 
The plain-text interpretation of Amendment 67 just described is con-
trolling and requires that a court interpret Amendment 67 just as it reads 
because the text is not ambiguous and a plain-text interpretation would not 
produce absurd results.63 First, Amendment 67’s text is not ambiguous be-
cause the sole grant of power to define juvenile jurisdiction to the General 
Assembly, the lack of limitations on that power, and the lack of limitations 
on the jurisdiction subject to the General Assembly’s power are not open to 
multiple reasonable interpretations.64 To the contrary, the General Assembly 
is the only entity given the authority to set jurisdiction “relat[ed] to juve-
niles” with no bounds of law or equity related to the General Assembly’s 
use of that power or the scope of the jurisdiction subject to that power.65 
There is no mention of the judiciary’s role in establishing juvenile jurisdic-
tion and no mention of any reservations of jurisdiction to the judiciary other 
than the jurisdiction that the General Assembly establishes pursuant to 
Amendment 67. Moreover, confusion and ambiguity only arise if one tries 
to interpret Amendment 67 in order to reach the strained conclusion that the 
General Assembly cannot in fact limit the involvement and authority of the 
judiciary in juvenile matters even though the General Assembly is the only 
branch authorized by Amendment 67 to define the judiciary’s jurisdiction. 
Second, a literal interpretation of Amendment 67 does not produce ab-
surd results because such an interpretation presents a reasonable approach to 
developing a comprehensive, consistent, and effective child-welfare system. 
For example, a literal interpretation places the responsibility and authority 
for achieving the state’s policy objectives for juvenile matters in the General 
Assembly, which the Arkansas Supreme Court itself recognized is “the body 
 
 63. See, e.g., Curry v. Pope Co. Equalization Bd., 2011 Ark. 408, at 6, 10, 385 S.W.3d 
130, 134, 136 (“Language of a constitutional provision that is plain and unambiguous must 
be given its obvious and common meaning.”); Ludwig v. Bella Casa, LLC, 2010 Ark. 435, at 
5, 372 S.W.3d 792, 796 (observing that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of 
a law is to construe the law “just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually ac-
cepted meaning in common language”); Brewer v. Fergus, 348 Ark. 577, 583, 79 S.W.3d 
831, 834 (2002) (“Where the meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous, we do not 
resort to the rules of statutory, or in this case, constitutional interpretation.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Wickham v. State, 2009 Ark. 357, at 5–6, 324 S.W.3d 344, 347 (providing 
that a law may be interpreted when it is “open to two or more constructions” or when its 
meaning is such that “reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning”). 
 65. ARK. CONST. amend. 67. 
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equipped and designed to perform that function.”66 Such an interpretation 
also gives the General Assembly the power to prescribe the appropriate in-
volvement of the judiciary in all juvenile matters by way of setting the judi-
ciary’s jurisdiction and addresses the problems that Amendment 67 was 
arguably designed to address, including those related to competing jurisdic-
tions between multiple state courts and competing branches of government 
that characterized and undermined the juvenile system prior to the adoption 
of Amendment 67. A literal interpretation is also consistent with the General 
Assembly’s existing power to control state agencies tasked with child wel-
fare and set the responsibilities of those agencies in the child-welfare sys-
tem. Moreover, the decision of Amendment 67’s framers to give the General 
Assembly the only authority to define juvenile jurisdiction need not be the 
best (or even a good) way to design the juvenile system’s jurisdictional 
framework or the way the judiciary would have provided for juvenile juris-
diction or the judiciary’s role in the child-welfare system; it is sufficient that 
the decision is unambiguous and does not produce absurd results.67 
b. A reasonable interpretation of Amendment 67 reboots the ju-
risdiction of Arkansas courts in juvenile matters 
Even if a plain-text interpretation of Amendment 67 would be so un-
clear as to require that the amendment be interpreted beyond the plain mean-
ing of the text,68 a reasonable interpretation of Amendment 67 yields the 
same results based on established principles of constitutional interpretation, 
the circumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted, the problems that 
the amendment was designed to fix, and the development of constitutional 
and statutory law since Amendment 67 was adopted. First, the choice of 
Amendment 67’s framers to grant the power only to the General Assem-
bly—with no mention or inclusion of the judiciary—indicates Amendment 
 
 66. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562 
(1987) (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983)) (“We leave 
the matter of achieving a constitutional system to the legislature, the body equipped and 
designed to perform that function.”). 
 67. As the Arkansas Supreme Court observed six years before the adoption of Amend-
ment 67, “where the meaning of a[] . . . constitutional amendment is clear and unambiguous, 
this Court is primarily concerned with what the document says, rather than what its drafters 
may have intended . . . and we have no authority to construe the amendment to mean any-
thing other than what it says.” Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106, 109–10, 655 
S.W.2d 426, 428–29 (1983). 
 68. Although most of the cases cited in this sub-section refer to the interpretation of 
statutes, their analysis is equally applicable to interpreting constitutional amendments like 
Amendment 67 because the “rules of statutory construction apply to [the] interpretation of 
constitutional amendments.” Brewer, 348 Ark. at 583, 79 S.W.3d at 834. Therefore, no fur-
ther attempt will be made to differentiate statutory interpretation from constitutional interpre-
tation other than to accurately reflect what a given case says. 
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67 should be interpreted to prohibit the judiciary from defining jurisdiction 
in juvenile matters by asserting jurisdiction not provided by the General 
Assembly. Under the maxim of statutory interpretation known as expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, the express designation of the General Assembly 
may be properly construed to exclude the judiciary from having the power 
to define juvenile jurisdiction.69 In addition, allowing a court to inherit or 
otherwise retain previously held jurisdiction would improperly create a new, 
unexpressed exception to Amendment 67’s grant to the General Assembly 
of sole authority to define juvenile jurisdiction.70 Had the framers intended 
for such an additional exception to exist, the framers could have easily 
drafted such an exception just as the framers specified that juvenile courts 
under Amendment 67 would retain the juvenile jurisdiction then vested in 
county courts by Article 7, section 28 of the Arkansas Constitution. 
Second, Amendment 67’s use of the term “jurisdiction” should be in-
terpreted to include all possible jurisdiction related to juvenile matters, in-
cluding all jurisdiction cognizable at law or in equity. As suggested above, if 
the framers had intended for courts to wield jurisdiction beyond that which 
the General Assembly specified, the framers could have expressly provided 
for the specific kinds of jurisdiction that the General Assembly had the dis-
cretion to define or expressly stated what jurisdiction the courts retained. 
 
 69. See, e.g., Larry Hobbs Farm Equip. v. CNH America, LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 385, 291 
S.W.3d 190, 195 (2009); Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 748, 841 S.W.2d 593, 595 (1992) 
(applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to resolve an issue of constitu-
tional interpretation). Such an exclusive designation of power to the General Assembly is 
also consistent with Arkansas’s strong separation-of-powers doctrine that prohibits one 
branch of government from exercising the authority of another branch of government. See 
supra notes 56–57, 59 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Calnan, 310 Ark. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 595. In Calnan, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court addressed a similar issue of interpretation related to a constitutional amendment. Id. at 
746–47, 841 S.W.2d at 596. In that case, the court evaluated whether the requirement that a 
party must object in order to preserve an issue for appeal provides an exception to the right to 
a jury trial under the Arkansas Constitution where the defendant in the case failed to object to 
the trial court’s failure to honor the defendant’s right to a jury trial. Id. at 747–48, 841 
S.W.2d at 596–97. On that issue, the court found that the defendant did not lose his right to a 
jury trial by not objecting because the only exception to the right to a jury trial expressed in 
the Arkansas Constitution was “waiver.” Id. at 749, 841 S.W.2d at 596. The court held that 
the expression of “waiver” as the only exception to the general rule that the right to a jury 
trial was to remain inviolate meant that there were no other exceptions to the right to a jury 
trial. Id. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 596. Calnan is particularly relevant to this article’s analysis of 
Amendment 67 because, in both situations, the analysis pits the judiciary’s long history of 
employing the given requirement or power against the correct interpretation of a specific 
constitutional provision, specifically the long-standing requirement that objections must be 
preserved at trial against the right to a jury trial in Calnan and the judiciary’s long-standing 
jurisdiction over juveniles against the jurisdictional changes contemplated by Amendment 67. 
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Either method, if not phrased as a truly open-ended series,71 could have im-
posed limits on the scope of juvenile jurisdiction. But that is not what 
Amendment 67 provides. The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
once again suggests that the judiciary did not inherit or otherwise retain pre-
viously held jurisdiction over juveniles—including the Shelby Doctrine’s 
jurisdiction in equity over juveniles—because the framers included only one 
mechanism for a court to inherit or otherwise retain jurisdiction over juve-
niles, namely, the requirement that the General Assembly transfer juvenile 
jurisdiction held by county courts at the time Amendment 67 was adopted.72 
This demonstrates that the framers intended Amendment 67 to give the 
General Assembly power over all jurisdiction related to juvenile matters 
other than the one exception to the General Assembly’s power related to 
county court jurisdiction. 
Third, the problems that Amendment 67 was designed to fix and the 
circumstances in which Amendment 67 was adopted further indicate that the 
framers intended the General Assembly to have the exclusive authority to 
prescribe all jurisdiction available to Arkansas courts in child-welfare pro-
ceedings.73 Amendment 67 was expressly part of the General Assembly’s 
solution to the jurisdictional crisis that arose when the Arkansas Supreme 
Court invalidated Arkansas’s child-welfare system in Walker.74 Moreover, 
Amendment 67 was adopted in response75 to the broader and well-known 
dysfunction in the child-welfare system that resulted from overlapping juris-
dictions between nearly all of Arkansas’s trial courts—including between 
the courts with statutory jurisdiction over child-welfare cases76 and chancery 
 
 71. See Edwards v. Campbell, 2010 Ark. 398, at 4–5, 370 S.W.3d 250, 253 (describing 
ejusdem generis, the doctrine of interpretation that provides that when general words follow 
enumerations of particular things, the general words must be interpreted to include only those 
things of the same kind as those specifically enumerated things); State v. Oldner, 361 Ark. 
316, 327, 206 S.W.3d 818, 822 (2005) (same); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W. 
465, 468–69 (1919) (same). 
 72. ARK. CONST. amend. 67. 
 73. See Brewer, 348 Ark. at 581, 79 S.W.3d at 833–34 (observing that when interpreting 
a constitutional amendment, “it is helpful to determine what changes the amendment was 
intended to make in the existing law”). 
 74. See, e.g., Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 47–52, 722 S.W.2d 
558, 560–62 (1987); BLAIR & BARTH, supra note 31, at 225, 227; GOSS, supra note 40, at 
239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
 75. GOSS, supra note 40, at 239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
 76. Prior to Walker, county courts held jurisdiction over child-welfare matters governed 
by the juvenile code. Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–52, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62; see also supra notes 
31–39 and accompanying text. After Walker, the General Assembly transferred the jurisdic-
tion formerly held by county courts into a juvenile division of circuit court with respect to 
juvenile delinquency and into a juvenile division of probate court with respect to “juveniles 
in need of supervision” and dependent-neglected juveniles. Act of Feb. 6, 1987, Reg. Sess., 
No. 14, §§ 2, 3, 1987 Ark. Acts 24, 25–27; see also supra notes 31–39 and accompanying 
text. 
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courts, which held the jurisdiction in equity over juveniles asserted by the 
Shelby Doctrine.77 The overlapping jurisdictions directly impacted the effec-
tiveness of the increasingly complex statutory scheme designed by the Gen-
eral Assembly to implement expanding public policies to protect juveniles 
because, as Walker and other cases demonstrated, the General Assembly had 
limited means to improve the operation of the child-welfare system prior to 
the adoption of Amendment 67. 
These limitations arose from the fact that the Arkansas Constitution’s 
then-existing jurisdictional framework (1) limited what court the General 
Assembly could designate to be a juvenile court;78 (2) created confusion as 
to the contours of the jurisdictional framework involving juveniles,79 includ-
 
 77. See GOSS, supra note 40, at 239; supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text. 
 78. These limitations were based partially on the General Assembly’s inability to create 
a court other than chancery courts, courts of common pleas, and the Court of Appeals of 
Arkansas. ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 32, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22; ARK. 
CONST. amend. 24 (permitting the General Assembly to provide for the consolidation of 
chancery and probate courts); ARK. CONST. amend. 58, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, 
§ 22, subsec. D; Walker, 291 Ark. at 47, 722 S.W.2d at 560; Ward Sch. Bus Mfg., Inc. v. 
Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 120, 547 S.W.2d 394, 405 (1977) (“The powers of the General As-
sembly to alter the structure of the judicial system [are] very limited.”). The Arkansas Consti-
tution also imposed limitations on what jurisdiction could be exercised by the various courts. 
ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 27, 33, 51–52 (jurisdiction of circuit courts); id. §§ 11, 14–15, 35, 
45, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (same); id. § 15, repealed by ARK. CONST. 
amend. 80, § 22 (jurisdiction of chancery courts); id. § 34, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 
80, § 22 (jurisdiction of probate courts); id. § 28 (jurisdiction of county courts); id. § 34, 
repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (same); id. § 24, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 
80, § 22 (jurisdiction of probate and chancery courts). Admittedly, Amendment 24 and the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hutton indicate that the General Assembly did have 
some ability to designate a juvenile court—but only some authority. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that the conclusion in Hutton that the General Assembly had the authority to expand 
the jurisdiction of probate court is arguably dicta. First, the issue of the probate court’s juris-
diction over dependency-neglect cases was unnecessary to the result reached by the Hutton 
court, particularly given that the court found that the probate court did have jurisdiction over 
such matters. See, e.g., Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 267–68, 769 S.W.2d 394, 400 
(1989); In re Giurbino, 258 Ark. 277, 281, 524 S.W.2d 236, 238 (1975) (“[T]his court will 
not decide constitutional questions unless such a decision is necessary to a determination of 
the pending case.”). Second, the court could have solely relied on the much narrower basis 
that the actions of the juvenile master in the case exceeded the authority permitted by Arkan-
sas law, which the court found before reaching the issue of probate court jurisdiction; instead, 
the court went out of its way to address the issue of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hutton, 298 Ark. at 
267–68, 769 S.W.2d at 399–400 (holding that the actions of the juvenile court were contrary 
to the Arkansas Constitution, existing case law, and the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Paschal v. State, 2012 Ark. 127, at 14–15, 388 S.W.3d 429, 437 (declining to reach additional 
constitutional issues after finding a statute unconstitutional on more direct state constitutional 
grounds); Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 9, 11, 308 S.W.3d 135, 
141–42 (same). 
 79. One need only look at the legions of cases challenging the jurisdiction of circuit, 
chancery, probate, and county courts over juvenile matters between 1907 and 1989 to see that 
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ing as to the extent of probate80 and chancery81 court jurisdiction over juve-
nile matters; and (3) ensured that the child-welfare system and the juvenile 
 
the proper distribution of juvenile jurisdiction in Arkansas has long been an open question. 
See, e.g., Walker, 291 Ark. at 47–48, 722 S.W.2d at 560 (striking down the 1975 Juvenile 
Code’s investiture with county courts of jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed by the 
juvenile code); Dyer v. Ross-Lawhon, 288 Ark. 327, 330, 704 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1986) (hold-
ing that a probate court has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian even with a pending juvenile 
court matter); Jarmon v. Brown, 286 Ark. 455, 456–57, 692 S.W.2d 618, 619–20 (1985) 
(invalidating the custody order of a chancery court because county courts had exclusive juris-
diction over bastardy cases); Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 243–45, 617 S.W.2d 
857, 858–59 (1981) (employing the jurisdictional scheme of juvenile, probate, chancery, and 
circuit courts as provided in the juvenile code and the Arkansas Constitution); Lee v. Grubbs, 
269 Ark. 205, 206–07, 599 S.W.2d 715, 716 (1980) (finding that juvenile courts do not have 
the jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for illegitimate juveniles because such jurisdiction was 
held only by probate courts); Sargent v. Cole, 269 Ark. 121, 125–26, 598 S.W.2d 749, 752 
(1980) (holding that a juvenile over age fifteen could be tried in juvenile, circuit, and munici-
pal courts as provided by the juvenile code); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 935–36, 377 
S.W.2d 816, 820–21 (1964) (finding that the juvenile court could not appoint a guardian 
because the appointment of a guardian was within the sole jurisdiction of probate courts); 
Edwards v. Martin, 231 Ark. 528, 529–30, 331 S.W.2d 97, 97–98 (1960) (providing that the 
probate court has no jurisdiction over the custody of juveniles because chancery courts are 
vested with that jurisdiction); Underwood v. Farrell, 175 Ark. 217, 217, 299 S.W. 5, 6 (1927) 
(holding that a juvenile court did not have the jurisdiction to sentence a delinquent juvenile to 
prison because that jurisdiction was held by circuit courts); Scott v. Brown, 160 Ark. 489, 
489, 254 S.W. 1074, 1075–76 (1923) (holding that the juvenile court did not violate the con-
stitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of probate courts over the persons and estates of juve-
niles); Ex parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W. 465, 466, 469 (1919) (upholding the 1911 
Juvenile Code’s investiture with county courts of jurisdiction over juvenile matters governed 
by the juvenile code). The determination of what jurisdiction belonged in which court was 
also compounded by Arkansas’s retention of courts of equity as separate courts from courts 
of law well past 1989 and the jurisdictional tension that such a system produces. See Morton 
Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts: Historical 
Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 244–45, 247 (1995); 
Mark R. Killenbeck, And Then They Did . . . ? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 
ARK. L. REV. 235, 312–37 (1991). 
 80. At the time Amendment 67 was adopted, the jurisdiction of probate courts related to 
child-welfare matters was something of open question because of two potentially conflicting 
authorities in Arkansas: (1) the Arkansas Supreme Court 1919 holding in King that probate 
courts did not have jurisdiction over child-welfare matters contemplated by the juvenile code, 
King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 467–68, and (2) Amendment 24, which was adopted in 
1938 and allowed the General Assembly to revise probate court jurisdiction. ARK. CONST. 
amend. 24. Indeed, despite the adoption of Amendment 24, King’s prohibition appears to 
have been good law at the time of the adoption of Amendment 67 because neither the court in 
Walker nor any appellate court in Arkansas had abrogated this rule. Walker, 291 Ark. at 48–
51, 722 S.W.2d at 560–62 (citing cases that approved of King but only abrogating King to the 
extent that the Walker court held that county courts did in fact lack jurisdiction to hear child-
welfare matters because such were not matters only of “local concern”). It was not until 
1989—a year after Amendment 67 was passed by voters—that the Arkansas Supreme Court 
addressed the impact of Amendment 24 on the appropriate jurisdiction of probate courts 
related to juvenile matters and found that Amendment 24 provided the General Assembly 
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court were subject to the competing jurisdiction of other courts—most nota-
bly the jurisdiction in equity of chancery courts over juveniles that the Shel-
by Doctrine asserts.82 It therefore stands to reason that Amendment 67 was 
adopted to not only put in place a constitutional child-welfare system that 
complied with Walker, but also to eliminate the limitations on what court the 
General Assembly could designate as the court in child-welfare cases, what 
jurisdiction the General Assembly could grant to such a court, and the con-
current and competing jurisdiction over juveniles in child-welfare cases held 
by courts that had undermined the effectiveness of the child-welfare system 
for so long. 
 
with the constitutional authority to add jurisdiction over juvenile matters to the jurisdiction of 
probate courts. Hutton, 298 Ark. at 267–68, 769 S.W.2d at 400. Even Hutton, however, tacit-
ly suggests that Amendment 67 informed the court’s conclusions regarding the impact of 
Amendment 24 on the General Assembly’s authority because the Hutton court noted the 
existence of Amendment 67 following its formal analysis involving Amendment 24. See id., 
769 S.W.2d at 400. 
 81. Although chancery courts prior to Amendment 67 surely held the jurisdiction over 
juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine, the extent of a chancery court’s jurisdiction was far 
less settled because even though chancery courts were ostensibly limited to the jurisdiction 
that chancery courts could have exercised in equity at the time of the adoption of the 1874 
Constitution, it was not always clear just what fell within that equitable jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Mark R. Killenbeck, Nothing That We Can Do? Or, Much Ado About Nothing? Some 
Thoughts on Bates v. Bates, Equity, and Domestic Abuse in Arkansas, 43 ARK. L. REV. 725, 
734 (1990) (arguing that chancery courts were not limited to the jurisdiction in equity cog-
nizable at the time the people adopted the 1874 Constitution). This was because all equitable 
remedies—including the jurisdiction over juveniles held by a chancery court—were only 
available if there is not an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Bryant v. Picado, 338 Ark. 227, 
230–231, 996 S.W.2d 17, 18–19 (1999); American Investors Life Ins. Co. v. TCB Transp., 
Inc., 312 Ark. 343, 345, 849 S.W.2d 509, 511 (1993); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 91, 793 
S.W.2d 788, 790 (1990) (citing Patterson v. McKay, 199 Ark. 140, 134 S.W.2d 543 (1939)). 
Thus, with the expansion of the jurisdiction and remedies available to courts of law under the 
various incarnations of Arkansas’s juvenile codes, the equitable jurisdiction over juveniles 
asserted by the Shelby Doctrine would have become increasingly narrow over time because 
of the expansion of legal remedies limiting the circumstances in which equitable jurisdiction 
could have been asserted over juveniles. In other words, even though the General Assembly 
could not expand or contract equitable jurisdiction, the equitable jurisdiction over juveniles 
became subject to increasingly expansive remedies at law that limited the circumstances in 
which equity could properly be invoked. Not surprisingly, the court in Shelby did not address 
nor much less conclude that the juvenile code did not provide an adequate remedy at law. 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
 82. Perhaps the first recognition of the concurrence of these competing and separate 
jurisdictions came from the Arkansas Supreme Court itself in King, where the court held that 
the 1911 Juvenile Code did not interfere with the jurisdiction of probate courts over the 
guardianship of the estates of minors, the jurisdiction of criminal courts over the criminal 
prosecution of juveniles, the jurisdiction of circuit courts over all matters not otherwise pre-
scribed by the Arkansas Constitution to another court, or the “general jurisdiction over the 
persons and property of minors” held by chancery courts in equity. King, 141 Ark at 213, 217 
S.W. at 467–70. 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 415 
Fourth, the General Assembly’s decision to respond to the Walker de-
cision with a constitutional amendment further demonstrates that the framers 
intended Amendment 67 to provide the General Assembly the exclusive, 
constitutional authority to prescribe all jurisdiction available to Arkansas 
courts in child-welfare proceedings. Specifically, the General Assembly 
passed Amendment 67 and sent it to the voters for approval after the Gen-
eral Assembly had passed Act 14, its initial emergency response to Walker, 
but before the General Assembly passed the Juvenile Code of 1989, the 
General Assembly’s more comprehensive child-welfare reform effort that 
vested jurisdiction over child-welfare matters in a single court, the juvenile 
division of chancery court.83 The adoption of Amendment 67 prior to the 
enactment of the revised juvenile code was plainly necessary in order to 
allow the General Assembly to provide chancery courts with jurisdiction 
over child-welfare matters governed by the juvenile code because the Gen-
eral Assembly was not authorized to modify the jurisdiction of chancery 
courts as the General Assembly could with probate courts84 and chancery 
courts did not have the catch-all jurisdiction that circuit courts had over mat-
ters not otherwise specifically designated to another court by the Arkansas 
Constitution.85 However, the breadth of Amendment 67’s broad announce-
ment of the General Assembly’s authority would have been unnecessary if 
all the General Assembly intended to do was simply to allow the General 
Assembly to modify chancery jurisdiction to include matters governed by 
the juvenile code.86 The adoption of Amendment 67 itself further suggests 
that the framers believed that the General Assembly’s existing powers were 
not sufficient. Moreover, the General Assembly’s decision to vest jurisdic-
tion over child-welfare matters with chancery courts in the 1989 Juvenile 
Code does not necessarily mean that the General Assembly intended chan-
cery courts to retain equity jurisdiction over juveniles following the adop-
tion of Amendment 67. Again, such an intent is not evidenced anywhere in 
Amendment 67’s text and is contraindicated by the fact that the only juris-
diction that Amendment 67 did carry over was jurisdiction related to county 
courts, which did not have equity jurisdiction. 
Fifth, the specific, exclusive, and limited jurisdiction that the General 
Assembly provided in the Juvenile Code of 1989 to the juvenile courts of 
 
 83. Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, No. 273, 1989 Ark. Acts 486 (codified as amended 
at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013)). 
 84. Compare ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 15, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22, 
with ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 34, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22, and ARK. CONST. 
amend. 24; see Hutton, 298 Ark. at 267–68, 769 S.W. at 400. 
 85. Robins v. Ark. Soc. Servs., 273 Ark. 241, 244–45, 617 S.W.2d 857, 858–59 (1981); 
King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 466–68 (providing that circuit courts would have jurisdic-
tion over child-welfare matters if such matters were not vested with any other court). 
 86. Compare ARK. CONST. amend. 24, with ARK. CONST. amend. 67. 
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the time—then the juvenile division of chancery court—indicates that the 
General Assembly intended Amendment 67 to reboot the jurisdiction over 
juveniles held by Arkansas’s courts. Consider the following: chancery 
courts prior to the adoption of Amendment 67 unquestionably had the au-
thority to “make all orders that will properly safeguard the[] rights” of juve-
niles appearing before them under chancery courts’ jurisdiction in equity 
over juveniles.87 Thus, if that jurisdiction had continued, chancery courts 
and modern circuit courts acting as juvenile courts after them would have 
the equitable jurisdiction to protect juveniles appearing before them and 
ensure that “necessary services” were being provided to the juveniles in 
whatever kind of case the juvenile was involved in, child-welfare or other-
wise. And the scope of this jurisdiction would have been limited only by the 
bounds of equity and not by any limitations made by the General Assembly 
in law, a fact that the General Assembly was well aware of following Walk-
er. Nevertheless, the Juvenile Code of 1989 included specific limitations on 
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and the authority of juvenile courts to or-
der the Department to provide services—limitations that would have been 
meaningless unless the General Assembly had intended the juvenile code to 
prescribe the whole jurisdiction available to juvenile courts. These specific 
limitations indicate that the General Assembly did intend to prescribe juris-
diction as described in the Juvenile Code of 1989. This apparent intention 
supports the conclusion that the framers intended Amendment 67 to reboot 
the jurisdiction over juveniles held by Arkansas’s courts. 
Sixth, Amendment 67 itself would be rendered meaningless88 if all it 
did was state that the General Assembly had the power to confer jurisdiction 
over juvenile mattes without the ability to alter existing common law juris-
dictions like equitable jurisdiction. Such a reading would effectively render 
Amendment 67 constitutional surplusage because it would be a mere re-
 
 87. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 105, 680 S.W.2d 118, 120 (1984) (citing 
Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583, 12 
S.W.2d 879 (1928); State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)). 
 88. Arkansas’s jurisprudence governing the interpretation of statutory and constitutional 
provisions has long required that such provisions must be interpreted so as not to render the 
provision meaningless. Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261, at 3, 2011 WL 2412740, at *2 (ob-
serving that laws must be interpreted “so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignifi-
cant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible”); Osborn v. 
Bryant, 2009 Ark. 358, at 6, 324 S.W.3d 687, 690 (same); Larry Hobbs Farm Equip. v. CNH 
Am., LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 383, 291 S.W.3d 190, 195 (2009) (finding that courts must con-
strue statutes so that “no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant” and so that “meaning 
and effect” are given to every word in the statute); McDonald v. Bowen, 250 Ark. 1049, 
1060, 468 S.W.2d 765, 771 (1971) (Fogleman, J., concurring and dissenting) (“In statutory 
and constitutional construction, if it is possible to do, we are bound to give meaning and 
effect to every word, phrase and clause, so that no word is rendered void, superfluous or 
insignificant or discarded as surplusage.”). 
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statement of Amendment 80, which gives the General Assembly the power 
to “establish jurisdiction of all courts” unless otherwise provided by the Ar-
kansas Constitution and affords modern circuit courts with the jurisdiction 
previously held by circuit, chancery, probate, and juvenile courts, including 
such common law and equitable jurisdiction as may have existed in those 
courts at the time Amendment 80 was adopted.89 Amendment 80 therefore 
encompasses a broad jurisdictional power that would completely encompass 
Amendment 67’s power because Amendment 80 is not limited to juvenile 
matters and Amendment 80 did not repeal Amendment 67 as it had done 
with Amendment 24, another jurisdictional amendment.90 Moreover, 
Amendment 67 appears to fall within Amendment 80’s exception for other 
constitutional provisions. Thus, even if the jurisdictional authority contem-
plated under Amendment 80 includes common law jurisdiction, Amendment 
67 overrules that jurisdictional augmentation for child-welfare proceedings 
because it does not specifically provide for the reservation of common law 
jurisdiction like Amendment 80 did for all other types of cases.91 In these 
ways, it seems that the framers of Amendment 80 intended Amendment 67 
to mean something more than even the broad power over jurisdiction pro-
vided to the General Assembly under Amendment 80.92 
 
 89. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 10 (“The General Assembly shall have the power to 
establish jurisdiction of all courts . . . unless otherwise provided in this Constitution.”); ARK. 
CONST. amend. 80, §§ 10, 19, subsec. B, ¶ 1. 
 90. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22. More to the point, even though Amendment 80 
was adopted later than Amendment 67, Amendment 80 does not supersede Amendment 67’s 
specific authorization because Amendment 80 specifically did not supersede Amendment 67 
like Amendment 80 did with other constitutional provisions related to jurisdiction, including 
Amendment 24, and Amendment 80 is not irreconcilable with Amendment 67. See, e.g., 
ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22 (expressly superseding Amendment 24 along with a list of 
specific constitutional provisions that did not include Amendment 67 and providing that 
“[n]o other provision of the Constitution . . . shall be repealed by [Amendment 80] unless the 
provision is in irreconcilable conflict with the provisions of [Amendment 80]”); Brock v. 
Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, at 16–17, 309 S.W.2d 179, 189 (providing that a law may be 
deemed repealed by implication where there is either an irreconcilable conflict between the 
first law and the law adopted subsequent to the first law or the “legislature takes up the whole 
subject anew and covers the entire ground of the subject matter of a former [law] and evident-
ly intends it as a substitute”). 
 91. No other applicable provision reserved to any court common law jurisdiction at the 
time Amendment 80 was enacted except for Amendment 80 itself, leaving Amendment 67 as 
the only “otherwise provided” source that would impact jurisdiction. See supra notes 88–90 
and accompanying text. Moreover, even if Amendment 80 were to be interpreted as subsum-
ing and implicitly overruling Amendment 67, no equitable jurisdiction over juveniles existed 
in child-welfare proceedings at the time that Amendment 80 was adopted. 
 92. Indeed, a natural reading of Amendments 80 and 67 together preserves the General 
Assembly’s prerogative under Amendment 67 to prescribe the jurisdiction of modern circuit 
courts in juvenile matters while allowing Amendment 80 to reserve probate and equity juris-
diction over matters not having to do with juveniles. In addition, such a harmonious reading 
is in accord with the framers’ intentional omission of Amendment 67 in Amendment 80’s 
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c. Arkansas case law supports the interpretation that Amend-
ment 67 rebooted the jurisdiction of Arkansas courts in juve-
nile matters 
Arkansas’s case law on the jurisdiction of juvenile courts before and 
after Amendment 67 is largely in accord with the interpretation that 
Amendment 67 rebooted the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts over juveniles 
and limited the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts to only that jurisdiction 
provided by the General Assembly.93 The Arkansas Supreme Court and the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals have long held that Arkansas’s courts have lim-
ited authority and jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings and that the ju-
venile code imposes limitations on the authority of courts to order the De-
partment to act in child-welfare proceedings.94 Reviewing courts have also 
 
repealer even though the framers included other provisions related to modern circuit court 
jurisdiction such as Amendment 24, which impacted jurisdiction over probate and chancery 
courts and also included authority for the General Assembly to impact the jurisdiction of a 
court. See, e.g., Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 267–68, 769 S.W.2d 394, 400 (1989). But 
see Glover v. Henry, 231 Ark. 111, 115–16, 328 S.W.2d 382, 385 (1959) (declining to inter-
pret a constitutional amendment as doing anything more than “reaffirm[ing] the existing 
[constitutional] law as a basis for the operation of other provisions in the amendment”). Alt-
hough the Arkansas Supreme Court in Glover did find that it was permissible for a constitu-
tional amendment merely to restate existing law, the court based that finding on its conclu-
sion that the restatement was merely the part of the amendment that formed the “basis for the 
operation of the other provisions in the amendment.” Id., 328 S.W.2d at 385. By contrast, 
Amendment 67 has no other provisions other than the amendment’s grant of power to the 
General Assembly and the amendment’s description of that power. See ARK. CONST. amend. 
67. 
 93. Although Arkansas courts do still refer to child-welfare proceedings as “equity mat-
ters” after the adoption of Amendment 67 and Amendment 80, the references are limited to 
the de novo nature of appellate review that the cases were entitled to and never recognized 
any additional jurisdiction arising under equity. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 4–5, 423 S.W.3d 86, 88–89; Mahone v. Ark. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 819, at 3, 2010 WL 4983009, at *3, rev’d on other grounds, Mahone 
v. Ark. Dept. Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 370, 383 S.W.3d 854; Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs. v. C.M., 100 Ark. App. 414, 415–16, 269 S.W.3d 387, 388 (2007); Moiser v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 95 Ark. App. 32, 34–35, 233 S.W.3d 172, 174 (2006); cf. Ingle v. 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. 53, at 9, 431 S.W.3d 303, 308 (applying an exception 
to normal de novo review in equity cases where an appeals court can enter an order that the 
circuit court “should have entered”). 
 94. See, e.g., Young v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. 334, at 1, 3–4, 2012 WL 
4163177, at *1, *3–4 (holding that a circuit court could not reopen a dependency-neglect case 
after the court had closed the case because the court’s jurisdiction ended pursuant to the juve-
nile code once the juvenile was no longer dependent-neglected and the case was closed, but 
affirming the circuit court’s order based on the court’s separate jurisdiction to hear custody 
matters); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, at 7–9, 346 S.W.3d 283, 
288 (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order the Department to use a 
particular provider because the juvenile code prohibited trial courts from making such or-
ders); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506, 516–523, 95 S.W.3d 722, 779–
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acknowledged that, following the adoption of Amendment 67, the General 
Assembly’s passage of the juvenile code “defined jurisdiction of matters 
relating to juveniles and conferred such jurisdiction upon [juvenile courts]” 
and that both the juvenile courts and the Department are “creatures of stat-
ute.”95 
 
782 (2003) (holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction in a dependency-neglect 
action over an unborn fetus because the juvenile code’s definition of “juvenile” did not in-
clude unborn fetuses); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 319 Ark. 749, 750–51, 894 
S.W.2d 592, 593 (1995) (holding that the omission of any authority regarding the placement 
of juveniles in a youth services center precluded the juvenile court from entering an order 
making such a placement); Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 767–68, 894 S.W.2d 888, 889–90 
(1995) (holding that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over a delinquency proceeding that 
did not fall within the juvenile code’s definition of what delinquency proceedings the juvenile 
court could hear); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 485–89, 850 S.W.2d 
847, 849–51 (1993) (holding that a juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to order the De-
partment to pay restitution for a juvenile in the Department’s custody because, inter alia, the 
juvenile code did not provide the court with that authority); A.M., 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 423 
S.W.3d at 90–91 (holding that a circuit court did not have the authority to order the Depart-
ment to provide a juvenile maternity clothes or school uniforms because such services did not 
fall within the juvenile code’s definition of “family services”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
Thomas, 71 Ark. App. 348, 352, 33 S.W.3d 514, 517 (2000) (holding that a juvenile court 
lacked the jurisdiction to address the placement of names on the Child Maltreatment Central 
Registry because the jurisdiction was not provided to the juvenile court by statute); Ark. 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Southerland, 65 Ark. App. 97, 100, 985 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1999) 
(holding that a juvenile court did not have the statutory authority to order the Department to 
pay a foster-care board payment to a person who had not been licensed by the Department to 
be a foster home and finding such a payment would conflict with Department policy and 
federal law); cf. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cir. Ct. of Sebastian Cnty., 363 Ark. 389, 
393–94, 214 S.W.3d 856, 859–60 (2005) (declining to issue a writ of certiorari to a circuit 
court that had ordered physical and legal custody to be split where the juvenile code does not 
expressly allow custody to be split because the circuit court below had “jurisdiction” under 
the juvenile code to make custody determinations); Hudson v. Kyle, 352 Ark. 346, 349–52, 
101 S.W.3d 202, 205–07 (2003) (holding that a court did not have the authority to terminate 
parental rights under Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-9-220 despite jurisdiction over “all justiciable 
matters”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cox, 349 Ark. 205, 210–14, 82 S.W.3d 806, 810–
12 (2002) (holding that a probate court had jurisdiction to enter a guardianship order over a 
juvenile in the custody of the Department pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody and Juris-
diction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because the UCCJEA did not apply to the juvenile); 
Nance v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 53–54, 873 S.W.2d 812, 813–14 (1994) 
(clarifying a prior decision and holding that when the juvenile court took jurisdiction of a 
child-welfare case, the juvenile code’s requirements regarding review hearings became man-
datory and the juvenile court was “wrong” to dismiss the case in violation of those require-
ments); Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 211, 833 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1992) (holding 
that even though the juvenile court had jurisdiction to declare the juvenile mother in need of 
family services pursuant to the juvenile code, the court had no jurisdiction to prohibit the 
juvenile from obtaining an abortion); Lewis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 
154, at 14–15, 391 S.W.3d 695, 704 (holding that a circuit court lacked the authority to ter-
minate a parent’s rights except as provided under the juvenile code). 
 95. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407–08, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463–
64 (1991); see also Thomas, 71 Ark. App. at 352, 33 S.W.3d at 517. 
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Reviewing courts often cite the juvenile code’s specific provisions as a 
court’s source of authority even where the reviewing court finds that a lower 
court did have the authority or jurisdiction to act or order the Department to 
act.96 Perhaps the most frequently invoked of these limitations arises from 
the definition of “family services,” which Arkansas’s reviewing courts have 
consistently found to limit the scope and extent of the services that a modern 
circuit court has the authority to order the Department to perform.97 If the 
juvenile code did not in fact limit the authority and jurisdiction of modern 
circuit courts in this way—as the Shelby Doctrine implicitly requires—then 
courts in numerous cases would not have been limited to “family services” 
in those cases and would have instead been free to order the Department to 
provide such necessary services as the court believed appropriate under the 
jurisdiction in equity asserted by the Shelby Doctrine. Such a conclusion, 
however, conflicts with long-standing precedent in Arkansas and would 
appear to implicitly overrule Arkansas’s long-standing recognition of the 
juvenile code as the source of judicial authority in child-welfare proceed-
ings. 
3. Amendment 67’s Impact on the Shelby Doctrine and the Jurisdic-
tion of Circuit Courts in Child-Welfare Proceedings 
The interpretation that Amendment 67 rebooted all jurisdiction related 
to juveniles and extinguished all judicial jurisdiction over juveniles in child-
welfare proceedings is consequential in four related respects. First, the in-
terpretation directly and necessarily invalidates the Shelby Doctrine’s reli-
ance on jurisdiction that the General Assembly has not provided to modern 
circuit courts, specifically including the jurisdiction that chancery courts 
 
 96. Cf., e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.B., 347 Ark. 593, 599–603, 67 S.W.3d 
539, 543–46 (2002) (holding that the juvenile court could order the Department to pay for a 
juvenile’s residential treatment because the juvenile code allows the court to order financial 
assistance and treatment as “family services”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 
516, 529–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 231–33 (1998) (holding that a juvenile court had jurisdiction 
to order the Department to pay a family’s utility bills because the juvenile code specifically 
authorized courts to order cash assistance in family-in-need-of-services cases like the one 
before the court below); Clark, 304 Ark. at 407–08, 802 S.W.2d at 463–64 (upholding juve-
nile court’s order for the Department to provide financial and transportation assistance be-
cause such assistance was included in the juvenile code’s definition of “family services”); 
C.M., 100 Ark. App. at 416–17, 269 S.W.3d at 389–90 (holding that a juvenile court could 
order the Department to pay for a juvenile’s legal representation in an administrative hearing 
because the payment would constitute “cash assistance” under the juvenile code’s definition 
of “family services”). 
 97. See, e.g., A.M., 2012 Ark. App. at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d at 90–91; cf. T.B., 347 Ark. at 
599–603, 67 S.W.3d at 543–46; R.P., 333 Ark. at 529–32, 970 S.W.2d at 231–33; Clark, 304 
Ark. at 407–08, 802 S.W.2d at 463–64; C.M., 100 Ark. App. at 416–17, 269 S.W.3d at 389–
90. 
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held in equity over juveniles prior to the adoption of Amendment 67. Se-
cond, the interpretation recognizes the juvenile code as the only source of 
jurisdiction and authority available to modern circuit courts in child-welfare 
proceedings, which in turn invalidates the Shelby Doctrine’s express asser-
tion that circuit courts have jurisdiction in child-welfare matters beyond the 
jurisdiction prescribed by the juvenile code. Third, the interpretation con-
firms and constitutionalizes Arkansas’s long-standing case law that provides 
that the jurisdiction of modern circuit courts in child-welfare cases is limited 
to the jurisdiction prescribed in the juvenile code. Fourth, the interpretation 
does not change what is required to invoke jurisdiction in equity generally 
or the limitations imposed on the scope of the jurisdiction over juveniles in 
equity specifically. 
The jurisdictional bases of the Shelby Doctrine, however, assert that 
circuit courts hold jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that was held by 
chancery courts prior to the adoption of Amendment 67 and that this juris-
diction authorizes circuit courts to dictate the Department’s internal opera-
tions in child-welfare cases.98 More specifically, the majority in Shelby ex-
plained that circuit courts held jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that au-
thorized circuit courts to “make all orders that will properly safeguard the[] 
rights” of juveniles appearing before it, including orders to protect such ju-
veniles and “assure that . . . necessary services are being delivered.”99 The 
majority relied on this specific source of jurisdiction to sanction the circuit 
court’s order that the Department “rectify” the high caseload of the Depart-
ment’s caseworker assigned to the case, which effectively dictated to the 
Department how it should conduct internal staffing operations.100 
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of such equitable jurisdiction is invalid 
because Amendment 67 extinguished the jurisdiction over juveniles held in 
equity by chancery courts when Amendment 67 was enacted in 1989.101 
Modern circuit courts therefore cannot exercise this equitable jurisdiction 
over juveniles unless the General Assembly granted such jurisdiction to cir-
cuit courts through the juvenile code or some other law.102 But as described 
 
 98. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, 
at *3–5; supra Part II. 
 99. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 102. See supra Part III.A.2. Likewise, even if the General Assembly had at one point 
legislatively conferred the same jurisdiction over juveniles previously held by chancery 
courts, the General Assembly would be free to revoke that jurisdiction; the key, in this re-
gard, is whether the General Assembly provided that jurisdiction to a given court at the exact 
time that the court attempts to use it. See, e.g., Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 245 Ark. 
755, 760, 434 S.W.2d 288, 290 (1968) (“There is no question that the legislature may limit or 
withdraw judicial jurisdiction conferred by a legislative act, and there is no question that the 
legislature may amend [statutes] in any manner it deems proper.”); James D. Robertson, 
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above, the General Assembly has never granted or otherwise reserved to any 
court jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the Shelby Doctrine asserts. 
The General Assembly also did not do so in Amendment 67 itself, in the 
1989 Juvenile Code, or in any of the numerous amendments to the 1989 
juvenile code that the General Assembly has enacted in the last two decades. 
Jurisdiction over juveniles in equity was also not altered by the adop-
tion of Amendment 80 because such jurisdiction had already been extin-
guished more than a decade before and would therefore not have been avail-
able to be passed to modern circuit courts by Amendment 80.103 Thus, 
Amendment 80 could not reserve to circuit courts the equitable jurisdiction 
over juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine because that jurisdiction 
simply did not exist at the time Amendment 80 was adopted. Even the ma-
jority in Shelby did not rely on Amendment 80’s consolidation of jurisdic-
tion in circuit courts as the source of the Shelby Doctrine’s authority and 
jurisdiction; rather, the majority merely concluded that equitable jurisdiction 
over juveniles was not altered by Amendment 80.104 
The operation of Amendment 67 to extinguish the equitable jurisdic-
tion asserted by the Shelby Doctrine and to afford the General Assembly the 
unfettered discretion to prescribe the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts relat-
ed to juvenile matters also means that the only jurisdiction that modern cir-
cuit courts have in child-welfare proceedings is that jurisdiction provided 
under the juvenile code. Put another way, the juvenile code is the only 
source of jurisdiction that modern circuit courts have to compel the Depart-
ment to provide services, take custody (or not) of juveniles, or otherwise act 
in child-welfare proceedings. Indeed, without the juvenile code, no court in 
Arkansas could order the Department to provide services, take custody, or 
otherwise act to provide for the welfare of juveniles. The full significance of 
this consequence is described in more detail in Part III.B below through the 
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but for now it is suffi-
cient to observe that Amendment 67 effectively deprives modern circuit 
courts of jurisdiction over juveniles and the Department sufficient to order 
the Department to do anything unless authorized by the juvenile code. 
 
Note, Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Commission: A Hard-Line Approach to Separation of 
Powers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 755, 770 (1995). 
 103. See supra Part III.A.2. Amendment 80 also did not reserve statutory jurisdiction that 
was in effect at the time Amendment 80 was adopted, which constituted the only jurisdiction 
Arkansas’s courts held over juveniles at that time. This is because the General Assembly was 
free to modify this statutory jurisdiction at any time that the General Assembly saw fit—even 
after Amendment 80 was adopted. See supra note 101. More importantly, interpretation of 
Amendment 80 that reserved the statutory jurisdiction over juveniles in place at the time 
Amendment 80 was adopted is misplaced because such an interpretation would directly con-
flict with the General Assembly’s continuing authority under Amendment 67. See ARK. 
CONST. amend. 80, § 22; id. amend. 67; supra Part III.A.2.b. 
 104. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
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Moreover, the interpretation that Amendment 67 rebooted all jurisdic-
tion related to juveniles and extinguished all judicial jurisdiction over juve-
niles in child-welfare proceedings accords with—and provides a specific 
constitutional mandate for—Arkansas’s long-standing case law that limits 
the jurisdiction of modern circuit courts in child-welfare cases to the juris-
diction prescribed in the juvenile code.105 Indeed, Arkansas courts have long 
held that the juvenile code’s specific prescriptions of authority limit what 
modern circuit courts can order the Department to do in cases involving the 
welfare of juveniles.106 More broadly, Arkansas’s appellate courts have held 
that the authority prescribed in the juvenile code is the extent of modern 
circuit court jurisdiction over juveniles, that Arkansas courts have limited 
authority and jurisdiction in child-welfare proceedings, and that the juvenile 
code imposes limitations on the authority of courts to order the Department 
to act in child-welfare proceedings.107 The Shelby Doctrine asserts just the 
opposite, namely, that modern circuit courts hold jurisdiction over juveniles 
in equity that allows modern circuit courts to act outside the juvenile code 
and that the juvenile code is “not the extent of circuit court jurisdiction over 
minors.”108 
Not surprisingly, the majority in Shelby cited only cases that predate 
Amendment 67 to support its position that modern circuit courts have the 
jurisdiction to act outside the juvenile code and order “necessary ser-
vices.”109 This reliance is significant because the majority’s exclusive reli-
ance on this limited swath of case law indicates that the majority did not 
consider the import of Amendment 67 on the traditional jurisdiction over 
juveniles asserted by the Shelby Doctrine—nor did the majority attempt to 
distinguish extensive modern case law that circumscribes the authority and 
jurisdiction of circuit courts. The reason for the majority’s failure to recog-
nize modern case law is, of course, unclear, and whether or not the majority 
affirmatively decided to ignore modern case law that did not support the 
 
 105. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. The majority in Shelby 
acknowledged that the juvenile code does provide the substantive law and procedures appli-
cable to juvenile matters covered by the juvenile code. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (“Ex-
clusive, original jurisdiction for specified proceedings occurring under the Juvenile Code is 
conferred on the circuit court.”). This acknowledgement, combined with the Shelby Doc-
trine’s core assertion that the juvenile code is not the only source of a circuit court’s jurisdic-
tion over juveniles, further suggests that the majority interprets the circuit court’s jurisdiction 
over juvenile code-based proceedings separate from the circuit court’s jurisdiction in equity 
over juveniles. 
 109. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (citing Jones v. Jones, 13 Ark. App. 102, 680 S.W.2d 
118 (1984); Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark 
583, 12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); State v. Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481 (1882)). 
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majority’s position, the majority in Shelby was clearly dissatisfied with the 
Department’s efforts in the case and unquestionably relied on dated cases to 
support the majority’s position. 
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of equitable jurisdiction over juveniles 
is also invalid under Amendment 67 because of what Amendment 67 does 
not do. Specifically, Amendment 67 does not change the requirement that 
equitable jurisdiction is only available if there are no adequate legal reme-
dies available110 and does not change the limitation on the exercise of equi-
table jurisdiction over juveniles to only the person and the estate of the indi-
vidual juvenile or juveniles before the given court exercising that jurisdic-
tion.111 These requirements have governed equity jurisdiction in general 
since antiquity and over juveniles specifically since before the introduction 
of the first juvenile codes in Arkansas.112 The majority in Shelby, however, 
did not apply any of these principles in its analysis or otherwise explain how 
the circuit court below could have exerted equitable jurisdiction over juve-
niles at all, much less how that jurisdiction could justify the entry of an or-
der against the Department to change the Department’s staffing in cases 
other than the one before the circuit court.113 Instead, the majority assumed 
that such jurisdiction was applicable and simply announced that juveniles 
are “wards of the [circuit court] and [that] it is the duty of those courts to 
make all orders that will properly safeguard the[] rights [of juveniles],”114 all 
without mentioning that juvenile jurisdiction in equity has always been lim-
 
 110. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 611, 80 S.W.3d 332, 336 (2002) (“[E]quity 
jurisdiction exists only when the remedy at law is inadequate.”); Watson v. Henderson, 98 
Ark. 63, 63, 135 S.W. 461, 464 (1911) (noting that even the jurisdiction in equity over juve-
niles is limited and “sits silent in the courts as long as the law is able to meet the demands of 
justice”); see also supra note 80. 
 111. See, e.g., Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W.465, 470 (1919) (“The juris-
diction of chancery courts, as the jurisdiction of probate courts in matters relating to guardi-
ans, deals solely with the person and the estate of the individual infant, and has reference to 
the interests of the particular jurisdiction over individual minors.”) (emphasis added); Jones, 
13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at 120 (providing that constitutionally created courts such 
as chancery courts held their “traditional jurisdiction over individual minors”) (emphasis 
added). 
 112. See, e.g., King, 141 Ark. at 213, 217 S.W. at 470; Watson, 98 Ark. at 63, 135 S.W. at 
464 (citing Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481; Myrick v. Jacks, 33 Ark. 425, 1878 WL 
1283 (1878)); Jones, 13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at 120. 
 113. See Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–5. Neither the circuit 
court below nor the majority in Shelby provided any analysis as to the availability of an equi-
table remedy or whether or not the juvenile code provided an adequate remedy at law. And 
neither the circuit court below nor the majority in Shelby addressed the limitation on equita-
ble jurisdiction over juveniles to only the person and estate of the specific juvenile before the 
circuit court. 
 114. Id. at 3, 2012 WL 401615, at *3 (citing Jones, 13 Ark. App. at 105, 680 S.W.2d at 
118; Richards v. Taylor, 202 Ark. 183, 150 S.W.2d 32 (1941); Kirk v. Jones, 178 Ark. 583, 
12 S.W.2d 879 (1928); Grisby, 38 Ark. 406, 1882 WL 1481). 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 425 
ited to the specific juveniles appearing before the court of equity or the re-
quirement that the equitable jurisdiction is only available if the remedy at 
law is insufficient. 
Amendment 67’s impact on a circuit court’s jurisdiction over juveniles 
in equity, however, is not the only deficiency with the Shelby Doctrine’s 
jurisdictional bases. As described below in Part III.B, the Shelby Doctrine’s 
framework also violates Arkansas’s sovereign immunity doctrine. 
B. Sovereign Immunity, the Judiciary’s Inherent Powers, and the Jurisdic-
tion of Circuit Courts to Enter Shelby-Style Orders 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in Arkansas is as old as the state 
itself and has long protected the state and state agencies115 from becoming a 
defendant or otherwise being coerced in any state court except in certain 
narrow circumstances where a recognized exception to the immunity ap-
plies.116 The majority in Shelby, however, failed to address the Department’s 
sovereign immunity directly, much less provide any analysis as to why the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity would not apply to the Department in the 
case. 
This failure is remarkable because, absent the juvenile code and related 
statutes, there is no other legal authority for any court in Arkansas to order 
the Department to provide services, take custody of juveniles, or otherwise 
act to provide for the welfare of juveniles. Although the majority did touch 
on overlapping principles common to both the separation of powers and 
sovereign immunity regarding the general prohibition against courts direct-
ing the discretionary actions of executive agencies,117 the majority never 
developed a fully-formed sovereign immunity analysis of the prohibition 
against any compelled action that sovereign immunity adds to separation-of-
powers principles. As a result, the majority in Shelby effectively conflated 
the two doctrines and subsumed sovereign immunity as nothing more than a 
restatement of separation-of-powers principles that only prohibit one branch 
 
 115. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 731, 
733; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Eddings, 2011 Ark. 47, at 4, 378 S.W.3d 694, 697 (citing 
Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 301 Ark. 451, 784 S.W.2d 771 (1990)); 
Short v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 347 Ark. 497, 65 S.W.3d 440 (2002). 
 116. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made 
defendant in any of her courts.”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 487–
88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 850–51 (1993); Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Flake, 254 Ark. 624, 
628, 495 S.W.2d 855, 858 (1973) (“Sovereign immunity was a common law doctrine that 
originated centuries before the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 117. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 4–5, 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5. 
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of government from exercising the powers of another branch of govern-
ment.118 
This article therefore now turns to address these issues and ultimately 
concludes that the Shelby Doctrine violates the Department’s sovereign im-
munity because the Department’s sovereign immunity applies to invalidate 
Shelby-style orders, and none of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity 
doctrine apply. In addition, the broad Inherent Protection Power asserted in 
Shelby should not constitute a new exception to sovereign immunity that 
would otherwise authorize the entry of Shelby-style orders. 
1. Sovereign Immunity Applies to Invalidate the Shelby Doctrine 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides state agencies with juris-
dictional immunity from suit and prohibits any legal action against a state 
agency that has the purpose or effect, directly or indirectly, of coercing the 
state agency to act or not act.119 Coercion to act includes compelling a state 
agency to spend funds from the State’s treasury, subjecting the State to lia-
bility, or otherwise controlling the action of a state agency.120 The Shelby 
Doctrine therefore triggers the Department’s sovereign immunity because 
the Department is an agency of the State and Shelby-style orders sanctioned 
under the Shelby Doctrine coerce the Department to act to affirmatively 
“fix” problems identified by a court even where the order has the effect of 
compelling the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise 
dictating the Department’s internal operations in child-welfare cases. 
 
 118. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at *4–5 (citing Villines v. Lee, 321 Ark. 405, 902 S.W.2d 233 
(1995)) (discussing the separation-of-powers doctrine but failing to note that the exceptions 
to the general prohibition against reviewing discretionary executive functions described in 
Villines are based on sovereign immunity principles). 
 119. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20; LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 372 
Ark. 40, 42, 269 S.W.3d 793, 795 (2007) (observing that sovereign immunity requires the 
dismissal of a legal action if it “operate[s] to control the action of the State or subject[s] it to 
liability”); Travelers Cas. v. State Highway Comm’n, 353 Ark. 721, 726–28, 120 S.W.3d 50, 
52–54 (2003) (same); State, 312 Ark. at 487–89, 850 S.W.2d at 850–51 (explaining that 
sovereign immunity applies to “[a]ny suit, whether in law or equity, which has for its purpose 
and effect, directly or indirectly, coercing the State”). See generally Jack Druff, State Court 
Sovereign Immunity: Just When Is the Emperor Armor-Clad?, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 255 (2002). 
 120. LandsnPulaski, 372 Ark. at 42, 269 S.W.3d at 795; Travelers, 353 Ark. at 727–28, 
120 S.W.3d at 52–54; Short, 347 Ark. at 504–08, 65 S.W.3d at 445–48 (providing that forc-
ing the State to pay funds from its treasury renders the State a defendant and violates its sov-
ereign immunity); Dermott Spec. Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 90, 93, 32 S.W.3d 477, 479 
(2000) (same); Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 527, 121 S.W. 742, 745–46 (1909) (providing 
that suits that compel state officers to “do acts which would impose a contractual pecuniary 
liability upon the state, or to issue any evidence of debt, in the name of the state, which would 
have that result, is in fact and legal effect a suit against the state” and therefore prohibited). 
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In Shelby, for example, Judge Brown affirmatively commanded the 
Department to reduce the caseload of the caseworker involved in the case—
an order that clearly seeks to control the Department’s internal and discre-
tionary staffing functions. And notwithstanding Judge Brown’s disclaimer 
that he did not intend to “micromanage” the Department,121 Judge Brown 
effectively required the Department to either hire new caseworkers or trans-
fer existing caseworkers into the county to reduce the Department’s case-
load per worker overall by prohibiting the Department from moving the high 
caseload to another caseworker.122 Moreover, because there is no way for the 
caseworker’s caseload to change without assigning the cases to new or exist-
ing caseworkers, the Department would also likely be required to spend 
funds from the State’s treasury to pay for new salaries, mileage, and other 
attendant expenses in order to comply with the order in Shelby and other 
Shelby-style orders. 
And even if the analysis assumes, as the majority in Shelby held, that 
the circuit court was not attempting to control discretionary staffing issues, 
but rather was merely seeking to obtain a case plan that the Department was 
“obligated to provide,” the circuit court still ordered the Department to “fix 
the problems that stopped [the Department] from fulfilling its obligations 
and duties” and identified the “problem” as being the high caseload of the 
caseworker.123 The difference between telling a state agency to “fix” some-
 
 121. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–4. As Justice Danielson ob-
served in his forceful dissent in Shelby, the transcript of the permanency planning hearing and 
Judge Brown’s written order expressly designate the caseworker’s caseload as the specific 
issue that the Department was to rectify within five business days. Id., 2012 WL 401615, at 
*2–4 (majority opinion) (“Forty-one cases, especially the type of cases she has, is too many 
and I want that rectified within five business days of today’s court order.”); id. at 6, 2012 WL 
401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2 (majority opinion) (“Now, somebody’s going to 
have to split out some of these cases and . . . I don’t want nobody else to get 41 either as a 
result of it.”); id. at 6, 2012 WL 401615, at *6 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Judge 
Brown’s disclaimer that he had no intention to micromanage the Department “makes it more 
evident that the circuit court wrongly believed it had some sort of management authority” at 
all). And while there might be some argument that there might be systemic or policy changes 
that could be implemented to address the caseworker’s high caseload—such as through pro-
grams like the Department’s new differential response model aimed at reducing custody cases 
in favor of alternate, non-custody-based approaches—it is nearly impossible that such broad 
changes could occur within Judge Brown’s five-day window in which the Department was to 
“fix” the problem and in any case would still constitute coercion of the Department. See 
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, 
POLICY & PROCEDURES MANUAL 18–27 (2015), available at http://humanservices.
arkansas.gov/dcfs/dcfsDocs/Master%20DCFS%20Policy.pdf. The five-day window, in turn, 
left redirecting new caseworkers or transferring new existing caseworkers into the county as 
the only viable option to comply with Judge Brown’s order—with an order compelling the 
Department to do either clearly constituting an order coercing the Department to act. 
 123. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *2–4. 
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thing to ensure a specific result and telling a state agency exactly how to fix 
something to ensure a specific result is simply a distinction without a differ-
ence, as both coerce the Department to take some action. And as described 
below, there is no authority for a state court to use the Department’s failure 
to comply with the requirements of the juvenile code to trigger additional 
jurisdiction over the Department. 
2. The Shelby Doctrine Is Not Saved by Any Recognized Exceptions 
to Sovereign Immunity 
The Shelby Doctrine and all Shelby-style orders that coerce the De-
partment to act under the jurisdiction and authority asserted by the Shelby 
Doctrine are invalid under the sovereign immunity doctrine unless an excep-
tion to sovereign immunity applies. The only exceptions that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has recognized to this immunity are those circumstances in 
which (1) the General Assembly has created a specific waiver of an agen-
cy’s sovereign immunity (“the Waiver Exception”), (2) the state agency 
waives sovereign immunity as the moving party seeking specific relief (“the 
Moving Party Exception”), (3) the state agency or an officer of a state agen-
cy is refusing to do a purely ministerial action required by statute or is act-
ing illegally (“the Ministerial Exception”), or (4) the coercion of a state 
agency arises from the court’s contempt powers (“the Contempt Excep-
tion”).124 As described below, however, the Shelby Doctrine is not saved 
from invalidation by the Department’s sovereign immunity because none of 
these exceptions apply to authorize a circuit court to act beyond the authori-
ty conferred by the juvenile code. 
a. The General Assembly did not sufficiently waive the De-
partment’s sovereign immunity in child-welfare cases to al-
low Shelby-style orders 
The General Assembly did not create a sufficient waiver of the De-
partment’s sovereign immunity under the Waiver Exception to allow Shel-
by-style orders. This is because the Waiver Exception applies to a state 
agency like the Department only if the General Assembly creates a specific 
waiver by either a statute’s express terms or by the necessary implication of 
a statute’s express terms.125 The General Assembly, however, has not creat-
 
 124. See, e.g., Landsnpulaski, 371 Ark. at 43, 269 S.W.3d at 795–96; Ark. Dep’t of Hu-
man Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232 (1998); State, 312 Ark. at 488, 
850 S.W.2d at 850–51. 
 125. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, at 4–6, 425 S.W.3d 
731, 734–35 (providing that the State’s sovereign immunity can be waived where the General 
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ed a sufficient waiver that permits Shelby-style orders through either of the-
se modes of operation. First, no statute by its express terms authorizes a 
circuit court to order the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or 
otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations. Second, the juvenile 
code should not be interpreted to waive impliedly the Department’s sover-
eign immunity except as specifically waived in the context of the Depart-
ment’s express obligations under the juvenile code, obligations that do not 
cover the Department’s internal operations much less the entry of Shelby-
style orders. 
The question of implied waiver, however, is a tedious one given the ju-
venile code’s numerous and often lengthy sections126 and the judiciary’s 
recognition that the roles and responsibilities as between the circuit court 
and the Department in child-welfare proceedings are not well defined under 
the juvenile code.127 The juvenile code’s mandate to protect juveniles also 
does not clearly specify what roles the judiciary and the Department have 
with respect to achieving those worthy goals.128 Even the specific obliga-
tions imposed do not always make clear the allocation of authority and re-
sponsibility between the Department and the judiciary. This article therefore 
now turns to evaluating the propriety of implied waiver by considering ex-
isting case law and the juvenile code’s statutory scheme. 
i. Arkansas law suggests that the juvenile code does not 
impliedly waive the Department’s sovereign immunity 
The question of whether or not the juvenile code creates any implied 
waivers of the Department’s sovereign immunity has never been specifically 
addressed by Arkansas’s appellate courts. Arkansas law, however, supports 
the conclusion that the juvenile code does not create any implied waivers of 
the Department’s sovereign immunity because Arkansas’s courts have rec-
 
Assembly creates “a specific waiver of sovereign immunity,” and further providing that a “[a] 
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity may be express or implied”). 
 126. For the purposes of this subsection, references to the juvenile code include ARK. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367 (Supp. 2013) as well as other sections of the Arkansas Code 
that impose further obligations on the Department that are part and parcel to most child-
welfare proceedings. Most notably, such additional sections include ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 9-
28-101 to -120 (Supp. 2013). 
 127. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 407, 802 S.W.2d 461, 
463 (1991) (“The jurisdictions of the juvenile court and DHS overlap in numerous and varied 
areas.”); Bruce Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare 
Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377, 
383–84 (1995). Nor is Arkansas different in this regard from other states. See generally id. 
 128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Supp. 2013). Other sections also provide that “the 
state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse and neglect by providing services and 
supports that promote the safety, permanency, and well-being of the children and families of 
Arkansas.” Id. § 9-28-101 (Supp. 2013). 
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ognized that even though the juvenile code does provide for specific excep-
tions to sovereign immunity in child-welfare proceedings, the exceptions are 
limited to the juvenile code’s express provisions that allow circuit courts to 
order “family services.”129 Notably, this is the main provision in the juvenile 
code that allows a circuit court to order the Department to take any kind of 
specific, affirmative action. 
As the Arkansas Supreme Court in Arkansas Department of Human 
Services v. R.P. observed, the juvenile code created only a specific waiver to 
sovereign immunity by allowing circuit courts to order the Department to 
provide “family services” in child-welfare cases,130 but expressly limited the 
waiver to the “family services” that circuit courts were allowed to order un-
der—and as defined by—the juvenile code.131 The juvenile code in turn ex-
pressly prescribes the services that a circuit court can order the Department 
to perform to only those services that are (1) relevant, (2) provided to the 
given juvenile or the juvenile’s family, and (3) provided in order to prevent 
a juvenile from being removed, reunite a juvenile with the person from 
whom the juvenile was removed, implement a permanent plan of adoption 
or guardianship in a dependency-neglect case, or rehabilitate a juvenile in 
delinquency or family-in-need-of-services cases.132 
Furthermore, a plain-text reading of the definition of “family services” 
indicates that “family services” does not encompass Shelby-style orders be-
cause Shelby-style orders that direct the Department to “fix” a problem iden-
tified by a court and have the effect of coercing the Department to reduce a 
caseworker’s caseload or otherwise direct the Department’s internal opera-
tions are simply not a service provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s fami-
ly as the definition of “family services” requires.133 Rather, such orders are 
 
 129. See R.P., 333 Ark. at 531–32, 970 S.W.2d at 232–33. 
 130. Although R.P. dealt with a family-in-need-of-services case governed by the juvenile 
code, the same limited waiver applies in dependency-neglect cases such as Shelby because 
dependency-neglect cases share disposition limitations that are, in relevant part, identical to 
family-in-need-of-services cases. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-334 (Repl. 2013) 
(providing that a circuit court is limited in dependency-neglect cases to ordering the Depart-
ment to perform “family services”), with id. § 9-27-332. 
 131. R.P., 333 Ark. at 331–32, 970 S.W.2d at 232–33. 
 132. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B) (Supp. 2013); R.P., 333 Ark. at 331–32, 970 
S.W.2d at 232–33 (providing that the definition of “family services” sets the contours of the 
General Assembly’s limited waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity). The definition 
of “family services” was amended in 2013 to clarify when a circuit court could order the 
Department to provide services to rehabilitate a juvenile, but the definition provided here 
matches in relevant part the definition in place at the time the Arkansas Supreme Court de-
cided Shelby in 2012. See Act of Apr. 10, 2013, No. 1055, § 5, 2013 Ark. Acts 3963, 3965. 
 133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25). An argument could be made that any order related 
to the Department’s caseworker operations would constitute a service to the juvenile or the 
family through the casework and case management services that the Department provides to 
families. Under this argument, the order in Shelby to modify a caseworker’s caseload and the 
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expressly and exclusively directed to the Department. In addition, interpret-
ing such orders as “family services” would violate the maxim of statutory 
interpretation known as eiusdem generis because the Department’s internal 
operations do not fit within the category of services specifically listed in the 
“family services” definition134—which all relate to actual services provided 
to the juvenile or the family and do not include any example services related 
to the Department’s operations.135 By contrast, directly ordering the Depart-
ment to prepare a case plan, which was not prepared in Shelby,136 would 
 
Department’s staffing overall would be a service because the order impacts the Department’s 
operations, which impacts the Department’s casework, which impacts the casework services 
that the Department provides to the juvenile and the family. Such an interpretation, however, 
would improperly expand the category of services authorized under “family services” to 
include any act as long as the act merely relates to the actual services provided to the family. 
First, the interpretation would read out of the definition the requirement that the act ordered 
by the court be a service affirmatively provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s family. Id. § 
9-27-303(25)(A); Hobbs v. Baird, 2011 Ark. 261, at 3, 2011 WL 2412740, at *3 (observing 
that laws must be interpreted “so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and 
we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible”); Larry Hobbs Farm 
Equip. v. CNH Am., LLC, 375 Ark. 379, 383, 291 S.W.3d 190, 194 (2009) (same); Ark. 
Comp. Health Ins. Pool v. Denton, 374 Ark. 162, 165, 286 S.W.3d 698, 701 (2008) (same). 
Second, the interpretation would defeat the express terms of the statutory definition by allow-
ing the limited definition of “family services” to be swallowed by an effectively unlimited 
definition of “family services” that includes any service that merely relates to the actual ser-
vices provided to the family. See, e.g., Griffen v. Ark. Jud. Discipline Comm’n, 355 Ark. 38, 
52–53, 130 S.W.3d 524, 533 (2003) (declining to interpret a judicial canon to allow a judge 
to speak with a legislator about any matter of interest to the judge because that interpretation 
would swallow the rule that prohibits judges from consulting with bodies or officers of the 
other branches); Willett v. State, 334 Ark. 40, 42–43, 970 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1998) (declining 
to interpret the rules of attorney practice allowing “nonresident lawyers” to practice in Ar-
kansas pro hac vice to allow non-practicing lawyers who are licensed in another state but 
reside in Arkansas to practice in Arkansas because such an interpretation would swallow the 
non-resident lawyer rule). Third, the interpretation would be contrary to Arkansas appellate 
courts’ long-standing interpretation that “family services” was a limited definition that im-
poses limitation on juvenile courts’ authority to order the Department to act. See supra notes 
51, 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Edwards v. Campbell, 2010 Ark. 398, at 4–5, 370 S.W.3d 250, 253 (describing 
eiusdem generis, the doctrine of interpretation that provides that when general words follow 
enumerations of particular things, the general words must be interpreted to include only those 
things of the same kind as those specifically enumerated things); State v. Oldner, 361 Ark. 
316, 327, 206 S.W.3d 818, 822 (2005) (same); Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 213, 217 S.W. 
465, 468–69 (1919) (same). 
 135. The definition of “family services” includes an unbounded list of example services, 
including child care, homemaker services, crisis counseling, cash assistance, transportation, 
family therapy, physical, psychiatric, and psychological evaluation, counseling, and treat-
ment. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(A) (Supp. 2013). 
 136. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 4, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*2, 4. 
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constitute a direct service provided by the Department to the juvenile and 
the family that requires the participation of the juvenile and the family.137 
And even if Shelby-style orders were to be deemed a proper service 
provided to the juvenile or the juvenile’s family, the “service” would argua-
bly still not fall within the “family services” portion of the juvenile code’s 
limited waiver because such a “service” would not fall within the limited 
legitimate purposes that the juvenile code’s definition of “family services” 
requires.138 These purposes limit “family services” to only those services 
that are provided to prevent removal, reunify the juvenile with the person 
from whom the juvenile was removed, implement a permanency plan of 
guardianship or adoption in a dependency-neglect case, or rehabilitate a 
juvenile in a delinquency or family-in-need-of-services case.139 
For example, the service would not be for the purpose of preventing 
removal of a juvenile from a home because the Department’s failure to re-
duce a caseworker’s caseload or make other changes to the Department’s 
internal operations would not—as the juvenile code requires—constitute an 
immediate danger to a juvenile where removal would be necessary to pre-
vent serious harm to the juvenile.140 Likewise, the service would not be for 
 
 137. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-402, 9-28-111 (Supp. 2013). Case plans are an important 
element in dependency-neglect cases and require the Department to develop case plans with 
the family and other interested parties in dependency-neglect cases in order to set out the 
“plan for services for a juvenile and his or her family” and to let the family know what is 
required of them in the case. Id. §§ 9-27-303(9), -337, -338, -341, -359 to -361, 9-28-111 
(Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 138. See id. § 9-27-303(25)(B). In addition, the juvenile code also imposes express limita-
tions on the definition of “family services” and a circuit court’s ability to enter certain orders 
related to them. For example, the juvenile code specifically prohibits a circuit court from 
specifying a specific provider of “family services.” Id. § 9-27-335(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). Like-
wise, “cash assistance” is one of the services that a circuit court is empowered to order the 
Department to provide—but the juvenile code provides a specific definition for cash assis-
tance that excludes certain types of assistance, including long-term financial assistance; fi-
nancial assistance that is the equivalent of a foster-care board payment, an adoption subsidy, 
or a guardianship subsidy; and financial assistance for car insurance. Id. § 9-27-303(10)(B) 
(Supp. 2013). Such exclusions accordingly narrow the services that a circuit court could order 
the Department to perform and narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity that R.P. and other 
cases recognize. 
 139. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d 
86, 90. 
 140. Id., 423 S.W.3d at 90 (holding that an order directing the Department to provide 
school uniforms to a juvenile was not for the purpose of preventing removal because the lack 
of school uniforms did not constitute an immediate danger where removal was necessary to 
prevent serious harm to the juvenile, which are required elements under the juvenile code). 
The Department’s failure to prepare a case plan in Shelby would also not meet this require-
ment for the same reasons: the lack of a case plan would not itself constitute an immediate 
danger to a juvenile where removal would be necessary to prevent serious harm to the juve-
nile. Cf. id., 423 S.W.3d at 90. Moreover, in Shelby, the juvenile had already been removed at 
the time of the circuit court’s order, so the purpose could not have been to prevent removal. 
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the purpose of reunifying a juvenile with the person from whom the juvenile 
was removed because changes to a caseworker’s caseload or the Depart-
ment’s other internal operations would not make a juvenile more or less safe 
if the juvenile were to be returned, which is how the juvenile code evaluates 
reunification.141 The service would also not be for the purpose of implement-
ing a permanent plan of adoption or guardianship in a dependency-neglect 
case because changes to a caseworker’s caseload or the Department’s other 
internal operations would not implement the adoption or guardianship of a 
juvenile, prepare a juvenile for adoption or guardianship, prepare a prospec-
tive adoptive parent or guardian, or otherwise impact any element of the law 
governing adoptions or guardianships in Arkansas.142 Finally, the service 
would not be for the purpose of rehabilitating a juvenile in a delinquency or 
family-in-need-of-services case because changes to a caseworker’s caseload 
or the Department’s other internal operations in a dependency-neglect case 
simply do not relate to the rehabilitation of a juvenile.143 
 
 141. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(48)(A)(iii) (“In determining whether or not to 
remove a child from a home or return a child back to a home, the child’s health and safety 
shall be the paramount concern.”) (emphasis added); id. § 9-27-337(e)(1)(C)(iii) (providing 
that in all review hearings the circuit could shall determine whether the juvenile should be 
returned to his parents based on the best interests of the juvenile and “whether or not the 
juvenile’s health and safety can be protected by his or her parent or parents if returned 
home”); id. § 9-27-338(c) (providing that the statutory preference at permanency planning 
hearings is to return a juvenile to a fit parent or to the person from whom custody was re-
moved if it is in the best interests of the juvenile and the juvenile’s health and safety can be 
adequately safeguarded if returned home); see also id. § 9-27-302(1)–(2) (Supp. 2013) 
(providing that the health and safety of the juvenile shall be the measure of when a juvenile 
must be removed from a home); id. § 9-27-328(a)–(b) (providing that a juvenile should not 
be removed from his or her home unless the health and safety of the juvenile warrant imme-
diate removal in order to protect the juvenile); id. § 9-27-332(a)(2) (Supp. 2013) (same); id. § 
9-27-335(e) (same). The permanency planning statute in fact provides specific conditions for 
reunification to occur and specific conditions to continue with reunification, none of which 
involve the Department’s staffing operations. Id. § 9-27-338(c). 
 142. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-9-201 to -224 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (Revised Uniform 
Adoption Act); id. §§ 28-65-101 to -704 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2013) (“the Guardianship 
Code”). The facts in Shelby demonstrate even more directly that changes to the Department’s 
internal staffing operations are not provided to implement an adoption or guardianship be-
cause there was in fact no permanency plan established in Shelby other than reunification, so 
the purpose could not have been to implement a permanent plan of adoption or guardianship. 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2 (observ-
ing that the circuit court declined to hold a permanency planning hearing, which would have 
changed the goal in the case from reunification to another permanency plan). When Shelby 
was decided, the purposes sanctioned by the juvenile code were slightly different, but still 
covered the implementation of adoption and guardianship permanency plans as appropriate 
purposes. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii). 
 143. Shelby was also a dependency-neglect case, a type of case in which the juvenile 
code—unlike with delinquency or family-in-need-of-services cases—does not provide the 
rehabilitation of a juvenile as an appropriate disposition. Compare id. § 9-27-330 (Supp. 
2013) (providing for the rehabilitation of juveniles as a permissible disposition in delinquen-
434 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Furthermore, interpreting Shelby-style orders as meeting one of the ju-
venile code’s legitimate purposes would be inappropriate for two additional 
reasons. First, such an interpretation would improperly expand the category 
of services authorized under “family services” to allow a court to order the 
Department to perform any act so long as the act merely relates to actual, 
legitimately-purposed “family services” that the Department provides to the 
juvenile or the family.144 Second, such an interpretation would eviscerate 
any meaningful separation of powers between the judiciary and the Depart-
ment in child-welfare cases and empower a circuit court to act as a manager 
of an executive agency. Indeed, the only connection between one of the lim-
ited legitimate purposes for “family services” and ordering the Department 
to change its internal operations or a court managing the use of the Depart-
ment’s resources is that such orders relate to services that the Department 
provides insofar as the Department’s caseworkers provide the services. 
The holding in R.P. is also in harmony with numerous cases that rec-
ognize that the juvenile code limits the jurisdiction of Arkansas’s courts to 
only that jurisdiction provided by the General Assembly in the juvenile 
code.145 For example, in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. A.M., 
the Arkansas Court of Appeals invalidated an order directing the Depart-
ment to pay for a juvenile’s school uniforms because the lack of school uni-
forms did not constitute an immediate danger where removal was necessary 
to prevent serious harm to the juvenile as would be required under the juve-
nile code to authorize removal.146 Although A.M. was not based on the De-
partment’s sovereign immunity per se, it did recognize that the definition of 
“family services”—and the meaning of the terms in the definition—imposed 
limitations on what a circuit court could order the Department to do in the 
same way that the courts in R.P. and other cases have evaluated the proprie-
ty of court orders against the statutory definition of “family services.”147 
 
cy cases), and id. § 9-27-332 (providing for the rehabilitation of juveniles as a permissible 
disposition in family-in-need-of-services cases), with id. § 9-27-334 (Supp. 2013) (omitting 
the rehabilitation of juveniles from the list of permissible dispositions in dependency-neglect 
cases); see Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2, 2012 WL 401615, at *2. And even though anyone who 
has ever practiced in dependency-neglect cases would note that courts routinely address juve-
nile rehabilitation in dependency-neglect cases, the juvenile code has now been amended to 
limit “family services” in dependency-neglect cases by excluding services provided for the 
purpose of rehabilitating juveniles. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii), (iv) 
(Supp. 2013), with id. § 9-27-303(25)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2012). 
 144. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 145. Supra notes 51, 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 146. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.M., 2012 Ark. App. 240, at 7–8, 423 S.W.3d 86, 
90. 
 147. Compare id., 423 S.W.3d at 90, with Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.B., 347 Ark. 
593, 601–03, 67 S.W.3d 539, 544–46 (2002) (finding that an order to pay $48,000 for a juve-
nile’s sex offender treatment did not violate the Department’s sovereign immunity because it 
fell within the “cash assistance” and “treatment” provisions of the “family services” defini-
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R.P. and A.M. also reflect the limited jurisdiction and authority pre-
scribed by the express terms of the juvenile code itself. Most notably, the 
juvenile code currently provides circuit courts with only a limited jurisdic-
tion to hear child-welfare proceedings148 and only a limited authority to act 
in child-welfare proceedings.149 For example, the juvenile code provides that 
modern circuit courts are only empowered to make certain specific disposi-
tions in dependency-neglect cases, namely, ordering the Department to pro-
vide family services as discussed above; setting custody of juveniles found 
to be dependent-neglected, including placing custody of such juveniles with 
the Department; and ordering parenting classes for the parents150—with each 
of those dispositions in turn heavily circumscribed in other sections of the 
juvenile code.151 
 
tion); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33 
(1998) (holding that order to pay money to restore a family’s utilities did not violate the 
Department’s sovereign immunity because it fell within the “cash assistance” provision of the 
“family services” definition and the services were offered to prevent the removal of the juve-
nile); Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. C.M., 100 Ark. App. 414, 417, 269 S.W.3d 
387, 389–90 (2007) (holding that an order to pay the attorney fees for a juvenile in the De-
partment’s custody did not violate the Department’s sovereign immunity because it fell with-
in the “cash assistance” provision of the “family services” definition); supra notes 51, 92–96 
and accompanying text. 
 148. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
 149. See id. §§ 9-27-329 to -335, -355 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing jurisdiction 
and authority of modern circuit courts to act in child-welfare proceedings); supra notes 51, 
92–96 and accompanying text; id. §§ 9-9-101 to -405 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 2013) (providing 
the terms of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which imposes 
limitations on the jurisdiction and authority to act in child-welfare proceedings). 
 150. See, e.g., id. § 9-27-334(a). Although section 9-27-334 applies only to dependency-
neglect cases like Shelby, the juvenile code provides similar prescriptions of authority in the 
other two types of child-welfare proceedings governed by the juvenile code, delinquency and 
families-in-need-of-services cases. See id. § 9-27-330 (prescribing disposition limitations in 
delinquency cases); id. § 9-27-331 (same); id. § 9-27-332 (Supp. 2013) (prescribing disposi-
tion limitations in family-in-need-of-services cases); id. § 9-27-333 (same). 
 151. See, e.g., id. § 9-27-334(a)(2) (limiting a circuit court’s authority to place custody of 
a juvenile with the Department only if it is in the best interests of the juvenile and only if the 
juvenile is physically placed with a licensed or approved foster home, shelter, or facility or 
exempt child-welfare agency); id. § 9-27-335 (limiting the disposition that a circuit court can 
order, including as to services and placement provided by the Department; prohibiting a 
circuit from ordering a specific provider for placement or family services except in limited 
circumstances; prohibiting a court from transferring custody of a juvenile to an individual 
absent a written home study; prohibiting a court from transferring custody of a juvenile un-
less the Department used reasonable efforts to provide family services and prevent removal 
of the juvenile from the home unless the court makes other specific findings; and prohibiting 
a court from ordering the Department to expend or forward social security benefits when the 
Department is the payee of the benefits); id. § 9-27-355 (limiting a circuit court’s authority to 
make placements involving the Department, including precluding a circuit court from order-
ing a particular foster care placement). 
436 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Further, the narrow limited waiver of the Department’s sovereign im-
munity recognized by Arkansas courts indicates that circuit courts do not 
necessarily need control over the internal operations of the Department in 
order to give effect to the juvenile code’s statutory scheme. Indeed, if circuit 
courts did need such control in order to give effect to the juvenile code’s 
statutory scheme, then would not circuit courts have the authority to order 
the Department to provide any relevant services in child-welfare proceed-
ings that the court found would directly address the issues in a given child-
welfare proceeding? Cases like R.P. and A.M. implicitly reject that conclu-
sion by not recognizing a broad authority that would allow circuit courts to 
exceed their authority under the juvenile code. 
Absent such a broad authority obtaining from the juvenile code’s statu-
tory scheme, the only way for circuit courts to have the authority to issue 
Shelby-style orders would be if such authority was allowed based on a spe-
cific statutory component of the juvenile code related to obligations imposed 
on the Department or the judiciary. This article therefore now evaluates 
whether the juvenile code’s statutory scheme creates an implied waiver of 
the Department’s sovereign immunity. 
ii. The R.P.-McLemore framework indicates the juvenile 
code does not create implied waivers of the Depart-
ment’s sovereign immunity 
The juvenile code’s statutory scheme is broadly purposed for the judi-
ciary to protect juveniles and “assure that all juveniles brought to the atten-
tion of the courts receive the guidance, care, and control . . . that will best 
serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the 
best interest of the state.”152 To achieve these ends, the juvenile code places 
 
 152. Id. § 9-27-302(1) (Supp. 2013). The juvenile code also provides other related pur-
poses, such as the following: 
To preserve and strengthen the juvenile’s family ties when it is in the best 
interest of the juvenile; . . . [t]o protect a juvenile by considering the ju-
venile’s health and safety as the paramount concerns in determining 
whether or not to remove the juvenile from the custody of his or her par-
ents or custodians, removing the juvenile only when the safety and pro-
tection of the public cannot adequately be safeguarded without such re-
moval; . . . to secure for [juveniles removed from his or her own family] 
custody care and discipline with primary emphasis on ensuring the health 
and safety of the juvenile while in the out-of-home placement; . . . [t]o 
assure, in all cases in which a juvenile must be permanently removed 
from the custody of his or her parents, that the juvenile be placed in an 
approved family home and be made a member of the family by adop-
tion; . . . [t]o protect society more effectively by substituting for retribu-
tive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation 
and rehabilitative restitution, recognizing that the application of sanctions 
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numerous obligations on the judiciary and the Department.153 The question 
therefore becomes, do any of the these purposes or obligations imply a 
waiver of the Department’s sovereign immunity so as to allow a circuit 
court to order the Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or other-
wise dictate the Department’s internal operations? 
Arkansas courts have found implied waiver only where the implication 
of a statute’s express terms necessarily requires waiver of an agency’s sov-
ereign immunity in order to give effect to the statutory scheme and avoid 
absurd results related to express provisions. Further, Arkansas case law il-
lustrates a useful four-step framework for determining whether the implica-
tion of a statute’s express terms necessarily requires the waiver of a state 
agency’s sovereign immunity (“the R.P.-McLemore framework”). First, 
does the given statute impose a non-discretionary154 obligation on the judici-
ary or the Department to act for the benefit of another party in the case? If 
so, second, does the statute specify a remedial mechanism to address a fail-
ure of the judiciary or the Department to perform that obligation? If not, 
third, is there any other remedial mechanism that would give effect to the 
obligation? If not, fourth, does the agency’s sovereign immunity need to be 
waived in order to give effect to the obligation in the way intended by the 
statutory scheme? 
In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. R.P., for example, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the juvenile code’s express terms that 
authorized circuit courts to “order family services” but did not specify who 
would provide or otherwise pay for such services.155 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court nevertheless held that the General Assembly specifically waived the 
 
that are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all 
cases; and . . . [t]o provide means through which the provisions of this 
subchapter are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured 
a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized 
and enforced.  
Id. § 9-27-302(2)–(3). 
 153. E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 409, 802 S.W.2d 461, 464 
(1991) (providing that the juvenile code prescribes affirmative requirements that are designed 
to achieve the juvenile code’s statutory purposes). 
 154. The nondiscretionary component of the R.P.-McLemore framework flows implicitly 
from the namesake cases described below involving nondiscretionary obligations of state 
agency, but also reflects the well-established rule in Arkansas that the judiciary does not have 
the authority to compel an executive or legislative body to perform a discretionary act. See, 
e.g., T.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Hargrove, 362 Ark. 649, 656–57, 210 S.W.3d 79, 82–83 (2005) 
(providing that a court lacks the authority to compel an executive or legislative body to act if 
the duty to act is discretionary); Saunders v. Neuse, 320 Ark. 547, 550, 898 S.W.2d 43, 45–
46 (1995) (same); State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426, 426, 3 S.W. 352, 360 (1887); Hawkins v. 
Governor, 1 Ark. 570, 587–92, 1839 Ark. LEXIS 29, at *13–15 (1839). 
 155. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–
33 (1998). 
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Department’s sovereign immunity to being ordered to provide family ser-
vices in child-welfare proceedings because “[a]ny other interpretation would 
effectively eviscerate the court’s power to order family services,” especially 
given that in certain types of child-welfare proceedings, the proceedings 
could be initiated by “any adult” and the Department would not even be a 
party involved in the case at all.156 The General Assembly, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held, could not have intended such a consequence and would 
have understood that the Department’s sovereign immunity would need to 
be waived as to providing family services in child-welfare proceedings even 
where the Department was not yet a party.157 
Likewise, in Weiss v. McLemore the Arkansas Supreme Court evaluat-
ed the sovereign immunity of the state agency responsible for managing the 
retirement program for the Arkansas State Police against suits brought by 
retirees to compel the agency to correct errors in retirement payments.158 In 
such circumstances, the Court held that the agency’s sovereign immunity 
was waived because the applicable statute expressly directed the agency to 
adjust errant payments and correct the error that caused errant payments.159 
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that even though the statute did not 
specify a remedial mechanism for an aggrieved retiree to correct an under-
payment like the statute provided the agency to collect an overpayment, the 
General Assembly could not have intended aggrieved retirees to be unable 
to compel the agency to correct errant payments as required by the statute.160 
Such a result, the Court held, would “eviscerate the purpose of the statute,” 
which was expressly designed to correct errors of payments.161 
In the case of the obligations imposed by the juvenile code and the ne-
cessity of Shelby-style orders to give effect to the obligations and the juve-
nile code’s statutory scheme, the most likely types of obligations that could 
require that circuit courts have the authority to issue Shelby-style orders are 
 
 156. Id. at 532, 970 S.W.2d at 233. Moreover, even the waiver of sovereign immunity 
recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court is limited because the juvenile code also pre-
scribes limitations on the family services that a court can order. For example, the juvenile 
code’s definition of “family services” itself limits the services that a circuit court can order to 
only such services as are permitted through the definitions, terms, and purposes. See supra 
notes 130–46 and accompanying text. Likewise, section 9-27-335(b)(1) limits the “family 
services” waiver to only allow circuit courts to order family services that are provided 
through a provider of the Department’s choosing. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-335(b)(1). In sum, 
these and other limitations narrow the General Assembly’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 
 157. R.P., 333 Ark. at 532, 970 S.W.2d at 233. 
 158. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 541–44, 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02 (2007). 
 159. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 900–02. 
 160. Id. at 544, 268 S.W.3d at 902. 
 161. Id., 268 S.W.3d at 902. 
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the Department’s obligation to provide “services”162 and the circuit court’s 
related power to order the Department to provide “family services” in cer-
tain child-welfare proceedings.163 The R.P.-McLemore framework, however, 
indicates that the authority to issue Shelby-style orders is not required in 
order to give effect to either obligation. First, the only non-discretionary 
obligation is the Department’s obligation to provide “family services” as 
ordered by the circuit court because all services that do not fall within the 
definition of “family services” are within the sole discretion of the Depart-
ment to provide and are not subject to judicial coercion.164 Second, at least 
four remedial mechanisms exist to give effect to the “family services” obli-
gation and eliminate the need for a circuit court to have the authority to is-
sue Shelby-style orders. 
The first three remedial mechanisms are related to the requirement un-
der federal and state law that the Department provide “reasonable efforts” in 
child-welfare proceedings and provide significant consequences if the De-
partment fails to provide appropriate services sufficient to meet the “reason-
able efforts” standard.165 For example, the juvenile code provides that if a 
circuit court finds that the Department has not made “reasonable efforts” to 
provide services to prevent a juvenile’s removal, the circuit court may dis-
miss the child-welfare proceeding outright, order family services to prevent 
the juvenile’s removal from the home, or transfer custody of the juvenile to 
 
 162. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-103 (Supp. 2013) (providing that the Department must 
provide “services to dependent-neglected children and their families” and prevent the need to 
remove a maltreated juvenile from his or her home). 
 163. See id. § 9-27-303(25) (Supp. 2013) (defining “family services” in child-welfare 
proceedings); id. § 9-27-332(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (authorizing circuit courts to order “family 
services” in family-in-need-of-services cases); id. § 9-27-334(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (authorizing 
circuit courts to order “family services” in dependency-neglect cases); see also Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33 (1998). 
 164. See supra note 154. In this way, the statutory dichotomy between the undefined 
“services” the Department is required to provide and the limited, narrowly defined “family 
services” that a circuit court is permitted to order is significant and does not defeat the juve-
nile code’s statutory scheme as to services that do not fall within the definition of “family 
services” because the juvenile code specifically contemplates that the only services that are 
enforceable in child-welfare proceedings are “family services.” Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 
9-27-332(a)(1), and id. § 9-27-334(a)(1), with id. § 9-28-103. 
 165. “Reasonable efforts” are defined by statute as the requirement that the Department 
“exercise reasonable diligence and care to utilize all available services related to meeting the 
needs of the juvenile and the family.” id. § 9-27-303(48)(A)(iv). More specifically, “reasona-
ble efforts” are required under state law in three circumstances in child-welfare proceedings: 
to prevent removal, to provide family services, and to finalize a permanency plan. See e.g., id. 
§ 9-27-303(48)(A)(i); id. § 9-27-328(b)(2), (c), (d), (f) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-335(a)(2), 
(e)(1), (e)(2) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-337(e)(1)(B)(i)(b) (Supp. 2013); id. § 9-27-338(d) 
(Supp. 2013). For the purposes of this subsection, however, the distinctions between the types 
of “reasonable efforts” are inconsequential. 
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the Department despite the lack of “reasonable efforts.”166 Similarly, if a 
circuit court finds that the Department has not made “reasonable efforts” to 
prevent removal or “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family following re-
moval of the juvenile, the circuit court may authorize or continue the juve-
nile’s removal and shall, in either case, note the Department’s failure on the 
record.167 Finally, a failure by the Department to provide “reasonable ef-
forts” in providing services renders any juvenile subject to a circuit court’s 
finding of “no reasonable efforts” ineligible for federal funding until a court 
enters a subsequent finding of “reasonable efforts,” which represents a sig-
nificant incentive to provide appropriate services because federal funding 
can make up seventy-five cents out of every dollar spent on a juvenile in 
foster care.168 
The fourth remedial mechanism is the coercive power of the circuit 
court’s inherent contempt power, which is itself an exception to the Depart-
ment’s sovereign immunity169 and can be used to compel the Department to 
provide any family services that the circuit court may order in an open case 
before the circuit court. Indeed, a circuit court simply does not need to be 
able to issue Shelby-style orders to give effect to the Department’s obliga-
tion to provide “family services” as ordered by a circuit court because all a 
circuit court would need to do is simply order the Department to perform the 
given family service deemed by the circuit court to be appropriate and pun-
ish the Department if the Department fails to perform the service ordered. In 
these ways, the circuit court’s contempt power provides a meaningful reme-
dial mechanism that gives sufficient effect to the juvenile code’s statutory 
scheme by punishing any failure by the Department to provide required 
“family services.” 
By contrast, R.P. and McLemore both involved cases in which the lack 
of a sufficient remedial mechanism occurred outside of a court’s contempt 
authority and outside of an existing court case. In R.P., for example, the 
Department was not yet a party to the family-in-need-of-services case in 
 
 166. Id. § 9-27-335(e)(2). 
 167. See id. § 9-27-328(d) (“When the court finds that the department’s preventive or 
reunification efforts have not been reasonable, but further preventive or reunification efforts 
could not permit the juvenile to remain safely at home, the court may authorize or continue 
the removal of the juvenile but shall note the failure by the department in the record of the 
case.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 §§ 423(a), 471(a)(15), 
472(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 671 (2013); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (d) (2014); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL §§ 
8.3A.5, 8.3A.9, 8.3A.9b, 8.3C.4 (2014), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/
laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp_pf.jsp; Gullick v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 326 
Ark. 475, 477–78, 931 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1996) (finding that reasonable efforts findings are 
not mere formalities because of the impact on the availability of federal matching funds). 
 169. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.d. 
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which the circuit court had ordered the Department to provide adequate 
housing and utilities to the family in the case.170 As a result of the Depart-
ment’s nonparty status, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a juvenile 
court’s authority in such circumstances would be meaningless unless the 
Department’s sovereign immunity to such an order was waived.171 Similarly 
in McLemore, the waiver of the agency’s sovereign immunity found by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court was based precisely on the fact that there was no 
ongoing case between the agency and the aggrieved retiree who had sued 
the state to correct the payments that the agency should have been making to 
the retiree.172 Absent a waiver to allow aggrieved retirees to initiate such 
actions, the Arkansas Supreme Court held, aggrieved retirees would be una-
ble to compel the agency to correct errant payments that the agency was 
required to provide.173 The Arkansas Supreme Court in both cases therefore 
held that the sovereign immunity of the agencies involved must be waived 
in order to provide a mechanism to compel the agencies’ respective obliga-
tions. 
The Department’s other service-related obligations174 also do not re-
quire that circuit courts have the authority to issue Shelby-style orders be-
 
 170. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–
33 (1998). 
 171. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 232–33. 
 172. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 541–44, 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02 (2007). 
 173. Id., 268 S.W.3d 897, 900–02. 
 174. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-323(k) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to 
“develop a statewide referral protocol for helping to coordinate the delivery of services to 
sexually exploited children”); id. § 9-27-335(d) (Supp. 2013) (providing that a juvenile may 
not be placed into the custody of any person unless a home study is performed by the De-
partment or a licensed social worker approved to do home studies); id. § 9-27-353(a) (Supp. 
2013) (requiring the Department “to care for and maintain [juveniles in the Department’s 
custody] and to see that the juvenile[s are] protected, properly trained and educated, and 
[have] the opportunity to learn a trade, occupation, or profession”); id. § 9-27-361(a) (Repl. 
2009) (requiring the Department to file with the circuit court at least seven business days 
before a dependency-neglect review hearing a court report that has been distributed to all 
parties); id. § 9-27-361(b) (Repl. 2009) (requiring the Department to file with the circuit 
court at least seven business days before a dependency-neglect review hearing a permanency 
planning court report that has been distributed to all parties); id. §§ 9-27-363(b) (Supp. 2013), 
9-28-114(b) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to develop a transitional plan “with 
every juvenile in foster care not later than the juvenile’s seventeenth birthday or within ninety 
(90) days of entering a foster care program for juveniles who enter foster care at seventeen 
(17) years of age or older); id. §§ 9-27-363(c), (e)–(g) (Supp. 2013), 9-28-114(c), (e)–(g) 
(Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to assist the juvenile in arranging for the juvenile’s 
medical, housing, financial, educational, and social needs and to provide to juveniles who 
reach eighteen years of age certain documents before closing the juvenile’s case); id. § 9-28-
101 (Supp. 2013) (providing that “the state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse 
and neglect by providing services and supports that promote the safety, permanency, and 
well-being of the children and families of Arkansas”); id. §§ 9-28-105 (Supp. 2013), 9-28-
108(c)(1) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to give preference to adult relatives in 
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cause sufficient remedial mechanisms exist to address adequately any failure 
by the Department to perform its service obligations without having to have 
the circuit court assume control over the Department’s internal operations. 
Indeed, although each of these numerous obligations imposes an obligation 
on the Department that may or may not be discretionary, the remedial mech-
anisms arising from the Department’s “reasonable efforts” requirement and 
the circuit court’s contempt power are sufficient and applicable175 to give 
effect to each obligation by providing meaningful ways to coerce the De-
partment to perform its service obligations and to punish the Department for 
 
certain circumstances involving placement decisions); id. § 9-28-106 (Supp. 2013) (requiring 
the Department to give preference to religious considerations in certain circumstances involv-
ing placement decisions); id. § 9-28-108(c)(3) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to 
inform any relative who inquires about being a placement resource for a juvenile about be-
coming a foster home and about obtaining custody); id. § 9-28-109(b) (Supp. 2013) (requir-
ing the Department to conduct a staffing within forty-eight hours of a foster parent’s request 
that a foster child be removed from the foster home); id. § 9-28-111 (Supp. 2013) (requiring 
the Department to develop a case plan for each dependency-neglect and family-in-need-of-
service case in which the court places custody of a juvenile with the Department); id. §§ 9-
28-112, -113(a)(2), (b) (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department to work with a juvenile’s 
school district to further the juvenile’s best interests, provide notice to a juvenile’s school 
district upon taking or receiving emergency custody of a juvenile, provide notice to a juve-
nile’s school upon a change in the juvenile’s placement, make educational decisions for juve-
niles in the Department’s custody, work together with other educational resources to ensure 
continuity of educational services for juveniles in the Department’s custody, immediately 
enroll a juvenile subject to a school enrollment change in the juvenile’s new school, and 
provide all known information related to the health and safety of the juvenile being enrolled 
or the other children at the school); id. § 9-28-118 (Supp. 2013) (requiring the Department’s 
caseworkers, supervisors, and area directors to have one hour of annual training on issues 
related to foster care placements). 
 175. Id. §§ 9-27-323(k), 9-28-118. The “reasonable efforts” remediation mechanisms are 
applicable because the Department’s service-related obligations relate to the Department’s 
service obligations, and the contempt-power remediation mechanism is applicable because 
each service-related obligation likely constitutes a limited waiver of the Department’s sover-
eign immunity under R.P. and each obligation exists only in the context of an ongoing child-
welfare proceeding. The only two exceptions are the juvenile code’s requirements that the 
Department “develop a statewide referral protocol for helping to coordinate the delivery of 
services to sexually exploited children” and that certain Department employees receive spe-
cialized training in issues related to foster care placements. Nevertheless, neither of these 
provisions would necessarily require that a circuit court have the authority to order the De-
partment to change the caseload of the Department’s caseworker, compel the Department to 
modify the Department’s staffing levels or allocations, or otherwise issue Shelby-style orders 
that direct the Department to “fix” problems as identified by a given circuit court. Moreover, 
a circuit court’s contempt power could still be used to give effect to these provisions because 
the Department’s failure to perform these obligations could be raised in a child-welfare pro-
ceeding, each obligation would likely constitute a waiver of the Department’s sovereign 
immunity under R.P., and a circuit court could order the Department to perform these obliga-
tions under pain of contempt. 
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failures to provide appropriate services to meet the Department’s service-
related obligations. 
b. The Department did not waive its sovereign immunity be-
cause the Department does not voluntarily seek relief in 
child-welfare proceedings 
The Department does not waive its sovereign immunity to Shelby-style 
orders under the Moving Party Exception by filing or otherwise participat-
ing in child-welfare proceedings. Although a state agency usually is deemed 
to have waived its sovereign immunity when it files a lawsuit to seek af-
firmative, specific relief,176 Arkansas’s appellate courts have held that a state 
agency does not waive its sovereign immunity if the agency is required to 
file a lawsuit and participate in the case.177 
This exception to the exception was expressly recognized in the case of 
child-welfare proceedings in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. 
State where the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Department did not 
voluntarily waive its sovereign immunity to orders not expressly sanctioned 
by the juvenile code because the Department was required to initiate and 
appear in child-welfare proceedings due to the juvenile code’s mandate that 
the Department obtain custody of juveniles in dependency-neglect proceed-
ings and appear in juvenile proceedings.178 The lack of voluntariness arising 
from the Department’s statutory obligation, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
held, was dispositive.179 
The Department therefore does not waive its sovereign immunity to 
Shelby-style orders by merely filing and participating in the child-welfare 
proceedings that the Shelby Doctrine purports to control precisely because 
the Department is required by law to do so in order to fulfill the Depart-
ment’s statutory obligation to protect juveniles. And as observed previously, 
 
 176. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Lindsey, 299 Ark. 249, 251, 771 S.W.2d 
769, 770 (1989); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Parker, 248 Ark. 526, 528–30, 453 S.W.2d 
30, 32 (1970). 
 177. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 488–89, 850 S.W.2d 
847, 851 (1993); cf. Lindsey, 299 Ark. at 251, 771 S.W.2d at 770 (providing that a state 
agency had voluntarily waived sovereign immunity by entering an appearance and seeking 
affirmative relief where it had no obligation to do so) (citing Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. 
Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 319–20, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1987)). 
 178. State, 312 Ark. at 488–89, 850 S.W.2d at 851. 
 179. See id., 850 S.W.2d at 851. The Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals have repeatedly cited State favorably. In Kiesling-Daugherty v. State, for example, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court applied State’s voluntary waiver requirement to the Office of 
the Attorney General of Arkansas in denying a motion for costs on appeal against the Office 
because the Office was required to be involved in the case at issue and therefore did not vol-
untarily waive its sovereign immunity. 2013 Ark. 281, at 3–4, 2013 WL 3322335, at *3–4. 
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the General Assembly’s decision to require the Department to file and par-
ticipate in child-welfare proceedings also does not act to waive the Depart-
ment’s sovereign immunity. 
c. The Department cannot be compelled to perform non-
ministerial actions required by statute, and Shelby-style or-
ders do not enjoin improper actions by the Department 
The Department’s sovereign immunity to Shelby-style orders is not 
overcome by the Ministerial Exception, which provides that an agency’s 
sovereign immunity may be overcome if the agency is not performing a 
ministerial action that the agency is required to perform by statute or if the 
agency is acting improperly.180 As described below, Shelby-style orders ex-
ceed the scope of the Ministerial Exception because such orders compel the 
Department to perform actions that the Department is not required to per-
form by statute and mandate the internal operations of a state executive 
agency at the direction of the circuit court. Shelby-style orders also arguably 
do not enjoin the Department from performing illegal actions. 
The scope of the Ministerial Exception is limited to two applications. 
The first limited application is that circuit courts acting through the Ministe-
rial Exception may only mandate a state agency to perform a purely ministe-
rial action that the agency is required to perform by statute (“the Compel 
Action Application”).181 But the Ministerial Exception does not permit a 
circuit court to order an agency to perform any action under this application 
unless the action is one that a state officer or employee must perform in a 
specific manner prescribed by law without any discretion as to how or under 
what circumstances the action is to be performed.182 By contrast, the Minis-
terial Exception does not apply to discretionary actions within the authority 
of the executive branch that involve “the exercise of reason in the adaptation 
of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act 
 
 180. See, e.g., LandsnPulaski, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t. of Corr., 372 Ark. 40, 43, 269 S.W.3d 
793, 795 (2007) (“If the state agency is acting illegally or if a state agency officer refuses to 
do a purely ministerial action required by statute, an action against the agency or officer is 
not prohibited.”). 
 181. Id., 269 S.W.3d at 795. 
 182. Pitock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 547, 121 S.W. 742, 750 (1909) (Wood, J., concurring) 
(defining a ministerial act as an action that “an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of 
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard 
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of the act done”). Other jurisdic-
tions have long held similar definitions. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
475, 498 (1866) (“A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in proper cases, be 
required of the head of a department, by judicial process, is one in regard to which nothing is 
left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to 
exist, and imposed by law.”). 
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should be done or course pursued.”183 The second limited application is that 
circuit courts acting through the Ministerial Exception may only enjoin a 
state agency from acting illegally, beyond the authority of the agency, or 
otherwise arbitrarily, capriciously, in bad faith, or in a wantonly injurious 
manner (“the Enjoin Action Application”).184 But even if an agency’s action 
is illegal, beyond the authority of the agency, or otherwise arbitrary, capri-
cious, in bad faith, or in a wantonly injurious manner, the only remedy 
available to the circuit court to address the improper action is to enjoin the 
agency from performing that action. 
The Ministerial Exception therefore does not allow the Shelby Doctrine 
to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity because Shelby-style 
orders do not satisfy the elements of either of the Ministerial Exception’s 
two limited applications. In the case of the Compel Action Application, 
Shelby-style orders do not satisfy the Compel Action Application’s two re-
quirements. First, Shelby-style orders effectively seek to compel the De-
partment to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the De-
partment’s internal operations in child-welfare cases—none of which the 
Department is required to do by statute. Put another way, the Ministerial 
Exception did not cover the circuit court’s order in Shelby even though the 
Department was required by statute to create a case plan because the De-
partment was not required to do what the circuit court effectively ordered, to 
wit, to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise comport the Depart-
ment’s internal staffing operations to a statutory requirement. Second, there 
appears to be no question that the management of the Department’s staffing 
operations is a discretionary action within the exclusive province of the De-
partment as a state executive agency. Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
itself recognized in Shelby that “the circuit court is generally without juris-
diction to judicially review the discretionary functions of the executive 
branch of government” and that staffing operations are a discretionary func-
tion of the Department that circuit courts do not have the authority to man-
age.185 Moreover, even if the court in Shelby had ordered the Department to 
prepare a case plan directly, such an order would arguably not fall within the 
 
 183. Murray v. Leyshock, 915 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 184. Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, at 7, 428 S.W.3d 415, 420 
(providing that the exceptions to sovereign immunity for unconstitutional, ultra vires, arbi-
trary, capricious, and bad-faith acts are limited to injunctive relief only); Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality v. Oil Producers of Ark., 2009 Ark. 297, at 6–7, 318 S.W.3d 570, 573–74 (2009); 
Ark. Tech. Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 507, 17 S.W.3d 809, 816 (2000); Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n v. Lindsey, 299 Ark. 249, 252, 771 S.W.2d 769, 771 (1989) (citing Ark. State Game 
& Fish Comm’n v. Eubank, 256 Ark. 930, 512 S.W.2d 540 (1974)); Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n v. Lindsey, 292 Ark. 314, 319–20, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1987). 
 185. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 5, 2012 WL 401615, at *5 
(concluding that the circuit court was not attempting to control discretionary staffing issues 
impermissibly). 
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Compel Action Application because preparing a case plan is not a merely 
ministerial action, but rather requires the exercise of considerable discretion 
in the Department’s primary expertise in child-welfare proceedings, social 
work. 
Likewise, Shelby-style orders do not satisfy both elements of the En-
join Action Application because such orders do not actually direct the De-
partment to stop acting illegally.186 Rather, Shelby-style orders direct the 
Department to affirmatively “fix” problems identified by a court by taking 
certain actions. Thus, although the order in Shelby did seek to stop the De-
partment from acting illegally in so far as the Department did not comply 
with the juvenile code’s requirement that the Department prepare a case 
plan, Shelby-style orders exceed the scope of the Enjoin Action Application 
because such orders purport to authorize a remedy other than the only reme-
dy authorized under the Enjoin Action Application: the injunction of a spe-
cific, illegal action being performed by a state agency. 
d. The Shelby Doctrine does not invoke a circuit court’s inher-
ent contempt powers 
The Department’s sovereign immunity relative to the Shelby Doctrine 
is not overcome by a circuit court’s inherent contempt power because the 
Shelby Doctrine simply does not rely on the circuit court’s contempt power. 
Without question, circuit courts have a broad, inherent authority187 to com-
pel compliance with court orders and to punish for noncompliance of those 
orders.188 Indeed, Arkansas courts have long recognized the judiciary’s con-
tempt power as an exception to the sovereign-immunity doctrine that could 
be used to compel a state agency like the Department to obey a court order 
or to punish the Department for failing to obey a court order where the coer-
 
 186. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 187. The Arkansas Supreme Court interprets the contempt power extremely broadly and 
does not recognize limitations on its authority to punish contempt set by statute by the Gen-
eral Assembly even though the General Assembly is empowered to regulate the punishment 
of indirect contempt. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 26 (permitting the General Assembly to regulate 
the punishment of indirect contempt but not direct contempt or indirect contempt from the 
disobedience of “process”); Ivy v. Keith, 351 Ark. 269, 279, 92 S.W.3d 671, 677 (2002) 
(interpreting statutory limits to be supplemental to a court’s authority and not as a limitation 
on the courts authority because “process” includes the disobedience of any order or similar 
mandate, whether made in writing or verbally); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. State, 312 
Ark. 481, 487–88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 851 (1993) (“The power to punish for contempt is an 
inherent power of the court.”). 
 188. Arkansas courts also have the clear authority to punish for willful misconduct com-
mitted before the given court that threatens the orderly procedure of the court or reflects upon 
the court’s integrity and that is separate from the disobedience of a court order. See, e.g., Ivy, 
351 Ark. at 278–79, 92 S.W.3d at 676–77; Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 197, 33 
S.W.3d 492, 499 (2000). 
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cion of the state agency arises from the court’s contempt powers.189 The 
Shelby Doctrine, however, does not invoke a circuit court’s contempt power 
as the source of a circuit court’s authority to enter Shelby-style orders. Con-
sequently, the Shelby Doctrine does not benefit from the exception to sover-
eign immunity arising from the contempt power and circuit courts could not 
justify Shelby-style orders based solely on a circuit court’s contempt power. 
Nevertheless, even if the circuit court in Shelby had relied on the 
court’s contempt power, the circuit court could still not have issued Shelby-
style orders as a sanction for contempt because the contempt power only 
enforces jurisdiction; it does not create jurisdiction and is subject to consti-
tutional and jurisdictional limitations that preclude the application of the 
contempt power in the context of Shelby-style orders.190 Arkansas courts 
have recognized that a court may punish the disobedience of a court order 
only where that court had the jurisdiction to enter the order.191 Likewise, a 
court may not impose sanctions in contempt situations that the court does 
 
 189. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 498–501, 
505, 237 S.W.3d 7, 9–11, 13 (2006); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 531–
32, 970 S.W.2d 225, 232–33 (1998); State, 312 Ark. at 487–88, 850 S.W.2d at 851 (recogniz-
ing that trial courts “must have the authority to control the parties and other persons before it” 
and that this control is effected in the context of the trial court’s contempt power); Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 563–66, 810 S.W.2d 331, 331–34 (1991) (providing 
that the contempt power is necessary for the purpose of enforcing its orders and ensuring that 
a party does not disregard orders in the future by having a consequence for failing to comply 
with the trial court’s order); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 115–
16, 839 S.W.2d 543, 544–45 (1992). 
 190. See, e.g., Bennett v. Collier, 351 Ark. 447, 451–52, 95 S.W.3d 782, 784–85 (2003) 
(holding that a party in a child-welfare proceeding could not be held in contempt after the 
court had terminated that party’s parental rights to the given juvenile because the court lost 
jurisdiction of that party after the termination proceedings ended); Gould v. Gould, 308 Ark. 
213, 217, 823 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1992) (providing that a court has the authority to “enforce an 
order to compel conduct, even if it is an order to pay money, by the contempt power” in the 
context of collecting past due child support arrearages, but that contempt power remains 
subject to the limitations imposed by article 2, section 16 of the Arkansas Constitution); 
Criswell v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 2014 Ark. App. 309, at 8, 436 S.W.3d 152, 
157 (holding that a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hold a party in contempt where that 
party was never properly served in the case); Black v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 788, at 3, 2010 
WL 4880682, at *3; Brock v. Eubanks, 102 Ark. App. 165, 168–69, 288 S.W.3d 272, 275 
(2008) (holding that a court may not vest with another party the court’s power and authority 
to determine compliance with a court order). 
 191. Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 534, 597 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1980) 
(“Disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction to enter 
it may constitute contempt.”); Black, 2010 Ark. App. 788, at 3, 2010 WL 4880682, at *3 
(citing White v. Taylor, 19 Ark. App. 104, 717 S.W.2d 497 (1986)) (recognizing that the 
contempt power “must be premised on the disobedience of a valid order of a court having 
jurisdiction to enter it”). 
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not have the jurisdiction to impose.192 This contempt power therefore does 
not give a circuit court carte blanche to enter whatever order it may feel is 
needed in a case, nor does it allow a circuit court to use the Department’s 
failure to comply with a court order to trigger additional jurisdiction over 
the Department or otherwise allow that circuit court to order the Department 
to do something that is beyond the circuit court’s jurisdiction to order. 
Given these principles, it seems clear that a circuit court could not use 
its contempt powers to issue Shelby-style orders—either as an order in the 
first instance or as a sanction for a failure to comply with a previous order—
because circuit courts lack the jurisdiction necessary to enter Shelby-style 
orders, and such orders violate the Department’s sovereign immunity.193 Put 
another way, although a circuit court could order the Department to perform 
something the juvenile code requires the Department to do and then rely on 
the circuit court’s contempt power to hold the Department in contempt for 
failure to comply with that order, a circuit court must not exceed its jurisdic-
tion when doing so.194 
The counterargument to this conclusion arises from the legions of cases 
that state that the contempt power can be used to “protect the rights of liti-
gants.” The majority in Shelby arguably cited this basis for the circuit 
court’s authority to protect the rights of juveniles and other litigants as direct 
and sufficient support for its holdings.195 And even though the majority in 
Shelby did not cite specifically to contempt as the basis for such authority, 
Chief Justice Hannah expressly references in his dissent in Arkansas De-
partment of Health and Human Services v. Briley—the first apparent formu-
 
 192. Bates v. McNeil, 318 Ark. 764, 768–70, 888 S.W.2d 642, 645–46 (1994) (holding 
that a trial court improperly imposed sanctions related to contempt because the trial court did 
not have the jurisdiction to order the alleged contemnor into custody before the hearing to 
show case and that such actions were unconstitutional as a violation of due process); Ex Parte 
Burton, 237 Ark. 441, 442–45, 373 S.W.2d 409, 409–11 (1963) (holding that a court could 
not punish a lawyer with incarceration and disbarment because the court lacked the jurisdic-
tion to do so where the lawyer’s conduct was not determined to be contemptuous and the 
court lacked the authority to disbar the lawyer). 
 193. See supra Parts III.A, III.B.1, III.B.2.a–c. 
 194. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 6–7, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*6–7 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Denmon, 2009 Ark. 
485, 346 S.W.3d 283) (observing that although the circuit court in Shelby could have ordered 
the Department to prepare the case for a permanency planning hearing and then punished the 
Department if the Department did not follow that order, the “circuit court must be careful not 
to exceed its jurisdiction when issuing these orders”). 
 195. Id. at 3–4, 2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. Specifically, the majority in Shelby referenced 
the need to protect the rights of juveniles and other litigants based on the circuit court’s juris-
diction over juveniles in equity as well as the circuit court’s Inherent Protection Power. Id., 
2012 WL 401615, at *3–4. 
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lation of the Shelby Doctrine concept—three contempt cases as justification 
for the circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order in that case.196 
A further review of the contempt power and its requirements,197 how-
ever, indicates that the authority to “protect the rights of litigants” through 
the contempt power is limited and does not afford circuit courts with the 
authority to issue Shelby-style orders. This authority to “protect the rights of 
litigants” exists only in the context of a civil contempt sanction that seeks to 
enforce the rights of a litigant by compelling obedience to orders made for 
the benefit of that litigant.198 In this way, the “rights of litigants” contem-
plated under the contempt power are simply the rights of parties in litigation 
to receive the benefit and enforcement of court orders imposed in the par-
ties’ individual cases. Thus, the contempt power could not be used to im-
pose a Shelby-style order as a sanction to “protect the rights of litigants” 
precisely because the civil contempt power is predicated on the enforcement 
of a prior court order; it is not a mechanism by which a court protects a par-
ty’s rights directly. 
Moreover, none of the contempt cases cited by Chief Justice Hannah in 
Briley provide a sufficient jurisdictional basis for a circuit court to enter a 
Shelby-style order because the trial court in each case had the jurisdiction to 
enter the orders and sanctions at issue, and none of the cases recognize a 
separate jurisdictional basis arising through the contempt power. For exam-
ple, the trial court in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. R.P. had 
the authority to sanction the Department’s representative with incarceration 
for the representative’s refusal to comply with the court’s valid and then-
 
 196. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 507, 237 S.W.3d 7, 
15 (2006) (citing Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998); 
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992); Hart v. 
McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001)). 
 197. The law and practice of contempt is extraordinarily broad, particularly with respect 
to the nature of the contempt power and the limitations that prescribe when and under what 
circumstances the contempt power can be employed. See generally Terry Crabtree, Contempt 
Law in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2–16 (1998). Fortunately, the only limitation relevant to 
the analysis of Shelby-style orders in this article relate to civil, indirect contempt arising out 
of the disobedience of a court order, specifically, the requirement that civil contempt sanc-
tions must be for the benefit of a party before the court. Briley, 366 Ark. at 499–501, 504–05, 
237 S.W.3d at 9–10, 13. 
 198. Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 356 Ark. 440, 448–49, 454, 156 
S.W.3d 228, 234–35, 238 (2004) (providing that civil contempt preserves and enforces the 
rights of private parties and coerces compliance with an order of the court); Hart, 344 Ark. at 
670, 42 S.W.3d at 562 (observing that a court’s contempt power may be wielded “to preserve 
the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders, and to preserve 
and enforce the parties’ rights,” and that civil contempt sanctions “are to preserve and enforce 
the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of 
those parties”); R.P., 333 Ark. at 534 n.2, 970 S.W.2d at 234 (“[C]ivil contempt proceedings 
are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obe-
dience to orders made for the benefit of those parties.”). 
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unchallenged order for the Department to pay to restore utilities in a child-
welfare proceeding because trial courts may impose criminal penalties such 
as imprisonment for disobedience of court orders199 and the trial court’s spe-
cific, statutory jurisdiction to order the Department to provide cash assis-
tance as a “family service” in the child-welfare proceeding before the trial 
court.200 Likewise, the trial court in Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices v. Gruber had the authority to punitively fine the Department $150 for 
the failure of a specific representative of the Department to appear at a juve-
nile delinquency hearing regarding the placement of a juvenile because trial 
courts may impose criminal penalties, including fines, for disobedience of 
court orders201 and trial courts have the authority to order non-parties like 
the Department’s representative to appear—even though neither the De-
partment nor the representative was a party to the case—where that nonparty 
was physically present before the trial court when it ordered the representa-
tive to appear at the next hearing.202 Finally, the trial court in Hart v. 
McChristian had the authority to sanction a litigant with the full cost of arbi-
tration between the parties where that litigant violated the trial court’s valid 
and then-unchallenged court order to transfer certain assets to a receiver and 
not to interfere with the receiver because trial courts may impose such re-
medial civil penalties for the disobedience of court orders and there was no 
allegation that the trial court lacked the authority to order parties to transfer 
assets and not interfere with a receiver.203 
Nevertheless, the nature of the contempt power does leave open the 
possibility that a circuit court may enter a Shelby-style order as a valid civil 
sanction if the sanction would be for the benefit of one or more of the spe-
cific parties before a court in a child-welfare procedure.204 Perhaps the most 
relevant case on this point is Briley, with the majority holding that a circuit 
 
 199. See, e.g., R.P., 333 Ark. at 540–41, 970 S.W.2d at 237; Crabtree, supra note 197, at 
1, 4–7 & nn.18–37. 
 200. R.P., 333 Ark. at 529–32, 970 S.W.2d at 231–33. 
 201. See, e.g., Gruber, 39 Ark. App. at 114–16, 839 S.W.2d at 544–45 (1992); Omni 
Holding, 356 Ark. at 448–49, 454, 156 S.W.3d at 234–35, 238 (discussing the ability of 
courts to impose fines); Crabtree, supra note 197, at 4–7 & nn.18–37. 
 202. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. at 115–16, 839 S.W.2d at 544–45 (citing Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306 
Ark. 146, 811 S.W.2d 761 (1991); Hilton Hilltop, Inc. v. Riviere, 268 Ark. 532, 597 S.W.2d 
596 (1980); Dennison v. Mobley, 257 Ark. 216, 515 S.W.2d 215 (1974)). 
 203. See, e.g., Omni Holding, 356 Ark. at 448–49, 454, 156 S.W.3d at 234–35, 238; Hart, 
344 Ark. at 670, 42 S.W.3d at 562; Crabtree, supra note 197, at 4–7 & nn.18–37. 
 204. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 498–501, 
505, 237 S.W.3d 7, 9–11, 13 (2006) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 
492 (2000)) (“Civil contempt is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties 
to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for the benefit of those par-
ties.”); see Hart, 344 Ark. at 670, 42 S.W.3d at 562 (“The purposes of civil contempt are to 
preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders 
made for the benefit of those parties.”). 
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court could not order the Department to prepare a “written methodology for 
responding to future staffing issues”—but only because such an order would 
not benefit the parent in that case given that the parent’s case had been 
closed.205 Although the majority arguably rejected the extensive authority 
asserted in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent by finding that the written-
methodology sanction was not appropriate, the majority’s sole reliance on 
the lack of benefit to the parent suggests that it might have ruled differently 
had the parent still been a party. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court may therefore find that a Shelby-style or-
der could be an appropriate sanction—but only if the circuit court has the 
jurisdiction to enter such an order. This article now turns to the only juris-
dictional basis that has not been addressed—and rejected—thus far: the In-
herent Protection Power. 
3. The Inherent Protection Power Does Not Overcome a State Agen-
cy’s Sovereign Immunity 
The Shelby Doctrine and all Shelby-style orders that coerce the De-
partment to act are invalid under the sovereign immunity doctrine despite 
the broad Inherent Protection Power asserted in Shelby. The Inherent Protec-
tion Power, however, has never been recognized as an exception to any state 
agency’s sovereign immunity.206 The only way for the Shelby Doctrine’s 
assertion of the Inherent Protection Power to overcome the sovereign im-
munity of a state agency like the Department would therefore be if a court 
were to interpret the Inherent Protection Power as constituting a new excep-
tion to sovereign immunity. 
The Shelby Doctrine’s assertion of the Inherent Protection Power, how-
ever, should not be recognized as a new exception to the Department’s sov-
ereign immunity in child-welfare proceedings. First, the Shelby Doctrine’s 
assertion of the Inherent Protection Power lacks sufficient support from Ar-
kansas law to constitute a new exception to the Department’s sovereign im-
munity. Second, the judiciary lacks a constitutionally sufficient role in child-
welfare proceedings that would otherwise support the Shelby Doctrine’s 
application of the Inherent Protection Power as a new exception to the De-
partment’s sovereign immunity. 
 
 205. See Briley, 366 Ark. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13. 
 206. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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a. The Inherent Protection Power asserted under the Shelby 
Doctrine is contrary to Arkansas law and does not constitute 
a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity 
The Inherent Protection Power as asserted by the Shelby Doctrine 
should not be interpreted as constituting a new exception to the Depart-
ment’s sovereign immunity because the actual inherent power invoked by 
the Shelby Doctrine under City of Fayetteville v. Edmark relates only to the 
procedural authority of courts to conduct proceedings and control court op-
erations and records (“the Inherent Procedural Power”) and would therefore 
not be sufficient to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity related 
to the Department’s internal operations. Further, a careful review of the 
Shelby Doctrine’s progenitor in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. 
Briley and long-standing precedent highlights the limited application of a 
subcategory of the Inherent Procedural Power to a court’s ability to compel 
a nonjudicial governmental entity to take certain actions necessary for the 
court to operate and does not extend to a circuit court’s authority to enter 
Shelby-style orders. Yet even this type of the Inherent Procedural Power is 
limited and would not provide the exception to the Department’s sovereign 
immunity that would be necessary for a court to enter Shelby-style orders. 
The Shelby Doctrine, however, sets out the Inherent Protection Power 
broadly as the “inherent authority” of a circuit court to protect the integrity 
of its proceedings and safeguard litigants appearing before it such that a 
circuit court may compel the Department to fulfill the Department’s obliga-
tions under the juvenile code and “correct problems that were preventing 
work and services [from being performed by the Department].”207 This invo-
cation of the Inherent Protection Power, however, is relatively new and un-
derdeveloped analytically, with the Shelby majority citing only one case to 
support it, namely, City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, which is a 1990 Arkansas 
Supreme Court case that held that attorney work product was subject to the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) absent the application of an exception 
such as a valid protective order.208 
The Shelby majority’s reliance on Edmark is misplaced because the 
“inherent authority” described in Edmark related only to the ability of trial 
courts to enter protective orders related to FOIA disclosures and to protect a 
litigant’s constitutional fair trial rights.209 And even though dicta in Edmark 
 
 207. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*3–5. 
 208. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 191–95, 801 S.W.2d 275, 281–83 
(1990). 
 209. See id., 801 S.W.2d at 281–83. Specifically, the Edmark court stated that “[a] trial 
court has the inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court in actions pending before 
it and may issue appropriate protective orders that would provide FOIA exemption[s] . . . and 
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more broadly related to protecting the “integrity of the court” and a litigant’s 
fair trial rights, Edmark itself simply does not support a broad “inherent” 
control over parties such as the control that the Shelby Doctrine expressly 
contemplates. Rather, Edmark was specific to the control over the parties 
expressly provided by statute under FOIA related to the disclosure or non-
disclosure of public records.210 Moreover, the “inherent authority” relied on 
in Edmark was limited in so far as the court found that a court in a FOIA 
action—apparently notwithstanding the court’s own “inherent authority” 
and the request for protection from the parties before the court—did not 
have the authority to enter a protective order binding on another court with 
pending litigation related to the FOIA disclosure.211 
The authorities relied on by Edmark and other invocations of a court’s 
“inherent authority” also support the conclusion that the “inherent authority” 
contemplated by Edmark was limited and did not include broad control of 
parties appearing before the court. For example, although the Edmark court 
cited Arkansas Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson as support for the “inherent 
authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants before it,”212 Patterson 
only related to fair trial rights granted to litigants under the United States 
Constitution and the Arkansas Supreme Court’s determination that a court 
did not have the authority to close the pretrial hearings in the criminal matter 
at bar because the appropriate constitutional test was not satisfied.213 Like-
 
always has the inherent authority to secure the fair trial rights of litigants before it.” Id. at 
191, 194, 801 S.W.2d at 281, 283. The Edmark court also referenced, without supporting 
authority, the “inherent power of a trial court to control actions pending before it.” Id. at 194, 
801 S.W.2d at 283. The issues in Edmark, however, did not pertain to protecting the integrity 
of the trial court or controlling the action before the trial court, but rather only related to 
protective orders and protecting the fair trial rights of the litigants, including the litigation 
rights of the City of Fayetteville under FOIA. See id. at 191–94, 801 S.W.2d at 281–83. 
 210. Id. at 191, 194, 801 S.W.2d at 281, 283. Furthermore, the Edmark court’s separate 
reference to “the inherent power of a trial court to control actions pending before it” does not 
change the limited scope of the “inherent authority” described in Edmark because Edmark 
did not involve controlling actions or parties appearing before the trial other than the disclo-
sure or nondisclosure of records under FOIA. Id. at 194–95, 801 S.W.2d at 283. The interpre-
tation of Edmark by later appellate decisions in Arkansas also bears out the limited nature of 
Edmark’s “inherent authority.” See, e.g., Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927, 
927 (2007) (providing that “the inherent authority of the trial court to control court records . . 
. is not absolute”); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 124, 871 S.W.2d 
352, 355 (1994) (describing the “inherent authority” recognized in Edmark as the “authority 
of a trial court to issue appropriate protective orders to control court records” and noting that 
this “inherent authority” has limitations). 
 211. See Edmark, 304 Ark. at 191, 801 S.W.2d at 281; cf. Hardy, 316 Ark. at 124, 871 
S.W.2d at 355. 
 212. Edmark, 304 Ark. at 194, 801 S.W.2d at 283. 
 213. Ark. Newspaper, Inc. v. Patterson, 281 Ark. 213, 214, 662 S.W.2d 826, 827 (1984). 
Specifically, Patterson addressed the application of a state law that provided all state courts 
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wise, other Arkansas courts have relied on the procedural nature of a court’s 
inherent power to ensure “an orderly, efficient[,] and effective administra-
tion of justice,”214 control court records,215 enforce its orders,216 stay an ap-
peal pending further proceedings,217 adopt rules of evidence, 218 adopt rules 
of procedure,219 order remittitur,220 correct and modify its own judgments,221 
address issues incidental to criminal law,222 appoint a special prosecutor 
when the prosecuting attorney is implicated in a crime,223 establish guidance 
for court clerks,224 and direct the manner in which a jury should be selected 
and summoned.225 
Moreover, only one appellate opinion in Arkansas has ever concluded 
that Edmark represents the broad power over litigants contemplated in Shel-
by—and that was Chief Justice Hannah’s previous dissent in Briley, which 
is addressed below separately. Indeed, out of the twenty-five other appellate 
court opinions that have cited to Edmark, other than Shelby and Chief Jus-
tice Hannah’s dissent in Briley, no opinion has asserted anything beyond the 
procedural authority of courts to conduct proceedings and control court op-
erations and records.226 For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited 
 
shall be public and the First Amendment with a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
related to a fair trial. See id., 662 S.W.2d at 827. 
 214. Burns v. State, 300 Ark. 469, 472, 780 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1989); Coakes v. State, 2014 
Ark. App. 298, at 5 n.1, 2014 WL 2011804, at *5 (“The right to counsel of one’s choice is 
not absolute and may not be used to frustrate the inherent power of the court to command an 
orderly, efficient, and effective administration of justice.”). 
 215. Ward v. State, 2013 Ark. 250, at 3, 2013 WL 2460209, at *3 (“We have recognized 
the inherent authority of the trial court to control court records.”); Ward, 369 Ark. at 313, 253 
S.W.3d at 927; Hardy, 316 Ark. at 123–24, 871 S.W.2d at 355–56. 
 216. Kelley v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 402, at 1 n.1, 424 S.W.3d 295, 296 (citing Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Clark, 305 Ark. 561, 810 S.W.2d 331 (1991)). 
 217. Stratton v. Stratton, 2014 Ark. App. 292, at 4–5, 2014 WL 1856706, at *4–5 (citing 
Clements v. State, 306 Ark. 596, 817 S.W.2d 194 (1991)). 
 218. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 104–05, 717 S.W.2d 488, 489–90 (1986). 
 219. Miller v. State, 262 Ark. 223, 226, 555 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1977). 
 220. Martin v. Rieger, 289 Ark. 292, 297, 711 S.W.2d 776, 778 (1986). 
 221. Blissard Mgm’t & Realty, Inc. v. Kremer, 284 Ark. 136, 139, 680 S.W.2d 694, 696 
(1984) (citing Massengale v. Johnson, 269 Ark. 269, 599 S.W.2d 743 (1980)); Cooper v. 
Cooper, 2013 Ark. App. 748, at 10, 431 S.W.3d 349, 355 (citing Harrison v. Bradford, 9 Ark. 
App. 156, 655 S.W.2d 466 (1983)). 
 222. Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 498, 625 S.W.2d 521, 523 (1981). 
 223. Weems v. Anderson, 257 Ark. 376, 380–81, 516 S.W.2d 895, 898 (1974). 
 224. Christy v. Speer, 210 Ark. 756, 758, 197 S.W.2d 466, 467 (1946) (noting that courts 
have the “inherent power to make such rules, not in conflict with the constitution or any valid 
statute, as the court may deem necessary for the prompt and efficient handling of matters 
before it”). 
 225. Norrid v. State, 188 Ark 32, 32, 63 S.W.2d 526, 527 (1933). 
 226. In addition to the cases that cite Edmark directly, at least 469 Arkansas cases cite to 
some form of “inherent authority” or “inherent power” at the time of this writing according to 
the FastCase research system. This article, however, does not purport to have exhaustively 
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Edmark in Broussard v. Saint Edward Mercy Health System regarding the 
authority of a court to decide who may testify and under what conditions,227 
as well as in Valley v. Phillips County Election Commission as support for a 
circuit court disqualifying an attorney from representing a client in a case 
before the court.228 The Arkansas Supreme Court also cited Edmark in Ward 
v. State and Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Hardy for the au-
thority of a court to control court records and seal portions of the record,229 
as did Justice Karen Baker in her dissent in McNair v. Johnson related to 
sealing court records230 and in her opinion in Reid v. Frazee related to the 
authority of a trial court to schedule an additional hearing after an adoption 
hearing but before entry of its adoption decree in order to obtain the consent 
of the minor being adopted as required by statute.231 Justice Baker has also 
cited Edmark in her concurrence and dissent in Arkansas Judicial Discipline 
and Disability Commission v. Simes as support for a circuit court’s authority 
to determine if sanctions are warranted for a violation of Rule 11 of the Ar-
kansas Rules of Civil Procedure,232 as well as in her dissent in Hausman v. 
Throesch as support for a trial court’s authority to enter an amended order.233 
The remaining seventeen decisions citing to Edmark relate only to either the 
 
reviewed these cases because they are not cited by the majority opinion in Shelby or Chief 
Justice Hannah’s dissenting opinion in Briley other than his citations to Edmark and Valley v. 
Phillips County Election Commission. Nevertheless, even a cursory review of these cases 
indicates that other Arkansas cases citing to a court’s “inherent authority” are consistent with 
the limitation on the “inherent authority” described in the Edmark line of cases as relating 
only to the procedural authority of courts. See, e.g., Green v. State, 2009 Ark. 113, at 8–11, 
313 S.W.3d 521, 526–28 (relating to the authority to hold parties to the terms of plea bar-
gains); Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Isbell, 360 Ark. 256, 258, 200 S.W.3d 873, 875 (2005) 
(relating to the authority of a court to modify its own order within ninety days of filing); Ark. 
Best Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Capital, 317 Ark. 238, 245–46, 878 S.W.2d 708, 711–12 (1994) 
(relating to the court’s authority to enter appropriate protective orders to control court rec-
ords); Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 537, 623 S.W.2d 813, 819 (1981) (relating to the 
authority of a court to require a bond for payment of child support); Wade v. Sonic Drive-In, 
42 Ark. App. 260, 261, 856 S.W.2d 630, 630 (1993) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (relating to the 
authority to institute orderly procedures for situations that arise and are not provided by any 
rule). 
 227. Broussard v. Saint Edward Mercy Health Sys., 2012 Ark. 14, at 6–7, 386 S.W.3d 
385, 389. 
 228. Valley v. Phillips Cnty. Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 497–98, 183 S.W.3d 557, 
559 (2004). 
 229. Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927, 927 (2007); Ark. Dep’t of Hu-
man Servs. v. Hardy, 316 Ark. 119, 123–24, 871 S.W.2d 352, 355–56 (1994). 
 230. McNair v. Johnson, 75 Ark. App. 261, 266–67, 57 S.W.3d 742, 746 (2001) (Baker, 
J., dissenting). 
 231. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 479–80, 41 S.W.3d 397, 400–01 (2001). 
 232. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disciplinary Comm’n v. Sines, 2011 Ark. 193, at 26, 381 
S.W.3d 764, 780 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 233. Hausman v. Throesch, 104 Ark. App. 113, 116–17, 289 S.W.3d 493, 495–96 (2008) 
(Baker, J., dissenting). 
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precedential value of Attorney General Opinions234 or to FOIA matters that 
do not assert any authority other than the ability of a court to enter orders 
related to FOIA and its exceptions.235 
The decisions in Ward, McNair, and Reid are particularly salient to un-
derstanding Edmark’s limited procedural scope because—just as in Shelby 
and Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley—the objective in each of the 
assertions of “inherent authority” in those cases related to protecting juve-
niles from harm. In Shelby, for example, the objective was ensuring that the 
Department provided juveniles with necessary services by compelling the 
Department to reduce a caseworker’s caseload or otherwise dictate the De-
partment’s internal operations,236 and in Briley it was ensuring that the De-
partment would be better able to fulfill its statutory obligations by ordering 
the Department to prepare a written methodology for responding to future 
staffing issues.237 Likewise, the objective in Ward was protecting against the 
disclosure of photographs of nude juveniles,238 protecting against the disclo-
sure of two juveniles’ testimony during an appeal in McNair,239 and protect-
ing the juvenile’s statutory rights by requiring evidence of the juvenile’s 
consent to adoption in Reid.240 
The actual authority described in Ward, McNair, and Reid demon-
strates that even when a court’s objective is to protect juveniles from harm, 
the “inherent authority” of a trial court is limited to its procedural authority 
to conduct proceedings and control court operations and records. The au-
thority asserted in Ward and McNair, for example, related to the trial court’s 
 
 234. See, e.g., White v. Priest, 348 Ark. 135, 144, 73 S.W.3d 572, 576 (2002); Ark. Prof. 
Bail Bondsman v. Oudin, 348 Ark. 48, 59, 69 S.W.3d 855, 862 (2002); Willis v. State, 71 
S.W.3d 61, 65–66 (Ark. App. 2002) (Roaf, J., dissenting). 
 235. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Brinkley, 2014 Ark. 139, at 12, 432 S.W.3d 609, 617; 
Harrill v. Farrar, 2012 Ark. 180, at 9, 402 S.W.3d 511, 516; Nabholz Const. v. Contractors 
for Pub., 371 Ark. 411, 418–19, 266 S.W.3d 689, 292–94 (2007); Pulaski Co. v. Ark. Demo-
crat-Gazette, 370 Ark. 435, 447–48, 260 S.W.3d 718, 726–27 (2007) (Glaze, J., dissenting); 
Harris v. City of Fort Smith, 359 Ark. 355, 365, 197 S.W.3d 461, 467 (2004); Fox v. Perroni, 
358 Ark. 251, 257–58, 188 S.W.3d 881, 885–86 (2004); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 
472 n.4, 182 S.W.3d 112, 124 (2004); Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 538–39, 983 S.W.2d 
902, 904 (1998); Swaney v. Tilford, 320 Ark. 652, 653–54, 898 S.W.2d 462, 463–64 (1995); 
Johninson v. Stodola, 316 Ark. 423, 425, 872 S.W.2d 374, 375 (1994); Sebastian Co. Chapter 
of the Am. Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 Ark. 656, 658–59, 846 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1993); 
Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485–86, 830 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1992); Kristen Inv. Props., 
LLC v. Faulkner Cnty. Waterworks, 72 Ark. App. 37, 40–41, 32 S.W.3d 60, 61–62 (2000). 
 236. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–5, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*2–5. 
 237. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–08, 237 S.W.3d 7, 13–15 
(2006) (Hannah, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 238. Ward v. State, 369 Ark. 313, 313, 253 S.W.3d 927, 927 (2007). 
 239. McNair v. Johnson, 75 Ark. App. 261, 266–67, 57 S.W.3d 742, 746 (2001) (Baker, 
J., dissenting). 
 240. Reid v. Frazee, 72 Ark. App. 474, 478–79, 41 S.W.3d 397, 400–01 (2001). 
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authority to seal court records.241 Likewise, the authority asserted in Reid 
related to the trial court’s authority to hold a subsequent hearing after an 
adoption hearing, but prior to the entry of the court’s judgment, once the 
court discovered the lack of evidence on the juvenile’s consent to adop-
tion.242 By contrast, the authority asserted in Shelby and in Chief Justice 
Hannah’s dissent in Briley related to the direct control of the Department’s 
actions and operations and not merely to the court’s authority to control its 
own proceedings.243 
Nevertheless, the reliance of the Shelby majority on Edmark and the 
Inherent Protection Power is not surprising because it is not the first time 
that members of the Shelby majority have cited Edmark in support of a 
Shelby-like Inherent Protection Power in a child-welfare proceeding. Indeed, 
Chief Justice Hannah, joined by Justice Jim Gunter, cited Edmark in a more 
detailed and arguably even broader exposition of the Inherent Protection 
Power in dissent to Briley than the power Chief Justice Hannah described 
almost six years later as the author of the majority opinion in Shelby. 
The issue in Briley was the Department’s failure to comply with a cir-
cuit court’s orders to provide family services and the circuit court’s finding 
that the Department was in contempt as a result of that failure.244 The major-
ity upheld the contempt finding and the circuit court sanction of reimbursing 
the parent $160 for out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of the De-
 
 241. Ward, 369 Ark. at 313, 253 S.W.3d at 927; McNair, 75 Ark. App. at 266–67, 57 
S.W.3d at 746 (Baker, J., dissenting). Notably, the majority in McNair implicitly rejected 
Justice Baker’s concern for protecting the juveniles in favor of following established appel-
late procedural requirements that required all testimony to be abstracted. Id. at 263, 57 
S.W.3d at 743 (majority opinion). 
 242. Reid, 72 Ark. App. at 478–79, 41 S.W.3d at 400–01. The Court of Appeals in Reid 
actually cited several bases for the trial court’s authority in that case to hold a hearing before 
the entry of the final adoption decree. First, the court found that trial courts have statutory 
authority to hold such hearings. Id. at 479, 41 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-
214(b) (Repl. 1993)) (“The court may continue the hearing from time to time to permit fur-
ther observation, investigation, or consideration of any facts or circumstances affecting the 
granting of the petition.”). Second, the court found that even without statutory authority the 
trial court had the “inherent authority” to hold such a hearing, citing for support Edmark and 
Massengale v. Johnson, a 1980 Arkansas Supreme Court case affirming the authority of a 
trial court to vacate its judgment and set a new hearing after the court became aware that it 
may have made a mistake in its judgment. Id., 41 S.W.3d at 401 (citing Massengale v. John-
son, 269 Ark. 269, 599 S.W.2d 743 (1980)). 
 243. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 2–5, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*2–5; Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–07, 237 S.W.3d 7, 13–15 
(2006) (Hannah, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Hannah and Jus-
tice Gunter, however, may take exception to this characterization given the link drawn in 
Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley between the ability of a trial court to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities in child-welfare proceedings and the Department’s performance of its statutory 
obligations and “full cooperation with the juvenile courts.” See id., 237 S.W.3d at 13–15. 
 244. Briley, 366 Ark. at 498–99, 237 S.W.3d at 9 (majority opinion). 
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partment’s contempt, but the majority rejected the sanction of compelling 
the Department to prepare a “written methodology for responding to future 
staffing issues” because such a sanction would not benefit the parties in the 
case as is required for all civil contempt sanctions.245 
Chief Justice Hannah in turn concurred with the contempt finding and 
the $160 reimbursement sanction, but dissented from the majority’s rejec-
tion of the “written methodology” sanction because circuit courts, Chief 
Justice Hannah argued, had the authority to order the Department to provide 
assurance in the form of a written methodology that the Department would 
carry out the Department’s obligations in child-welfare proceedings in addi-
tion to the actual issue of contempt.246 And just as in Shelby, Chief Justice 
Hannah cited in support of this authority the Inherent Protection Power, 
namely, the “inherent authority” of circuit courts “to protect the integrity of 
the court in actions before it . . . [and] to protect the integrity of the proceed-
ings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it.”247 
But Chief Justice Hannah did not stop there. In addition to citing 
Edmark and Valley as authority for the Inherent Protection Power later ar-
ticulated in Shelby, 248 Chief Justice Hannah further argued that circuit courts 
also have the inherent authority to “control parties who appear before it, 
especially parties such as [the Department] who appear repeatedly in court 
on many different cases” based on (1) the “duty” of a circuit court to “put in 
place a system designed to assure [the Department’s] performance in future 
cases, which benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction ra-
ther than just the child at issue [in Briley], and (2) “the primary responsibil-
ity and supervisory control [of the courts] to see that children of this state 
receive the assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection 
dictated by the judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice.”249 
 
 245. Id. at 504–05, 237 S.W.3d at 13. 
 246. Id. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13–14 (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 247. Compare Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 4, 2012 WL 410615, at *4, with Briley, 366 Ark. 
at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15 (citing Valley v. Phillips Cnty. Election Comm’n, 359 Ark. 494, 
183 S.W.3d 557 (2004); City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 
(1990)). 
 248. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15. Chief Justice Hannah’s citation to Valley 
is in effect merely a second citation to Edmark in so far as the Valley court cited to Edmark 
and no other authority for the principle that a circuit court has the “inherent authority to pro-
tect the integrity of the court in actions before it.” Valley, 359 Ark. at 498, 183 S.W.3d at 
559. 
 249. Briley, 366 Ark. at 506–07, 237 S.W.3d at 14–15. Chief Justice Hannah also cited to 
the statutory mandate that the juvenile code be liberally construed to “assure that all juveniles 
brought to the attention of the courts receive the guidance, care, and control . . . [that] will 
best serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best interest of 
the state.” Id., 237 S.W.3d at 14–15 (quoting ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-302(1) (Repl. 2002)). 
It is not clear, however, how—or even if—Chief Justice Hannah considered that goal as 
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In support of the concept that such expansive authority inures to a cir-
cuit court as a consequence of the Department’s failure to “fulfill its duty 
under the statutes,” Chief Justice Hannah cited to three cases involving the 
contempt power.250 Specifically, Chief Justice Hannah cited R.P. for the 
propositions that a circuit court cannot fulfill its duty if the Department does 
not perform its obligations and that the circuit court could order the Depart-
ment to do the Department’s duty, namely, to provide family services.251 
Chief Justice Hannah likewise cited Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices v. Gruber for the proposition that circuit courts cannot fulfill their stat-
utory responsibility without the Department’s “full cooperation with the 
juvenile courts” given the duty placed on the Department as the agency 
charged with providing or otherwise arranging services.252 Finally, Chief 
Justice Hannah cited to Hart v. McChristian to support the idea that a 
court’s contempt powers were appropriate to compel the Department “to 
provide assurance that [the Department] would and could carry out its obli-
gations . . . [because a] court’s contempt power may be wielded to preserve 
the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders, 
and to preserve and enforce the parties’ rights.”253 
Chief Justice Hannah’s assertion of “inherent authority” fails to support 
a sufficient jurisdictional basis for Shelby-style orders because it conflates 
the limited jurisdiction afforded to circuit courts by the juvenile code with a 
circuit court’s limited power to control its own proceedings and records and 
the court’s equally limited civil contempt power.254 First, the juvenile code 
 
empowering circuit courts to exercise control over parties, but it is consistent with the oft-
cited assertion by circuit courts in child-welfare proceedings that they have the authority to 
act in a juvenile’s “best interests.” In any event, for the reasons cited in this article, such 
authority is inconsistent with Arkansas law. 
 250. Id. at 505–07, 237 S.W.3d at 15. It is also important to note that Chief Justice Han-
nah’s citations to these cases for support of the Inherent Protection Power are entirely com-
prised of citations to jurisprudential considerations that are at most nonbinding dicta. See 
generally Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001); Ark. Dep’t of Human 
Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 255 (1998); Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Gruber, 39 
Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992). 
 251. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15. 
 252. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 15. 
 253. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 15. 
 254. That said, there may be at least two votes on the current Arkansas Supreme Court for 
recognizing “inherent authority” as sufficient to overcome the sovereign immunity of a state 
agency like the Department. Justice Karen Baker, for example, dissented in Kiesling-
Daugherty v. State and argued that sovereign immunity may be overcome, or at least avoided, 
by court rules adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 2013 Ark. 281, at 4–5, 2013 WL 
3322335, at *4–5 (Baker, J., dissenting). In the same case, Justice Josephine Linker Hart 
likewise stated in dissent that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s rule-making authority may 
overcome sovereign immunity based on the Arkansas Supreme Court’s constitutional “grant 
of authority . . . to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions under amendment 80 
and this court’s attendant promulgation [of rules]” and that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
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only provides circuit courts with a limited jurisdiction to act in child-welfare 
proceedings and does not provide sufficient authority to enter Shelby-style 
orders because of the impact of Amendment 67.255 Second, the procedural 
power set out in Edmark and its progeny constitutes a source of authority 
that is (1) separate and distinct from the circuit court’s jurisdiction under the 
juvenile code and its contempt power, and (2) limited in its application to 
controlling a circuit court’s own proceedings and records.256 Third, a circuit 
court’s contempt power is another source of authority that is likewise (1) 
separate and distinct from the circuit court’s jurisdiction under the juvenile 
code and its procedural power under Edmark, and (2) limited in application 
to imposing sanctions that a circuit court has the jurisdiction to enter and 
does not provide circuit courts with any such additional jurisdiction.257 
Moreover, the majority in Briley implicitly rejected Chief Justice Han-
nah’s assertion of such a broad “inherent authority,” insofar as the circuit 
court lacked the authority due to the limitations of the circuit court’s con-
tempt power.258 Indeed, had the majority recognized the Inherent Protection 
Power articulated in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent, the majority arguably 
would have found that the circuit court did have the authority to address the 
Department’s failure to adequately perform, which, Chief Justice Hannah 
observed, “is certainly relevant to the integrity of the proceedings before the 
court” and the “fair administration of justice both in [the case before the 
circuit court] and in many other cases before the circuit court involving ne-
glected children.”259 Instead, the majority in Briley did not address at all the 
joint responsibility between the Department and the judiciary that Chief 
Justice Hannah argued to exist in the operation of the juvenile system, find-
ing simply that the circuit court exceeded its authority in ordering the De-
partment to prepare a written methodology to address future staffing is-
sues.260 
 
“interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings justifies the imposition of costs, and the power 
to make an award of costs is incident to our inherent jurisdiction and authority over the order-
ly administration of justice between all litigants.” Id. at 5–7, 2013 WL 3322335, at *5–7 
(Hart, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Chief Justice Hannah wrote the majority opinion in 
Kiesling-Daugherty that rejected the operation of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s appellate 
rules allowing a litigant to recover the costs of appeal against the state. Id. at 2–4, 2013 WL 
3322335, at *2–4 (majority opinion). 
 255. See supra Part III.A. 
 256. See supra notes 207–43 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra Part III.B.2.d. In addition, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a 
court’s power to control and protect litigants is actually the contempt power, which this arti-
cle has already noted is of limited application and does not constitute a separate source of 
jurisdiction. Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 487–88, 850 S.W.2d 847, 851 
(1993); see also supra Part III.B.2.d. 
 258. See Briley, 366 Ark. at 505, 237 S.W.3d at 13 (majority opinion). 
 259. Id., 237 S.W.3d at 14 (Hannah, C.J., dissenting). 
 260. See id., 237 S.W.3d at 13 (majority opinion). 
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That said, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that state courts 
do have the constitutional authority to order a state governmental entity to 
take actions that are necessary and essential for the court to operate.261 As 
the Arkansas Supreme Court observed in Abbott v. Spencer, for example, 
state courts have the “inherent power” to order a governmental entity to pay 
expenses that are necessary and essential for a court to operate based on the 
doctrine that “there [are] three separate but equal branches of government, 
and therefore, inherent in the constitution is the principle that when one of 
the other branches fails to fund a court that court has the power to order 
those acts done which are necessary and essential for the court to oper-
ate.”262 Although Chief Justice Hannah did not cite this specific authority in 
either Shelby or his dissent in Briley, Chief Justice Hannah appears to in-
voke at least the spirit of this doctrine by focusing on (1) how dependent on 
the Department’s actions the circuit court’s own abilities to fulfill the circuit 
court’s statutory responsibilities in child-welfare proceedings, and (2) the 
circuit court’s responsibility to “see that the children of this state receive the 
assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection dictated by the 
judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice.”263 
The limited nature of this power, however, indicates that it is insuffi-
cient to overcome the Department’s sovereign immunity and authorize Shel-
by-style orders. First, the doctrine recognized in Abbott has only been exer-
cised in the context of a court’s ability to order a governmental entity to pay 
certain costs and resources and has never been used to justify any broad 
authority over that governmental entity, much less the entry of Shelby-style 
orders.264 Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court itself has admonished that 
this inherent power must be exercised conservatively and “only in those 
 
 261. See, e.g., Abbott v. Spencer, 302 Ark. 396, 398–99, 790 S.W.2d 171, 172 (1990); 
Venhaus v. State ex rel. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 28–29, 684 S.W.2d 252, 255 (1985); Turner Ex 
Parte, 40 Ark. 548, 551, 1883 WL 1184, at *2 (1883). Many courts have referred to this 
authority as the “inherent powers doctrine” based on the principles initially articulated in 
Turner Ex Parte in 1883. See, e.g., Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus, 
358 Ark. at 28–29, 684 S.W.2d at 255. Still other courts and commentators have described a 
related “inherent powers doctrine” regarding the judiciary’s authority to regulate the practice 
of law in Arkansas and elsewhere. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and 
Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 1 (1989). 
 262. Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398, 790 S.W.2d at 172 (citing Turner Ex Parte, 40 Ark. 548, 
1883 WL 1184); Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29, 684 S.W.2d at 255. 
 263. Briley, 366 Ark. at 507, 237 S.W.3d at 15 (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 264. See, e.g., Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172 (rejecting the application of 
the power because the issue did not relate to a failure to fund the court); Turner, 40 Ark. at 
551, 1883 WL 1184, at *1 (providing that a court had the authority to order another govern-
mental entity to pay the costs of a courthouse in which the court could operate). 
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areas that are vital for the proper functioning of a court.”265 Second, the doc-
trine is limited to only such orders that are necessary for the court to operate 
and not merely such things that would merely aid a court in carrying out its 
responsibilities.266 For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has twice re-
jected the authority of a circuit court to set the salaries to be paid by other 
governmental entities for court employees who aid the court in its operation 
where there was no showing that the court’s funding was so low that the 
court could not operate effectively.267 
A court’s limited power to order acts to be done that are necessary to 
the court’s operation, therefore, would not apply to save Shelby-style orders 
because such orders do not relate to paying costs or providing necessary 
resources such as court facilities. Rather, Shelby-style orders relate to the 
Department’s operations, not the court’s operations. In addition, despite 
Chief Justice Hannah’s assertion that a failure of the Department to perform 
its own obligations impacts the ability of a circuit court to fulfill its respon-
sibilities under the juvenile code, there has never been a showing that such 
failures of the Department rise to the level of preventing a court from oper-
ating. But even if they could, this article has already described how the cir-
cuit court’s contempt power and other remedial mechanisms available under 
the juvenile code would make the exercise of the power unnecessary be-
cause sufficient means exist to ensure that the Department fulfills its obliga-
tions.268 
b. The judiciary lacks a role in child-welfare proceedings that is 
constitutionally sufficient to support the Inherent Protection 
Power as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign 
immunity 
The Shelby Doctrine may survive if the judiciary has a constitutional 
role in child-welfare proceedings that would separately allow the broad In-
herent Protection Power asserted in Shelby to overcome the Department’s 
sovereign immunity as a new exception to the Department’s sovereign im-
munity or otherwise allow a circuit court to enter a Shelby-style order. Such 
a role is in fact presumed both implicitly in Chief Justice Hannah’s majority 
 
 265. State v. Post, 311 Ark. 510, 526, 845 S.W.2d 487, 495 (1993) (dissenting) (citing 
Turner Ex Parte, 40 Ark. 548, 1883 WL 1184). 
 266. See Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29, 
684 S.W.2d at 255. 
 267. Abbott, 302 Ark. at 398–99, 790 S.W.2d at 172; Venhaus, 285 Ark. at 28–29, 684 
S.W.2d at 255. 
 268. See supra Part III.B.2.a. But see Boyer, supra note 127, at 385–86 (arguing that 
juvenile courts must have the powers necessary to discharge their responsibilities effectively). 
2015] JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN CHILD WELFARE 463 
opinion in Shelby269 and explicitly in Chief Justice Hannah’s dissenting 
opinion in Briley.270 Chief Justice Hannah specifically argued in Briley that 
the judiciary has a duty and sufficient authority to participate in developing 
a compliant and proper “system” in child-welfare proceedings that would 
appropriately benefit juveniles in future cases. “Obviously,” Chief Justice 
Hannah wrote, “the circuit court was attempting to put in place a system 
designed to assure [the Department’s] performance in future cases, which 
benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction rather than just the 
child at issue in this case. This is the court’s duty.”271 
Neither Chief Justice Hannah’s majority opinion in Shelby nor his dis-
senting opinion in Briley, however, articulates a specific constitutional basis 
that authorizes such a role or otherwise overcomes the Department’s sover-
eign immunity. To the contrary, the responsibilities cited by Chief Justice 
Hannah are either statutory272 and, therefore, do not establish a constitution-
ally based role that would be sufficient to authorize a circuit court to violate 
the Department’s sovereign immunity, or, in the case of “the judiciary’s 
inherent obligation to serve justice,” are unsupported assertions of authority 
over the Department that have not been recognized as exceptions to the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine.273 Thus, although the juvenile code does impose 
certain responsibilities on circuit courts and generally “recognizes that the 
state has a responsibility to protect children from abuse and neglect by 
providing services and supports that promote the safety, permanency, and 
well-being of the children and families of Arkansas,” a circuit court’s re-
sponsibilities are merely statutory and, therefore, cannot overcome a consti-
tutional barrier like the Department’s sovereign immunity unless an appro-
priate exception applies.274 As described above, no such exception applies. 
This article therefore now turns to evaluate two possibly analogous cir-
cumstances that may support the entry of Shelby-style orders insofar as these 
circumstances have previously afforded a court with sufficient constitutional 
authority to control the operations of another branch of government. These 
circumstances include (1) the Lake View line of cases in which the Arkansas 
Supreme Court found that it had the authority to take active part in the de-
velopment of an appropriate educational system, and (2) the Angela R. line 
 
 269. See Ark. Dep’t Human Servs. v. Shelby, 2012 Ark. 54, at 3–5, 2012 WL 401615, at 
*4–5 (authorizing circuit courts to order systemic changes to the Department’s operations in 
order to “assure that necessary services are being delivered” in child-welfare proceedings). 
 270. Ark. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505–08, 237 S.W.3d 7, 
13–15 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 271. Id. at 506, 237 S.W.3d at 14. 
 272. See discussion supra Parts III.A, III.B.2.a. 
 273. See discussion supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.a. 
 274. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-301 to -367, 9-28-101 (Repl. 2009 & Supp. 
2013). 
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of cases in which federal courts became involved in the Department’s opera-
tions and imposed a “comprehensive revision of the child welfare sys-
tem.”275 
In the Lake View line of cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court authorized 
a system of compliance trials that afforded the judiciary with ongoing juris-
diction to actively take part in the development of an appropriate education-
al system based on the Arkansas Constitution’s mandate that “the State shall 
ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public 
schools.”276 Although Chief Justice Hannah’s dissent in Briley does not cite 
to the Lake View doctrine directly, it arguably does invoke the same concept 
of compliance trials authorized under Lake View. As Chief Justice Hannah 
argued in Briley, the circuit court had the authority to mandate the Depart-
ment to report to the circuit court the Department’s “fitness to perform [the 
Department’s] statutorily required function” in future cases—with the eval-
uation’s prospective application strongly echoing the authority recognized in 
the Lake View cases that a circuit court can actively participate in the ongo-
ing development of an appropriate educational system.277 
The Lake View line of cases, however, is based on a fundamentally dif-
ferent authority than the judiciary’s role in child-welfare proceedings pro-
vides precisely because of the specific—arguably tenuous278—constitutional 
basis relied on by the Arkansas Supreme Court in sanctioning the judiciary’s 
involvement in Arkansas’s educational system. Indeed, unlike the Arkansas 
Constitution’s multiple provisions related to the educational system,279 there 
is no current constitutional provision that relates to child-welfare proceed-
ings other than Amendment 67, which provides the General Assembly with 
exclusive authority to prescribe the judiciary’s jurisdiction in child-welfare 
proceedings.280 There is therefore simply no state constitutional basis to pro-
vide circuit courts with the authority to enter Shelby-style orders or other-
wise participate in Lake View-style compliance trials related to the pursuit of 
 
 275. See infra notes 276–84 and accompanying text. 
 276. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see Sharum, supra note 33, at 86–94; 
see also Bettina Brownstein, Lake View—A Roadmap for Asserting the Rights of Jailed 
Mentally Ill, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 525, 530–33 (2013) (describing the Lake View 
analysis for evaluating constitutional mandates on the state). 
 277. Compare Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 505, 508, 237 
S.W.3d 7, 14, 15 (2006), with Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 45–46, 
51–54, 79, 91 S.W.3d 472, 479, 482–85, 501 (2002), Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Hucka-
bee, 340 Ark. 481, 492–94, 10 S.W.3d 892, 899–900 (2000), and Sharum, supra note 33, at 
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 278. Sharum, supra note 33, at 90–93. 
 279. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV (the education article); id. amend. 11 (school tax); id. 
amend. 40 (school district tax); id. amend. 53 (free school system); id. amend. 74 (school tax, 
budget). 
 280. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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an appropriate child-welfare system—a fact that the Arkansas Supreme 
Court recognized in Walker when it rejected a broad role for the judiciary in 
the development of a constitutional child-welfare system and left “the matter 
of achieving a constitutional system to the legislature, the body equipped 
and designed to perform that function.”281 
Likewise, in the Angela R. line of cases federal courts became involved 
in the operation of the Department’s child-welfare operations after a class of 
plaintiffs commenced a civil rights case under section 1983 of the United 
States Code and alleged that Arkansas’s child-welfare system violated the 
constitutional and federal statutory rights of children.282 Specifically, the 
allegations were that the Department failed to investigate allegations of 
child abuse and neglect, failed to make reasonable efforts to keep families 
together, failed to provide adequate care for juveniles placed in foster 
homes, and failed to properly train foster parents.283 The parties in Angela R. 
ultimately settled the lawsuit with the adoption of a detailed settlement plan 
governing the Department’s child-welfare operations that was also later 
passed into law and ultimately enforceable through application to federal 
court as a consent decree.284 
 
 281. Walker v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 51, 722 S.W.2d 558, 562 
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364 Ark. at 420–27, 220 S.W.3d at 660–65 (Hannah, C.J., dissenting). 
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YOUTH L. NEWS, March/April 1992, available at http://www.parentsinaction.net/english/
ClassActions/ARK92.pdf. 
466 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Just as with Lake View, however, the Arkansas judiciary’s role in child-
welfare proceedings involves a fundamentally different assertion of authori-
ty than the authority relied on in the Angela R. line of cases that simply pro-
vides no applicable basis to sanction Shelby-style orders. Even if one ac-
cepts the Shelby Doctrine’s authority arguendo, the Arkansas judiciary’s 
role in child-welfare proceedings lacks the federal-law nexus relied on in 
Angela R. because the Arkansas judiciary’s role is entirely based on the stat-
utory and constitutional law of Arkansas.285 Likewise, the Shelby Doctrine 
lacks the adoption of any statutory authority or enforcement mechanism that 
allows for the enforcement of the “comprehensive revision of the child-
welfare system” at issue as a consent decree in Angela R.286 Federal courts 
have further recognized that federal courts should refrain from micromanag-
ing state agencies and involving themselves in purely state law issues.287 
For these reasons, the Inherent Protection Power should not be inter-
preted as creating a new exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity 
because the judiciary holds only a statutory role in child-welfare proceed-
ings. Circuit courts therefore lack a constitutionally sufficient role in child-
welfare proceedings sufficient to overcome a constitutional-level barrier 
such as the Department’s sovereign immunity and are, therefore, precluded 
from entering Shelby-style orders that seek to reduce a caseworker’s case-
load or otherwise dictate the Department’s internal operations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas’s child-welfare system is complicated and messy. As Justice 
Darrell Hickman observed, “[j]uveniles in trouble are one of the most seri-
ous concerns for our society, our government, and our judicial system. 
There are rarely quick, easy, clear answers in juvenile matters.”288 To make 
matters worse, nearly every resource in the child-welfare system—both na-
tionally and in Arkansas—is at its limit. In Arkansas’s 2013 state fiscal year, 
for example, there were only 1,193 foster homes available in the entire state 
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for the 7,700 juveniles who were in foster care during that time.289 Likewise, 
hundreds of caseworkers consistently struggle with caseloads well above 
recommended levels290 while being tasked with investigating 36,206 allega-
tions of child maltreatment and ensuring the safety and well being of more 
than 10,000 juveniles every month on an annual budget of only $47.5 mil-
lion. 
It is therefore little wonder that courts around the state become frustrat-
ed with the Department’s performance and look to see what they can do to 
help. And that is exactly what Judge Brown, an experienced juvenile judge, 
was attempting to do when he ordered the Department to fix the high case-
load issue that was preventing a caseworker from providing the services 
required in her case. Not surprisingly, all but one member of the majority in 
Shelby also had judicial experience in child-welfare proceedings as a juve-
nile judge or chancery judge and were likely familiar with the service and 
performance issues that arise in child-welfare proceedings and the resource 
limitations that Judge Brown was attempting to address.291 
But the Shelby Doctrine is not the solution. As this article has argued, 
the Shelby Doctrine is unconstitutional because it asserts that circuit courts 
have jurisdiction over juveniles in equity that the General Assembly has not 
provided by law, assumes authority outside the limited jurisdiction provided 
to courts in child-welfare proceedings under the juvenile code, and relies on 
a court’s equitable jurisdiction and “inherent authority” to authorize circuit 
courts to control the Department’s internal operations without the benefit of 
any recognized exception to the Department’s sovereign immunity. 
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The Shelby Doctrine is also symptomatic of the judiciary’s increasingly 
unconstitutional role in child-welfare proceedings. Although numerous ap-
pellate decisions recognize the limitations that the juvenile code imposes on 
the authority of circuit courts to act in child-welfare proceedings, the judici-
ary as a whole certainly believes it has a role in the development of an ap-
propriate child-welfare system,292 and juvenile judges around the state fre-
quently invoke the “best interests of the child” as a basis for broad authority 
to make orders and complex social-work decisions in child-welfare proceed-
ings—often regardless of the juvenile code. 
These courts, however, lack the constitutional and subject-matter com-
petency to assume such a role because Arkansas law provides that the De-
partment is the state actor charged with providing social work and develop-
ing case plans in child-welfare proceedings. Circuit courts are effectively 
limited to determining if a juvenile is dependent-neglected or otherwise in 
need of services under the juvenile code and, if so, then ordering limited 
“family services” based on the recommendations of the Department and 
other service providers.293 The only supervisory role that courts have under 
the juvenile code is to determine whether the Department’s social work ef-
forts have been reasonable and ensure the Department does what the juve-
nile code requires. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court must, therefore, repudiate the Shelby 
Doctrine because until it does so, the Shelby Doctrine will stand for the 
proposition that the judiciary can direct a state agency to comply with a giv-
en court’s determination of what that agency’s staffing, internal operations, 
or services should be. And given the Shelby Doctrine’s expansion of a 
court’s “inherent authority” and the Edmark line of cases, there is no rea-
soned basis why some form of the Shelby Doctrine could not be applied in 
other types of cases involving other state agencies. The child-welfare system 
may be only another step for the judiciary’s increasing role in public policy. 
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